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ACT- Adaptive Choice Task 
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CF- Cognitive Flexibility 
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This thesis aimed to address three key questions. Firstly, do character 
strengths enable people to broaden and build (Fredrickson, 2001)?  Secondly, 
can the operation of The Broaden and Build Hypothesis extend to include 
cognitive flexibility (CF; i.e., rather than lower level cognition; memory, 
attention etc.)? Thirdly, do simple character strengths-based interventions 
(character strengths general, and hope-specific) impact on cognitive flexibility?  
A mixed method approach was adopted to address these questions.  
Seven studies were conducted using both laboratory-based experiments and a 
naturalistic diary study methodology. A character strengths pseudo-intervention 
and novel hope-based goal-oriented intervention were designed and 
implemented, and their impact evaluated on three non-traditional measures of 
cognitive flexibility. 
Overall, evidence supported extension of the Broaden and Build 
Hypothesis, and subsequent impact on complex CF, via goal-oriented 
intervention use. Efficacy of goal-oriented intervention was supported by both 
qualitative and quantitative data. Quantitatively, hope was reliably increased 
and negativity decreased after reflecting on an achieved goal. Moreover, 
participants who reflected on goals were found to perform better on fluency 
tasks (i.e., Alternative Uses Task; Guildford et al, 1977), and predictive 
relationships were found between increased hope, and optimality measures 
within the Adaptive Choice Task (Irons & Leber, 2015). Qualitatively, goal-
reflection was considered to be an enjoyable activity (e.g., participants 
indicating continuing the activity post-study), enhancing wellbeing as 
determined by participants. Notably here, adoption of a mixed methods 
approach highlighted differences between qualitative and quantitative data 
strands, and improved holistic perspective enabled by their convergence. 
Implications of the findings include discussion around conceptualization of 
cognitive flexibility and operation of goal-oriented interventions, with future 
work suggested for the exploration of goal- setting and motivation, and 
potential distinction between simple and complex cognitive flexibility. 
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Chapter 1: Positive Psychology and Hope 
Positive Psychology: A Brief Overview 
 One of the strongest positions from which to advocate positive 
psychology (PP) is its provision of an alternative to a traditional focus of 
psychological research (i.e., abnormal behaviour/phenomena; Gillham & 
Seligman, 1999). While work on abnormal behaviour clearly benefits humans 
(i.e., via increased understanding/ therapeutic development), in contrast, PP 
allows for more direct understanding of the character strengths and elements 
of wellbeing and fulfilment that contribute to ‘everyday’ human behaviour 
(Gillham & Seligman, 1999; Seligman & Czikszentmihalyi, 2000). More 
importantly, PP explores these factors using a robust empirical research 
framework, whereas other related perspectives (i.e., the humanistic view, 
Robbins, 2008) are often critiqued for their lack of empirical evidence in theory 
development (Peterson & Seligman, 2004)1. In addition to this, experimental PP 
research has provided a new viewpoint on established cognitive domains, such 
as visual attention, memory, decision making and problem solving (i.e., 
Fredrickson, 2001; 2004). Even beyond the remit of psychological research, PP’s 
focus is echoed in societal change, such as governmental policy (Cabinet Office, 
2018), health care initiatives (“Wellbeing and mental health: Applying all our 
health”, 2019), and higher education (Williams et al., 2018). These policy 
stances evidence the scope of PP and the potential it holds for understanding 
everyday behaviour, happiness, and flourishment.  
The PP school emerged from the work a group of researchers whose 
main motivation was to explore human flourishing (see Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000 for a review). The intention was to present holistic 
understanding of human behaviour by exploring positive traits (e.g., character 
strengths) and experiences, and building positive infrastructure by enabling 
fulfilment and flourishment, both as a science and a wider society (Gillham & 
 
1 Although it is of note that this divide is disputed (e.g., see Waterman, 2013), with suggestions that PP and Humanism 
simply differ in their epistemological and ontological approaches 
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Seligman, 1999; Seligman, 2003). Indeed, their aim was not necessarily to 
consider the ‘extraordinary’ within, but instead “ordinary human strengths and 
virtues” (p. 216; Sheldon & King, 2001), and “…study of the conditions and 
processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, 
groups and institutions…” (p.104; Gable & Haidt, 2005).  
Although PP was established as a recognised field in the late 1990s, 
many of its fundamental concepts built on classic social psychology and 
humanism (i.e., personality, happiness; Diener, 2009; Robbins, 2008). An 
example of this is Maslow’s (1943) Hierarchy of Needs, which highlights the role 
of fulfilling basic human wants (e.g., hunger, sex, sleep) in order to achieve 
more ‘elevated’ aspects of life (e.g., rewarding relationships, creative pursuits, 
achieving potential). Maslow emphasizes self-actualization as the ultimate level 
of fulfilment, but that the striving towards this goal necessitates the 
achievement (and maintenance) of more basic needs, lower in the hierarchy. 
Furthermore, even when higher levels have been attained, environmental or 
circumstantial changes can return us to lower levels; reinforcing an idea of on-
going life-long striving. Interestingly, this also reflects the growth of PP in the 
face of increased longevity. As people are living longer, researchers aim to 
understand how this impacts on wellbeing (e.g., Steverink et al, 2005) and life-
satisfaction (Diener, 2009; Gum, 2017; Robbins, 2008).  
 PP has faced particular critique (see e.g., Gable & Haidt, 2005) on the 
implicit (and intuitive) assumption that everything not explicitly considered 
positive is therefore negative (Diener, 2009). While this is patently not true 
(e.g., persistence might be considered a virtue, yet persisting in spite of 
negative outcomes may instead be obstinate or stubborn) it has arguably 
created a more critical audience for the philosophical underpinning of PP (e.g., 
Miller, 2008). For example, an assumption that negative traits are overlooked or 
ignored fails to take PP’s overarching holistic approach into account that 
positive and negative traits are a duality and are equally fundamental to human 
nature (Seligman, 2003; Gable & Haidt, 2005). 
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A further point of criticism concerns the relevance of PP beyond the 
research domain. Specifically, there has been dispute over PP interventions and 
applications, in that these may have been ‘rushed’ into real-world operation, 
perhaps before there was sufficient evidence to support them (Diener, 2009; 
Seligman, et al, 2005). That said, it is possible to argue that the recent surge of 
PP research has effectively rectified this (Gallagher, 2017; Proctor, 2017). 
Key Concepts in Positive Psychology 
The Good, Pleasant, and Meaningful Life (Seligman, 2003) 
 A fundamental aim of PP is to understand the components of human 
motivation that enables the maintenance and increase of life-satisfaction (i.e., 
subjective wellbeing, balance between positive and negative affect; Linley et al, 
2009). Seligman (2003) postulates three types of ‘life’ that an individual might 
pursue in their search for happiness. For example, the good life incorporates 
eudaimonic principles (e.g., see Ryff & Singer, 2008 for a review), in that 
happiness stems from positive traits, talents, and virtues. Thus, an individual is 
happy when they can use these talents and strengths (see also flow, below). 
Similarly, the pleasant life suggests that happiness stems from a life of 
enjoyment (e.g., hedonism; physical and bodily comforts), or that an individual 
is able to appreciate positive aspects of everyday life. Finally, the meaningful life 
places more emphasis on finding authentic meaning in our existence, by 
applying our personal strengths and virtues (e.g., through the betterment of 
others) and potential transcendence beyond the individual (i.e., connection to 
‘something bigger’). 
Flow 
 Flow is a PP phenomenon that the general public has found particularly 
appealing2, entering discussions between experts and laypeople alike. Originally 
 
2 Relatively recently, a successful UK advertising campaign by Lucozade, encouraged the viewer to ‘Find 




conceptualized by Csikszentmihalyi, and subject to extensive exploration since 
the 1970’s (Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009), flow can be understood as an 
individual becoming completely absorbed in a moment. The focus is single-
minded, with a loss of awareness for anything beyond the current objective 
(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). Typically, the state of flow is associated 
with creative pursuits (e.g., art, writing), and requires a balance between 
challenge (or action opportunity) and skill (or action capability). If a given task 
does not meet this requirement, then the individual experiences anxiety or 
boredom instead, dependent on whether task demands exceed personal 
capacity or vice versa. Flow is associated with a loss of temporal experience, 
although there appears to be no ‘typical’ lengths of a flow state (Nakamura & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). Flow has been investigated in a variety of settings, such 
as how it fluctuates in relation to attaining different goals types (Schweickle et 
al, 2017), and at work (Salanova et al, 2006). Flow is intuitively a desirable state, 
and one that is pursued as being a route to living a meaningful and satisfying life 
(Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009), and therefore has sparked much focus 
(see Engeser, 2012 for a review). Flow has been associated with a variety of 
positive effects, including work satisfaction (Bryce & Haworth, 2002) and 
academic achievement (Heine, 1996). Furthermore, the ‘real-world’ applications 
of flow interventions have tangible benefits, including transforming failing 
workplaces (Marsh, 2006 cited in Nakamura & Csikszentmihalyi, 2009). 
The Broaden and Build Hypothesis 
 Arguably, Fredrickson’s (2001) work on the Broaden and Build 
Hypothesis (BBH) converges more effectively with more traditional aspects of 
psychology; specifically here, in exploring adaptive features of positivity. 
Notably, this theoretical framework contrasts strongly to behavioural features 
typically associated with adaptive behaviour (e.g., detection of negatively-
valenced stimuli/affect) particularly associated with fight or flight responses. 
These include the narrowing of attentional lens and attention to negative 
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stimuli, and the interpretation of ambiguous situations as negative (Fredrickson 
& Branigan, 2005).  
Conversely, positive affect has also been shown to have strong, 
potentially adaptive, value.  It can broaden our cognitive functions, including 
our thought-action repertoire (T-AR; which enables novel/creative responses to 
stimuli; Fredrickson, 2001), as well as enhancing more specific cognitive abilities 
(e.g., attention, visual search; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Isen, 1987). Lastly, 
this been connected with reduced in-group/out-group thought patterns, with 
participants demonstrating less own-race bias with positive mood induction 
(Johnson & Fredrickson, 2005).  
Overall, these behavioural benefits appear to be permanent, allowing the 
extended T-AR to be utilised in successively positive and divergent ways. In turn, 
this elicits more positive affect and further broadening, referred to as an 
upwards spiral (Fredrickson, 2001) in contrast to the familiar negative construct. 
Taken together these processes form the ‘broadening’ (i.e., increased cognitive 
resources) and ‘building’ (i.e., ability to actualise and use these resources) from 
which the framework was named. Taken to the extreme and considering long 
term implications, BBH can be considered equally as adaptive as fight or flight/ 
threat response behaviour (Cohn & Fredrickson, 2011).   
 Subtly different to the positive effects frequently associated with BBH 
(e.g., social cognition), Fredrickson also proposed a BBH mechanism coined the 
undoing effect (Fredrickson et al, 2003; Garland et al., 2010). Specifically, this 
suggests that positive affect may be able to counter the impact of negative 
stimuli/stressors. For example, in a physiological study Tugade and Fredrickson 
(2004) as a result of positive affect saw a reduction in the impact of negative 
stimuli on participants’ cardiovascular systems (e.g., less extreme reactivity to 
stimuli, more rapid return to baseline). Interestingly here, participants were 
able to draw positive meaning from their negative experiences, when asked to 
reflect on their coping with current problems (i.e., experiencing emotions such 
as eagerness or excitement as well as typical responses such as frustration). 
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Moreover, similar positive impact can be seen in other psychophysical 
responses. Cohen and Pressman’s (2006) positive patient sample reported less 
pain and increased efficacy in dealing with their symptoms than their negative 
counterparts.  
 An assumption we might make about increased positivity, is that this 
only arises via brief laboratory induction or spontaneous processes in the 
individual. However, the benefits of BBH enhancement can also be induced via 
formal therapeutic-style interventions (e.g., Fredrickson et al 2008). Here, the 
authors demonstrated that increased daily positive affect (elicited via 
meditation) was related to increased life-satisfaction, decreased depressive 
symptoms, and an increase in personal resources (e.g., mindfulness, social 
support).  
Character Strengths 
 As mentioned above, classification of positive individual differences (i.e., 
character strengths) has also become a focus of PP. Similarly to PP as a whole, 
this part of the literature does not seek to replace classic theory (e.g., 
personality theories such as The Big Five; Costa & McCrae, 1992), but instead 
aims for expanded, more holistic, understanding of the individual. In this 
instance, individual differences are not considered with neutral objectivity, 
applied universally on a continuum, or with the balance of positive and negative 
aspects (i.e., arguably a nomothetic trait approach). The assumption behind 
character strengths is that everyone possesses them (to a greater or lesser 
degree), but that individual differences reflect the strengths that are most 
important to each person (Peterson & Seligman, 2004). An individual will 
typically identify a smaller number of ‘signature strengths’, which more typically 
represent traits are particularly celebrated by that individual (Peterson & Park, 
2009). The most common strengths are kindness, fairness, authenticity, open-
mindedness, compared to the less common prudence, modesty, and self-
regulation (Peterson & Park, 2009). Character strengths remain positive 
regardless of how they are represented within an individual (i.e., low gratitude 
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does not necessarily indicate an ingrate). Rather, an individual showing high 
levels of a particular strength means they resonate with a classified archetypal 
behaviour (i.e., a signature strength of teamwork would be typified by an 
individual working well with and as part of teams).  
Intuitively, within the character strengths literature, we could assert that 
strengths are typically positively associated with affect; using our strengths 
elicits positive emotion. In fact, Harzer (2016) emphasized a high degree of 
shared variance between character strengths (especially emotional and 
interpersonal) and subjective wellbeing (i.e., the hedonic component of 
happiness), in his review, with robust correlations between strengths and 
positive affect per se. Overall then, while we can point to a substantial amount 
of overlap in everyday understanding of these constructs, as can be inferred by  
from their respective fields of research (e.g., CS; Park & Peterson, 2009; PA; 
Fredrickson & Losada, 2005), and linking of character strengths and positive 
affect in the technical literature (e.g., Güsewell & Ruch, 2012), we can still argue 
they are independent conceptually. 
Measuring Character Strengths 
Reflecting the drive to classify PP phenomena, Peterson and Seligman 
(2004) constructed a framework of 24-character strengths, based on individual 
difference traits (e.g., hope, cf practice or developed talents; Peterson & Park, 
2009). Subsequently, this classification system has been held to be robust, 
incorporating both empirical and theoretical literature on character strengths 
(e.g., hope: Snyder et al, 1991; gratitude: McCullogh et al, 2002).  More 
importantly, their framework has reflected differences in cultural and 
geographical values, organised under six over-arching themes (see Table 1 
below).  
The Values in Action Inventory of Strengths (VIA-IS; Peterson and 
Seligman, 2004) has been a popular measure of this framework; recent  
research developments  have led to reduction from 240 to 96 statements (VIA-
IS-M; McGrath, 2017). Participants rate their agreement with statements, using 
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a five-point Likert scale, scored against a list of most prominent to least 
prominent strengths (McGrath, 2017; Peterson & Park, 2009). The VIA-IS-M 
represents a gargantuan effort to produce a robust and reliable measure of 
character strengths, with a plethora of methodologies used (e.g., focus groups, 
interviews, content analysis of single-strengths measures; Peterson & Park, 





Table 1. List of the VIA-IS Six Themes, and the 24 Associated Character Strengths, 
adapted from the VIA-IS (Peterson & Seligman, 2004) 
Theme Related character strengths 
Wisdom and Knowledge: Cognitive 
strengths/ the acquisition and use of 
knowledge 
Creativity (originality, ingenuity) 
Curiosity (interest, novelty-seeking) 
Judgement (critical thinking) 
Love of Learning (mastery of new skills) 
Perspective (wisdom) 
Courage: Emotional strengths Bravery (valor) 
Perseverance (persistence, industriousness) 
Honesty (authenticity, integrity) 
Zest (Vitality, enthusiasm, vigor, energy) 
Humanity: Interpersonal strengths Love (valuing close relationships) 
Kindness (generosity, nurturance) 
Social Intelligence (emotional/personal 
intelligence) 
Justice: Civic strength for a healthy 
society/community 
Teamwork (Citizenship, social responsibility, 
loyalty) 
Fairness (treating people equally) 
Leadership 
Temperance: protection against excess Forgiveness 
Humility 
Prudence (careful in one’s actions and choices) 
Self-regulation (self-control) 
Transcendence: Connection to wider 
environment/universe 






(Adapted from the VIA-IS; Peterson & Seligman, 2004) 
Character Strength Research 
As classification and measurement of character strengths has been 
undertaken historically, recent research has focused on their behavioural 
28 
 
implications and how character strengths are represented differentially (see 
Heintz et al, 2019 for a review). Correlational research highlighted strengths 
such as hope, gratitude, and love were found to be associated with life-
satisfaction (Park et al, 2004), also including zest in younger populations 
(Peterson & Park, 2009). One particular focus has been character strengths in 
the workplace. For example, the strengths of hope, persistence, zest, and 
curiosity were associated with people having healthier work-related behaviour 
and experiences (Gander et al, 2012). 
After a focus on application, a natural avenue is the exploration of 
intervention and augmented benefit. In fact, recently, character strengths have 
been recognised as a key area of intervention development (Linley et al., 2007), 
particularly in schools (Linkins et al, 2015). This has led to a strong evidence 
base, demonstrating (inter alia) increased life-satisfaction following character 
strengths-based exercises (Proctor et al, 2011)  and increased social skills and 
engagement in schools (The Positive Psychology for Youth program; see Gillham 
& Seligman, 1999; Seligman et al, 2009). 
Importantly, while character strengths remain distinct within the 
literature (Niemiec, 2013), they reflect many core values of the field. For 
example, the life ‘styles’ identified by Seligman (2003; e.g., the good and 
meaningful lives) above, emphasize the role of an individual’s talents and/ or 
character strengths in gaining life-satisfaction and fulfilment. However, in turn, 
this highlights the other purposes character strengths might have- distinct 
within the literature or held in common with other PP constructs (i.e., long-term 
behavioural implications).  
A potential candidate for such commonality is the BBH (e.g., Fredrickson, 
2004, see above), according to which adaptive functions of positive affect are 
shown with benefits to the T-AR.  Character strengths, designated as positive 
individual differences (i.e., traits), illustrate how the BBH may extend beyond its 
current remit. At a basic level, individual traits may elicit the affect needed for 
BBH to actualise; thus, possessing a particular strength would provide that 
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individual with an adaptive advantage. Indeed, the predictiveness of character 
strengths, in some instances accounting for greater variance than positive affect 
per se, life-satisfaction, optimism, self-efficacy, and self-esteem (e.g., see  
Martínez-Martí and Ruch, 2016), suggests that they may play a more integral  
role than simply facilitating positive affect. Indeed, BBH serves as an example of 
how both PP, and its facets, are an integral field in understanding the long-term 
implications of positive affect and behaviour.  
Hope  
Hope can be understood as future-oriented thinking, specifically, the 
ability to successfully attain goals, with an emphasis on sustaining motivation 
and overcoming obstacles (see Callina et al, 2017 for an overview; Snyder et al., 
1991; Snyder et al, 2003).3 Goals are designated as targets set by an individual, 
reflecting  subjective ambitions/ aspirations, varying in duration (i.e., short, mid 
or long term), specificity, and meaning (Rand & Cheavens, 2009). 
According to the literature (e.g., Snyder et al., 1991, 2003; Rand & 
Cheavens, 2009) hope is formed from two distinct features; agency and 
pathways. Agency is broadly synonymous with motivation, enabling the 
individual to focus on attainment of a desired goal.  In contrast, pathways is 
specifically related to overcoming obstacles, and planning the most appropriate 
route needed to achieve the goal. Overall, neither aspect of hope is held to be 
more important (see Snyder above), however, an individual’s hopefulness is 
dependent on the interaction between the two. In other words, an individual 
with high hope will be able to plan a route to goal attainment effectively, 
adapting as necessary, and sustaining the necessary motivation. Persistence in 
pursuit of goals is sustained through goal appraisal and feedback (i.e., does the 
outcome remain the same/is it worth continuing?), allowing for an adaptive 
 
3 Hope and optimism are frequently used interchangeably (e.g., Peterson & Seligman, 2004). While these 
constructs are closely related, optimism is generally considered a dispositional outlook (i.e., rather than 
focus on goal actualisation and attainment) with an emphasis on future-oriented thinking, or that ‘good 
things will happen’ (Carver et al., 2009). While hope semantically appears similar, its behavioural 
implications (i.e., agency, pathway behaviour) highlight the difference, therefore the two constructs have 
been considered distinct for the purposes of this thesis.  
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response to any situational change. Agency and pathways also appear 
reciprocal, an increase in one indicating an increase in the other (Gallagher, 
2017). 
That said, hope is not necessarily a ‘permanent’ trait, contrasting the 
standard view of trait stability (e.g., consistent and reliable across environments 
and time). This makes intuitive sense, as failure to achieve goals would suggest 
a reduction of hope (Snyder et al., 2002).  However, initial development of hope 
emerges in childhood, with pathways ability increasing with knowledge of event 
causality and temporality (i.e.., cause and effect of events, temporal proximity). 
Further, agency ability develops as children learn they can potentially affect 
these events (Rand & Cheavens, 2009). Overall, the characteristic abilities and 
qualities comprising the hope construct develop as an individual recognises the 
achievement and satisfaction associated with goal attainment, and 
subsequently, pursue their next goal to reinforce these positive feelings. 
The prevalence of hope throughout history further signify its role in 
current research. Historically, hope has been a central concept in human society 
(e.g., inspiring art and literature), taking a fundamental place in religions such as 
the Abrahamic faiths (Selvam & Poulsom, 2012). Hope has also been considered 
a virtue to be cultivated and cherished in society (Callina et al., 2017; Gallagher, 
2017), with the work of some early psychotherapists (e.g., Tiger, 1979) 
advocating hope as a potent trait necessary for development. While some 
aspects of hope have waned in societal relevance, such as Pandora and her box 
of evils 4, it has inspired a plethora academic research.  
Finally, it is worth noting that since the inception of hope scales by 
Snyder in the early 1990s, some aspects of the theory and its application have 
been questioned. Aspinwall and Leaf (2002) highlight that hope is conceptually 
related to other constructs (e.g., self-efficacy, optimism), and this should be 
factored into our conceptualisation of hope. Moreover, Tong et al (2010) 
 
4 Although, the allegory remains a particular favourite of academics studying hope and is used frequently 
in literature reviews (e.g., Gallagher, 2017). While beyond the scope of the current thesis, that hope is the 
only ‘evil’ left in the box raises a philosophical question on inherent value of hope. 
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conducted a series of studies to better understand the agency- and pathway 
subscales. Through examining peoples’ understanding of hope as a concept, 
they found that only trait agency was positively associated with hope, not 
pathways. While they caution to not overstate their results, this does serve to 
highlight that hope- and positive psychology more generally, is a relatively new 
and dynamic field of study.   
Hope Research 
Hope in the Workplace. As with the more general construct of character 
strengths above, hope has been investigated in a variety of applied settings. In 
this literature, one focus has been strongly occupational in nature; hope has 
been associated with higher levels of better-quality workplace performance, 
particularly regarding effective goal-setting and pro-social behaviour (e.g., 
teamwork; Reichard et al, 2013). In addition, hope has been connected with 
flow (see Flow above) and passion in the workplace, with all three constructs 
significant predictors of workplace performance (Mouton, 2015; Mounton & 
Montijo, 2018. In turn, the experience of positive emotions increases levels of 
work-related hope (Ouweneel et al, 2012). 
Hope and Academic Achievement. However, the empirical literature has 
not only addressed implications of levels of workplace hope.  A wide range of 
research has highlighted the role hope can play in adolescent well-being, 
especially in academic settings (e.g., Day et al, 2010; Snyder et al., 2002). Here, 
hope correlates with academic achievement and predicts performance 
(specifically, reduction in drop-out rates, superior grades), even after controlling 
for intelligence, self-esteem, and previous academic performance (Snyder et al., 
2002). Moreover, evidence from longitudinal work  has shown hope to be the 
best predictor of grades and positive affect in high-school students (Ciarrochi et 
al, 2007), positive psychological well-being (Singh et al, 2012), and global life 
satisfaction (Gilman et al, 2006; see also Marques et al, 2013, for an 
examination of hope and spirituality in adolescents). As a whole, hope appears 
to be a unique predictor of academic performance, outperforming intelligence, 
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personality, and previous academic performance in accounting for variance 
(Day et al., 2010). 
Hope and Health. The scope of investigation into hope is not 
constrained to issues of human performance. As might be expected, there is an 
extended corpus that examines the impact on health, both mental and physical.  
Individuals with high levels of hope appear to cope with illness, injury, and 
sensory impairments more effectively (Jackson et al, 1998). In contrast to low 
hope individuals, pain was reported less frequently and less severely, and both 
effects have also been evident when translated to a non-medical context (e.g., 
cold-pressure tasks; Snyder et al., 2005; pain catastrophizing; Hood et al, 2012; 
Berg et al, 2008). Arguably then, these studies suggest a privileged position for 
hope in enabling better coping strategies for and tolerance of physical illness 
and pain.  
Alternatively, hope might be indicated as a mediating factor, rather than 
a causal mechanism in such effects. Thus, facilitation of resource-seeking and 
enhanced support networks may lead to more effective coping with physical 
stressors than hope per se (Rasmussen et al, 2018). This viewpoint is 
strengthened by the range of healthy behaviours attributed to individuals with 
higher levels of hope (e.g., decreased use of alcohol and tobacco; Berg et al, 
2011; healthier food choices; Nollen et al., 2008; Nothwehr et al, 2013; and 
increased physical activity; Berg et al., 2011; Nothwehr et al., 2013).   
In addition to such physical advantages, hope has also been associated 
with positive changes in mental health. Similarly to the medical context above,  
higher hope individuals are generally better at generating effective strategies to 
deal with stress (Snyder et al., 1991), rather than adopting the avoidance 
behaviours  associated  with lower levels of hope. Similar benefits have been 
seen with decreased symptoms of depression (see Alarcon et al, 2013 for a 
review).  In fact, evidence from eye-tracking indicates that this is also reflected 
in the allocation of attentional resources; higher hope participants focused less 
on dysphoric and threating stimuli (Kelberer et al, 2018). In turn, this was 
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highlighted as a potential mechanism by which individuals might reduce 
psychological distress- echoing the undoing effect postulated under the BBH 
(e.g., Fredrickson, 2001).  
Hope and Wellbeing. More intuitively, hope has also been connected 
with higher levels of positivity, specifically increased flourishing and well-being 
(Gallagher & Lopez, 2009). An association with higher levels of life-satisfaction, 
well-being, and perceived physical well-being (e.g., Wrobleski & Snyder, 2005; 
here in an adolescent sample). That said, beyond this intuitive relationship, 
there is evidence of a reciprocal mechanism, where goal orientation and 
attainment (as key components of hope) have been connected with increased 
happiness, and failed attainment with frustration and anger (Bagozzi & Pieters, 
1998). 
Hope Research in Summary. Taken as a whole, the behavioural, 
cognitive, and social benefits associated with higher levels of hope above 
suggest that this particular character strength confers potential evolutionary 
advantages. Overall, higher hope individuals are better able to cope with 
stressors (Jackson et al., 1998; Kelberer et al., 2018), make better decisions 
(Nothwehr et al., 2013), and interact more effectively with others (Reichard et 
al., 2013). Given these important benefits, it is not surprising that research 
focus has turned towards robust methods of increasing levels of hope in 
individuals and groups.  
Improving Hope 
 Collectively, PP interventions appear to be proliferating (see Proctor, 
2017). A recent meta-analysis on PP interventions assessed via randomised 
control trials (RCT) included 50 studies (Hendriks et al., 2019), not counting the 
plethora of other research which did not meet the analysis requirements (i.e., 
none RCT’s, interventions that focused on a single component such as 
forgiveness therapy). Looking more closely at hope-based interventions, these 
have been used extensively in therapeutic/clinical settings, with a clear ‘track 
record’ of increasing agency thinking (Cheavens et al, 2006; Klausner et al., 
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1998), self-esteem and life-satisfaction.  Generally, such interventions address 
the two facets of hope (i.e., agency and pathways) separately (Cheavens & 
Guter, 2017). For example, pathways tasks typically focus on goal-mapping (i.e., 
planning and adapting routes to goals), whereas agency interventions promote 
motivation, working to adjust the thought patterns needed to actualise goals. 
However, hope has also been considered more holistically, with interventions 
working on goal-setting behaviour (known as goal stretching or “goldilocks” 
goals; Pedrotti et al, 2008).  By encouraging individuals to set goals that 
challenge them, and promoting self-concordant (i.e., subjectively relevant) 
goals, we can facilitate development of hope- oriented thinking. In turn, this 
increases positive feedback, thereby reinforcing the positive feedback loop 
(Koestner et al, 2002). 
 Echoes of the humanistic school (i.e., teleological development and 
lifelong striving for self-actualization; e.g., Ryff & Singer, 2008) can be seen as 
hope interventions have also been used with participants at both ends of the 
lifespan. In educational settings, the Making Hope Happen Program worked 
with children over five weeks (Pedrotti, 2017; also see Pedrotti et al., 2008), in 
groups between eight to ten, each session lasting around 45 minutes; the 
children were paired up as ‘hope buddies’ and worked together to review 
progress after each session. The children were guided though activities such as 
The Hope Game where players needed to acquire both agency and pathways 
cards in order to progress, emphasising the necessity for both elements. 
Increased levels of overall hope (in addition to agency and pathways scales) 
were found by the end of the intervention measured using the Children’s Hope 
Scale (Snyder et al., 1997), and were also found to have been sustained six 
weeks later. Similarly, working with older adults (aged 55+), goal-focused group 
psychotherapy elicited improved goal-setting and actualisation behaviour 
(Klausner et al., 1998; also see Gum, 2017). Moreover, participants who 
received this goal-based therapy also increased in hope, and social functioning, 
while decreasing in hopelessness and anxiety. 
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 On the other hand, a meta-analysis by Weis and Speridakos (2011) has 
also highlighted variability in intervention effectiveness.  Out of the 27 studies 
included, seven represented single interaction programmes, with 19 multiple 
session interventions. Generally, hope levels appeared to increase more 
substantially (d = .40) if administered in a one-off session compared to multi-
session programs (d = .19). Further, laboratory setting returned larger increases 
(d = .39) than those dispensed in health settings (d = .18). However, the 
researchers also pointed to different samples ‘typically’ used in each setting 
(e.g., long-term interventions in clinical settings, with over-representation of 
special populations etc.); this may account for any disparity in findings.  
Measuring Hope  
General strength measures (e.g., VIA-IS-M; McGrath, 2017; Peterson & 
Park, 2009) can clearly be used to determine an individual’s levels of hope. 
However, as hope is one of 24 strengths measured, the test may lack the focus 
of a single-trait measure, and/or the data include an unacceptable level of 
noise. Notably, the VIA-IS measure also does not distinguish between state and 
trait hope. While these constructs are not unrelated, it is important to explore 
them individually, if our aim is to achieve a comprehensive understanding of 
this character strength.  
State hope (e.g., event-reactive and transitory hope levels), can be 
measured using the State Hope Scale (SHS; Snyder et al., 1996). The SHS 
consists of six items (i.e., three agency- and three pathways- related), with 
responses using an 8-point Likert scale (1 = Definitely false, 8 = Definitely true) 
and participant instructions to respond based on feelings ‘in that moment’. The 
SHS is considered highly reliable, with Cronbach’s alpha values ranging from .82 
to .95, with test-retest reliability of .80. 
Trait hope (i.e., dispositional, enduring levels of hope) can be measured 
using the Trait Hope Scale (THS; Snyder et al., 1991)5. The THS is also considered 
 
5 This measure is also referred to as the Adult Dispositional Hope Scale 
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highly reliable and replicable scale; values of Cronbach’s alpha ranged from .74 
to .84, with test-retest reliability of .80. The scale consists of 12 statements (i.e., 
four agency, four pathways, four distractor statements). As above, participants 
rate each statement using an 8-point Likert scale (1 = Definitely false, 8 = 
Definitely true). Both scales are well-regarded and regularly used in research 
(see Rose & Sieben, 2018). Further, they have been found to complement the 
VIA-IS-M classification, providing in-depth exploration that builds effectively on 
more general levels of examination.  
Moving Beyond the Research 
In summary, PP’s emphasis on human flourishing and fulfilment (e.g., 
achieving ‘The Good Life’; Peterson & Seligman, 2004) provides a strong base 
from which individual differences (e.g., adaptive behavioural traits) can be 
explored. This is especially highlighted by Frederickson’s work (e.g., BBH; 2001), 
indicating behavioural benefits to domains as diverse as cognition, social 
intelligence, and affect. The hope character strength itself is well-documented 
(e.g., see Snyder et al., 2005), and illustrates the potential link between this 
aspect of positivity and adaptive behaviours. However, an important question 
also emerges from this idea; why have such sophisticated (and potentially, 
‘elevated’- according to earlier schools of psychological thought; e.g., Maslow, 
1943) human behaviours become part of our everyday task-oriented behaviour?  
It seems a truism of evolutionary theory that such traits must have had 
some adaptive function, or exist as by-product of an adaptive behaviour 
(Badcock, 2003). Indeed, empirical support for the theoretical framework of PP 
indicates multiple connections to both psychological and physiological 
development (Fredrickson, 2001; Peterson & Seligman, 2004; Fredrickson & 
Losada, 2005) and on-going importance over the lifespan (Seligman, 2004). 
Thus, it seems feasible that such behaviourally-relevant strength traits might 
influence task performance more generally.  
Finally, with detailed review of character strengths, and a key aim of this 
thesis in mind (i.e., to develop and explore character strength-based 
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interventions), the connection between character strengths and positive affect 
must be acknowledged (e.g., Harzer, 2016; see Character Strengths above). In a 
pragmatic sense, character strengths and affect might be considered mutually 
faciliatory, with character strengths enabling positive affect and vice versa.  As 
such, any attempt to disentangle them via interventions or measures would be 
difficult. That said, character strengths and affect are conceptually distinct, with 
a wealth of literature and understanding dedicated to each field independently 
(e.g., McGrath, 2017; Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008, respectively). Importantly, 
disentangling these concepts is beyond the scope of this thesis. Thus, while this 
debate is acknowledged, moving forwards, character strengths and affect will 
be considered as distinct for the purpose of this work (and specifically, 
intervention development). 
Chapter two will explore the ‘umbrella’ construct of cognitive flexibility, 
its relationship with executive functions, and specific behaviour associated. In 
addition, the overarching, high-level cognitive ability explored above, will be 
used to illustrate how BBH may be extended beyond both simple positivity and 




Chapter 2: Flexible Thinking- What is Cognitive Flexibility? 
 The overarching aim of this thesis is to explore the adaptive functions of 
positive individual differences. Within the Positive Psychology literature, the BBH 
(Fredrickson, 2001; see Chapter 1) provides an effective framework for this 
exploration (i.e., enhanced cognition, behaviour, and thought-action repertoire; 
T-AR). However, although robust evidence supports the operation of the BBH 
(e.g., Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005), the definition of this general 
cognitive/behavioural improvement (i.e., enhanced T-AR; see Chapter 1) is 
limited, with no clear scope for which of cognition may be implicated. This 
chapter aims to fill this gap in our understanding by examining Cognitive 
Flexibility (CF); the ability to switch between mental processes quickly and 
effectively in order to behave appropriately in any given environment (Dajani & 
Uddin, 2015). Even by this brief definition, one can intuit an overlap between 
BBH and CF. By developing a more coherent understanding of CF, and the 
interplay between these two concepts, we can move beyond intuition, and 
provide a framework which can be explored in this thesis. 
CF will be explored in more depth below, with a view to providing a 
detailed insight into the associated behavioural and cognitive abilities involved. 
Firstly, I will review current understanding of the CF construct, including an 
overview of executive functions (EF) and how they relate theoretically and 
practically with CF. Next, I will explore more general CF research, other closely- 
linked cognitive constructs, and traditional measures of CF. Finally, I will distil 
these diverse ideas into a ‘working definition’ to enable its use as an effective 
‘vehicle’ to explore the operation of BBH and more specifically, character 
strengths; the literature surrounding CF is often inconsistent (and perhaps even 
confusing), and therefore will need to be consolidated in the development of a 
working definition.  
What do we know about CF? 
 In its most simplistic form, CF is part of everyday human behaviour, 
allowing an individual to reconfigure their thoughts and switch between tasks 
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(Braem & Egner, 2018). An (unfortunately) banal example of CF is organising 
laundry, switching focus between fabrics and colours to organise clothes, or even 
shape and size when pairing socks. Here, the individual is able to switch between 
behavioural responses, based on the changing stimuli in their environment (e.g., 
pairing the green socks, folding a shirt), whilst maintaining both a general task 
objective and specific task demands. 
The concept of CF has prompted much debate (see Diamond, 2013; Dick, 
2014; Gonzalez et al., 2013), with a more nuanced definition of the concept 
developing over the last 60 years. One of the earliest definitions from Scott 
(1962) focuses on a more ‘top-down’ approach to CF, connecting to an 
individual’s ‘concept system’ and its application to different environmental 
stimuli. Arguably, Scott uses a lexical approach (i.e., specifically Nations or 
Countries) and measures flexibility based on the ‘dimensional complexity’ of how 
meaningfully stimuli are grouped together (e.g., geography, name, political 
ideology). In contrast, Martin and Anderson (1998) understood CF as a general 
resource that an individual taps into at all times, allowing wider awareness of the 
behavioural options available and the capacity to act flexibly. Adding to the 
complexity of our understanding, Canas et al (2003) suggest CF can be cultivated. 
Children as young as three have engaged successfully with paradigms which test 
CF (Diamond, 2005) and demonstrated skills associated with this high-level set of 
cognitive abilities. More recently, CF has been presented as allowing an 
individual to adapt how they think about an item or concept (i.e., ‘lateral 
thinking’), maintaining the flexibility to adapt to a changing environment, and to 
think and act in more creative ways (Dreu et al., 2011).  
The Neuroscience of CF 
CF also spans into the field of neuroscience, with an emphasis on 
exploring brain regions associated with CF (see Barbey et al., 2013). For example, 
Dajani and Uddin (2015) suggest an interplay between nodes within the frontal 
and parietal cornices, nodes which are also typically associated with EFs such as 
WM and IC. Further, individual differences in CF have been shown to be 
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predicted by dopamine receptor levels in different brain regions (i.e., prefrontal 
cortex; Samanez-Larkin et al., 2013; see O’Reilly, 2013). While consideration of 
the minutiae of the neural networks involved in CF are beyond the scope of this 
thesis, the differences in developmental trajectories in different nodes (i.e., IC is 
developed as early as 12 months, compared to the continuing development of 
WM from toddler to early adult) suggest that CF starts to be seen in children as 
young as four years old.  
Moreover, Dajani and Uddin (2015) highlight the detrimental impact of 
neurodiversity and/or executive dysfunction (e.g., autistic spectrum disorder, 
obsessive-compulsive disorder) can have on CF, with neuroimaging studies 
underlining the differences in brain activation between neuro-diverse and neuro-
typical children (although there is very little agreement as of yet about the 
specifics of these differences). Interestingly, while neuroscience can offer some 
insight into the effect of brain impairment on CF, it has also had a profound 
effect on the typical method and measures used to assess CF, with many being 
designed specifically for use in clinical settings (see Typical measures of CF 
below). 
Conceptual issues   
At this point already, it is clear there are issues in conceptualizing CF in 
precise terms- and reaching a broad consensus. These issues will be explored in 
more detail below (see A Pragmatic View of CF), however, the general point is 
well illustrated by Koch et al’s (2018) review of CF research (specifically task-
switching) attempting more integrative and specific understanding of the 
concept. Koch et al argued that typical research approaches (e.g., focusing on 
cognitive structures or brain architecture) led to paradigmatic constraints (i.e., 
dual-task paradigms). In turn, they argue that this limits understanding, and 
impacts negatively on generalisability. They also assert the need for adoption of 
more comprehensive and integrative approaches, which acknowledge that any 
central CF mechanism encompasses a broad range of CF-related skills. 
41 
 
Braem and Egner (2018) challenge the traditionally conceptualized 
supervisory role of CF. They contest the view that CF is a mechanism via which all 
associated cognition and behaviour are ‘administered’ (e.g., Diamond, 2014). 
Instead, they posit that associative-learning mechanisms are more relevant to CF 
operation, and that contextual cues (specific stimuli in an environment e.g., 
differences faces; see Chiu & Egner, 2017) are downplayed in traditional models 
outlined above. In particular, they suggest more emphasis should be placed on 
the role of bottom-up environmental cues (e.g., colours, locations etc.,) in 
triggering CF processing. This approach would suggest that CF is domain- (or 
behaviourally-) specific. In more pragmatic terms, just because someone has 
learned to be cognitively flexible in one situation, does not necessarily mean this 
can be applied to other situations or environments.  
Regardless of our precise conceptualization of CF, much of the contention 
surrounding its treatment in the literature is its interconnectedness with other 
aspects of high-level cognitive functions. For example, this is characterized 
particularly strongly in the case of Executive Functions (EFs), as CF may be both 
the product of, and a facilitator for all EFs (Cañas et al., 2003; Diamond, 2005). In 
turn, this is reflected in CF measurement, which has documented the difficulty in 
separating CF from other higher cognitive processes (for EF specifically; i.e., Dick, 
2014; Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Miyake et al., 2000; see Traditional measures of 
CF below). Additionally, as EFs permeate much of the literature on higher-order 
cognitive functions, it is important to understand how these aspects relate to, 
overlap with, and are distinct from the ‘working definition’ of CF this chapter 
aims to provide. 
What are Executive Functions? 
Broadly speaking, EFs pertain to the ‘supervisory’ mental processes used 
when attending to, or concentrating on, stimuli (e.g., moving cognitive resources 
from one task to another; Diamond, 2013), rather than higher level processing 
(e.g., reasoning), or lower level cognitive functions (e.g., attention). EFs are 
distinct from automatic/intuitive attention which is habitual (i.e., subcortical 
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attention; Mangun et al., 1994); instead, effort is expended to attend to stimuli 
in a focused and deliberate way. In addition to attention, EFs are used to 
regulate and process information before selecting an appropriate behavioural 
response (Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000), for example, one might avoid repeating 
a current action, when a new one is needed to complete the current task 
(Diamond, 2013).  
The review literature (see e.g., Diamond, 2013; Jurado & Rosselli, 2007; 
Miyake et al., 2000) generally highlights two ways of categorising EF. The first can 
be labelled by cognitive function alone (i.e., updating, switching, and inhibition; 
Diamond, 2013), with the second indicating cognitive constructs, or what might 
be considered an ‘applied’ version of the first set of functions (i.e., Working 
Memory, Inhibitory Control, Task Switching; Miyake et al., 2000). For the 
purposes of this chapter, the focus will be on the second approach, cognitive 
constructs.  Primarily, this is because the original BBH research corpus is loosely 
aligned with this approach (although not necessarily by name; see Chapter 1). 
However, this is not to dismiss the depth of the theoretical debate in the 
literature.  The second reason for adopting this focus is simple convenience, 
given that this thesis is not based on EF research, nor is detailed exploration of 
these points particularly constructive for gaining clear understanding.  To this 
end, Figure 1 below highlights the EF construct hierarchy suggested by Diamond 
(2013); note that CF is depicted as central, connecting the core and higher 
functions. Additionally, task-switching has been added, to reflect its prominence 




Figure 1. Diagram of Executive Functions and their hypothesised interconnectivity, 
adapted from Diamond (2013) 
Inhibitory Control  
Inhibitory Control (IC) can be understood as the capacity to control 
responses (e.g., behaviour, thoughts, affect) to stimuli and enable an individual 
to act with agency rather than by impulse or with habitual responses (Miyake et 
al., 2000). This functionality allows people to think and act deliberately, choosing 
their response to allow for flexibility in any given scenario (Verbruggen & Logan, 
2008). Coming back to our laundry example, an individual can focus on selecting 
dark-coloured items only, while ignoring lighter ones (i.e., selective attention; 
Theeuwes, 2010). Here, the individual is able to ‘inhibit’ selecting the other type 
of clothing. However, IC is limited, and stimuli personally relevant to the 
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individual (e.g., a particularly smelly light-coloured sock) may force attention, or 
an impulsive reaction (i.e., involuntary attention; Theeuwes, 2010), therefore 
overwhelming IC. 
The applications of IC also extend across sensory modalities and function. 
For example, IC may enable individuals to control thoughts, and purposefully 
suppress memories they no longer want recall (Anderson & Green, 2001; 
Anderson & Levy, 2009; Diamond, 2013). Furthermore, inhibition can be applied 
to impulsive behaviour (i.e., self-control; Diamond, 2013; cf Fujita, 2011), a 
person inhibits by resisting temptation (e.g., to overindulge, to react to another’s 
behaviour). Self-control enables the individual to stay focused and avoid 
distractions, allowing time to think and adhere to social norms (Diamond, 2013), 
echoing the control displayed in attentional inhibition above. However, it is 
important to note that the constructs are distinct, and self-control extends 
beyond simple impulse inhibition (Fujita, 2011). In addition, within the PP 
literature, self-control has also recently been classified as central virtue, 
applicable as a concept across cultures (see McGrath, 2015). 
 Moreover, the various cognitive and behavioural functions of IC (e.g., 
inhibiting attention, and inhibiting action) have been found to correlate strongly, 
supporting the theoretical assertion of an underlying central mechanism, which 
underpins the disparate aspects of inhibition (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Miyake 
& Friedman, 2012). Finally, IC has been tested in laboratory settings using well-
established paradigms, such as the Stroop task (MacLeod, 1992; Stroop, 1935), 
the Flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Sanders & Lamers, 2002), and the 
Go/No-Go task (Verbruggen & Logan, 2008).  
Working Memory (WM) 
Working Memory (WM) is also considered a core EF (see Figure 1; also 
see Diamond, 2013; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), and is conceptualised as the 
ability to keep information ‘active in the mind’ (see Baddeley, 2010 for a review). 
WM enables individuals to retain information, beyond any perceptual cue, and 
work with, update, or otherwise manipulate that information.  A typical example 
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of WM (applied in mathematics, for example) is keeping a formula in mind, while 
using that formula to solve a problem. The point is not necessarily to commit the 
formula to memory, but instead to use and manipulate that information.  
Baddeley (2010) posits WM to be comprised of three main components: 
the central executive, the articulatory loop, and the visual-spatial scratch pad 
(see Figure 2). The articulatory loop and visual-spatial scratch pad process 
auditory and visual information respectively; however, the central executive is 
the main architect and the ‘cognitive space’ in which WM takes place (Baddeley, 
2010; Caplan & Waters, 1999).  The interaction of these three components (and 
their respective cognitive resource demand) have been shown in a variety of 
empirical studies (e.g., Meyer et al., 2010; Robbins et al., 1996; Vandierendonck 
et al., 2004). For instance, Robbins et al (1996) asked participants to select chess 
moves while performing one of three additional tasks (i.e., to engage one of the 
WM components). Experimental groups were instructed to either: 1) generate 
random numbers (central executive engagement), 2) press flashing keys (visuo-
spatial sketchpad engagement), or 3) rapidly repeat a word (phonological loop 
engagement). The quality of the chess moves was highest for the third group 
(and comparable between the other two groups); the phonological loop is the 
only component not required to formulate chess moves.  
Notably, move quality showed equivalent impairment (i.e., in line with 
increasing resource demand) across all conditions, suggesting similar effects on 
WM regardless of underlying individual differences (e.g., chess expertise). This 
breadth of impact on performance is echoed in the range of contexts to which 
phenomena can be applied. These include mathematics, problem solving, 
creativity, and reasoning (Baddeley, 2010; Miyake et al., 2000); diverse in terms 
of their meaning to/use by the individual, but similar in their cognitive 
complexity and requirement for flexibility. Thus, WM allows an individual to 
consider information and parse out the connection with other known things 





Figure 2. Diagram of the multicomponent WM model adapted from Baddeley (2010) 
As with IC, development of the WM research has prompted the 
emergence of a number of paradigms, which have become characteristically 
linked to the construct. For example, these types of WM measures comprise 
visuo-spatial reasoning tasks, such as the Corsi Block task (Kessels et al., 2000) in 
which participants have to copy the order of a series of blocks being touched by 






Figure 3. A typical corsi-block task adapted from Kessels et al (2000). Blocks are tapped 
in ascending numerical order 
Task Switching 
 In many models of EF (e.g., Miyake et al, 2000), task switching (TS) can 
also be considered core, although notably this is not the case for the Diamond 
(2014) model.  Even in its simplest form, TS involves all three of the Miyake et al. 
functions (2000; i.e., monitoring, updating, shifting), as it comprises the effortful 
shift of cognitive resources from one cognitive task to another, following some 
kind of ongoing scrutiny process (i.e., to evaluate when the shift needs to be 
made). However, whatever consensus there is as to what the TS processing 
entails (e.g., Monsell, 2003) similar levels of theoretical debate exist within the 
literature as with other EFs, and it is important to acknowledge that this 
discussion is beyond the remit of this chapter.  
In practical terms, when individuals perform specific tasks, they have an a 
priori understanding of the necessary procedural operations (i.e., a cognitive 
task-set). Thus, while there may be several behavioural options, the individual 
intentionally implements the appropriate task set (Monsell, 2003), potentially 
involving a shift of cognitive resources from one set to another. For example, 
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when a phone rings, I can allocate resources to this set and answer the call (i.e., 
switch to task set 2), but I could also inhibit attention to the sound and continue 
with my current task (task set 1). Each of these alternative responses are 
triggered by external stimuli (here, the phone ringing).  
Individual differences have been associated with TS abilities in several 
studies. For example,  video game experience was linked to improved 
performance on a TS paradigm (Strobach et al., 2012). Moreover, non-
experienced video gamers also improved in TS performance after video game 
practice. Here, the authors linked video games as mimicking the ‘real-world’ 
applications of EF such as TS. Similarly, TS training has been found to improve the 
switch-cost detailed above (Karbach & Kray, 2009). Building on this research, 
Pereg et al (2013) posited a connection with WM, and concluded that a central 
EF mechanism (connecting both TS and WM) was actually improved, rather than 
TS itself. TS has also been studied across the lifespan, and both younger children 
and older adults incurred larger switch costs than the average participant 
(Cepeda et al., 2001). Moreover, it was found that all participants switch costs 
improved with practice, and that older adults/younger children particularly 
benefited from increased preparation time (i.e., performance increase when 
responses were cued).  
Paradigms that use task-switching (e.g., continuous alternation tasks; see 
Gopher et al, 2000) typically require participants to shift between two or more 
different behavioural responses, deliberately pivoting away from the initial task-
set, orientating to another and thereby employing CF. For example, the figure 
matching task (Ellefson et al, 2006; Ellefson et al, 2017) requires participants to 
switch response to a target (i.e., sort by shape or colour) when instructed. 
Switches occurred using an alternating runs design (Rogers & Monsell, 1995), 
meaning participants eithers had to repeat the behavioural response of the 
previous trial, or switch to the alternative.  
Connecting the Core Functions. Diamond (2013) highlights a debate 
regarding just how separate WM and IC are, positing a central mechanism rather 
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than individual functioning constructs. Moreover, evidence continues to highlight 
the interconnectedness of EF (i.e., WM improved with TS training; Pereg et al, 
2013). Evidence for a potential central mechanism derives from the difficulty in 
parsing out and testing each component individually in research (e.g., see Liv, 
2015). Regardless of the debate, IC supports WM by preventing an individual 
from being overloaded (Duncan et al., 2008); an excess of information can flood 
the WM (as in the chess example above; Robbins et al, 1996) and IC may 
prevents this. The supportive relationship between the core EF’s is also 
demonstrated by their ability to feed into, and enable higher order functions, as 
detailed below. 
Other Higher Order Cognitive Functions 
As highlighted in Figure 1, these higher order aspects of EF (e.g., 
executive attention, fluid intelligence) are built from the core functions discussed 
above. These higher functions are typically considered as goal-directed (i.e., 
planning, reasoning, adapting; Collins & Koechlin, 2012; Schmidt, 2003), enabling 
more agency, and deliberate choices (Diamond, 2013).  
Executive Attention (EA). Also referred to as metacognition, is a 
mediator, or monitor of lower cognitive functions (e.g., sensory/perceptual 
processes; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000). Further, while EA can be included in 
models of EF (as in Figure 1 above), it can also be considered a component of 
other higher order functions (e.g., knowing what stimuli to attend). The 
divergence in specifying a definition EA is reflected in the variety of descriptors 
used in relation to this function (or those that demonstrate considerable overlap 
in their operation). For example, EA may operate alongside IC (e.g., Theeuwes, 
2010) by highlighting what needs to be inhibited, or metacognition (e.g., 
Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000) by spotlighting what else an individual should be 
aware of.  
Taken as a whole, EA can be considered akin to top-down regulation of 
attention (i.e., endogenous control of attention; Diamond, 2013; Rogers & 
Monsell, 1995). Simply put, EA may orient conscious awareness towards stimuli, 
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where internalized goals, expectations and previous experience drive the 
process. This is in contrast to exogenous attention in which attention is drawn 
automatically to a given stimulus, largely due to its inherent sensory features 
(e.g., luminance, colour, onset etc; Theeuwes, 2010). Further, EA has been 
indicated as the supervisory component of WM, managing its overall capacity 
(i.e., by maintaining attentional control of the processing; Engle, 2002). 
  In summary, EA appears to enable processing of lower-order cognitive 
input necessary for higher-order function, allowing an individual to focus on the 
resource demands of novel and complex tasks (e.g., problem solving and decision 
making; Fernandez-Duque et al., 2000).  In relation to non-cognitive behaviour, 
EA can also play a role in aspects of ‘self-control’ mechanisms mentioned above 
(i.e., IC). For example, EA can facilitate the response regulation and moderation 
pertinent in conflict situations (Holmboe & Johnson, 2005). In other words, by 
controlling access to emotional thoughts and behavioural impulses, 
inappropriate and socially-undesirable responses can be avoided (Rueda et al., 
2012). 
Fluid Intelligence. The intelligence literature is vast, closely mirroring the 
contemporary societal norms and priorities through psychology’s development 
as a scientific endeavour (Au et al, 2015). It can also be a hugely inflammatory 
topic (e.g., ‘The Bell Curve’; Hernstein & Murray 1994), tapping into prejudices 
and practices (see Hall, 2002 for a review of its continued impact on scientific 
processes). Even when potentially harmful opinions and values are constrained, 
the way we define and categorise individuals by intelligence can have 
considerable impact on almost every other aspect of their lives (e.g., education, 
occupation, social capital, self-development opportunities etc). Despite the 
relevance of intelligence to the topic of this chapter (i.e., cognitive ability, or 
speed of processing is associated with intelligence; Kail, 2000), and its traditional 
inclusion in Individual Differences curricula, intelligence is specifically relevant to 
this discussion in its fluid form (see e.g., Cattell, 1963; or Schweizer & Koch, 2002 
for a more recent review).  
51 
 
  Fluid intelligence relates to an individual’s ability to recognise patterns, 
reason, and solve problems (see Au et al., 2015 for a review), and particularly in 
relation to novel situations (i.e., without prior experience/ context to help).   
Beyond theory, fluid intelligence has also been found to be related to enhanced 
academic achievement and is considered to be a highly heritable trait (Hayes et 
al., 2015). Further, fluid intelligence has been found to be highly correlated with 
EFs (Roca et al., 2010), and especially WM, given the shared imperative of 
maintaining information as well as monitoring it for relevance, before 
completion of task processing/performance (Kane et al., 2005). Jaeggi et al 
(2008) showed that general EF training related to improvements in fluid 
intelligence, and in turn, increased training led to increased improvements. 
However, although implications of this study were interesting (i.e., suggesting a 
deeper interconnectivity between higher order cognitive processes), the findings 
were controversial (Hayes et al., 2015), with little success in replication.  
Divergent Thinking. This aspect of higher-order cognition may possibly be 
the phenomenon most readily recognized by the general public, and outside the 
scientific domain. Proclaimed to be one of the key competencies of the 21st 
century, due to its increasing cultural value in rapidly-hanging societies (Ritter 
and Mostert, 2017), divergent thinking can be considered as the ability to 
generate novel ideas. In turn, this has particular focus on the originality and 
usefulness of those ideas (Ritter and Ferguson, 2017).  
Most frequently, divergent thinking is applied in situations that typically 
require creativity, and is therefore considered an indicator of creativity (Runco 
and Asar, 212). Indeed, research has identified divergent thinking as having 
unique effects on creative problem solving (i.e., better quality, more original) 
that cannot otherwise be attributed to intelligence or expertise (Vincent et al., 
2002). More recently Silvia et al (2008) used an alternative method of assessing 
divergent thinking. Rather than using frequency of responses to indicate 
uniqueness, they instead asked participants to nominate their own most creative 
response after the divergent thinking task. Interestingly, Silvia et al also found 
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evidence to connect the level of divergent thinking with ‘higher-order’ individual 
differences (e.g., in their terminology, ‘plasticity’). 
Finally, divergent thinking is highly correlated with the other aspects of 
cognition described above (e.g., fluid intelligence; Benedek et al., 2014). This 
relationship is also reflected in the overlap between measures of divergent 
thinking and CF tasks (e.g., fluency tasks, Guildford et al, 1978; see below). 
Bringing these aspects of higher order cognitive functions together, paired with 
the EFs outlined above, the range and interconnectedness of CF mechanisms is 
abundantly clear. 
Where Does This Leave Our Understanding Of CF: An Umbrella Term? 
While these aspects of higher cognitive abilities are clearly not an 
exhaustive list, they enable more ‘expansive’ abstract processing and, less 
‘prescriptive’ cognition. Thinking specifically about EFs, their interconnectedness 
(and overlapping concepts directly linked with CF) are apparent, with common 
themes (i.e., adaptive function, novel and complex reasoning etc.,) evident 
throughout the theoretical framework. However, as outlined above, the aim here 
is not to provide systematic review of EF literature, but rather to explore the 
breadth of work overlapping with our ideas of what CF represents. Therefore, 
despite the evident depth and breadth of work on EF, from this point, CF will be 
used as an umbrella term to reflect these sophisticated mechanisms and 
phenomena that indicate adaptive cognition.  
Regardless of the precise structure of CF, or its relation to specific neuro-
architecture, the literature, as a whole, highlights a number of the debates in 
working in such a broad and complex field. This is also reflected in the methods 
through which CF is assessed and measured. Below, several examples of CF 
research will be explored, reviewing in particular their application to factors such 
as wellbeing, mindfulness, and social flexibility (i.e., coping with, and adapting to 
changes in social environments Muyan-Yilik & Demir, 2019). In addition, some 
common measures of CF will be reviewed, in order to establish how these may fit 
with the research needs of this thesis’ empirical work.   
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A Pragmatic View of CF: Behaviour, Measures, and Applications 
Behaviour Associated with CF 
Other than its conceptual interconnectedness with higher order 
cognition, CF has also been linked with a range of other constructs and 
behaviours. For example, Koesten et al. (2009) investigated CF as a mediating 
factor in wellbeing for young adults, with higher CF indicating more effective 
communication methods. Specifically, in more expressive families (i.e., an 
environment actively cultivating expression/openness), young adults were more 
likely to have higher levels of CF; environments characterized by conflict 
avoidance and expression suppression negative predicted CF levels. In turn, this 
was suggested to arise from affirming and flexible communication, where 
competing ideas and explanations were promoted. In addition, the authors 
suggested that CF flourishes in such environments, as individuals learn improved 
stress coping, management of multiple stimuli, improved perspective-taking, 
creating a cyclical process feeding back into enhanced CF and wellbeing (or at 
least, indicating a reciprocal dynamic between these factors).  
 CF has also been linked more directly into wellbeing facilitation, 
specifically mindfulness and meditation practices. In a Stroop task, Moore and 
Malinoswki (2009) compared between groups of experienced and inexperienced 
meditators. Here, CF was related positively to meditation experience; 
participants familiar with meditation were able to inhibit incorrect Stroop task 
responses more effectively, maintaining focus of attention over a longer period 
of time. Similarly, CF was positively associated with self-compassion, and 
negatively associated with dogmatism (i.e., a lack of open-mindedness; Martin et 
al., 2011). In fact, from the perspective of a lay person, a connection between CF 
and mindfulness might be asserted. CF may be understood as active, deliberate 
cognition (i.e., not impulsive behaviour), in turn, mindfulness seeks to minimise 
impact of distractions in a self-aware, purposeful manner.  
Beyond effortful and deliberate actions (e.g., meditation), enhanced CF 
has also been explored in relation to socially-flexible behaviour (i.e., coping with 
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and regulating ones social environment, and interactions). A recent study 
(Muyan-Yilik & Demir, 2019) investigated coping strategies (together with CF and 
dispositional hope), aiming to understand how these factors influence wellbeing. 
Contrary to previous research (e.g., Martin et al., 2011), there was no support for 
relationships between either CF or coping and wellbeing.  However dispositional 
hope, stress avoidance (cf Koesten et al., 2009), and social support-seeking traits 
(e.g., finding another to help with distress or stress) did predict wellbeing. These 
contradictory findings may be attributable to limitations in the study design; all 
traits were measured by questionnaires only, and therefore subject to typical 
limitations of self-report (e.g., social disability). Similarly, Yu and Lee (2017) 
found a complex relationship between baseline participant hopelessness and CF. 
Specifically, hopelessness was negatively associated with CF, although this 
association disappears when hopelessness is at a low level.  
Conversely, a number of classic cognition studies have highlighted that CF 
may incurs behavioural/performance costs. For example, Rogers and Monsell 
(1995) showed a reliable ability to switch between cognitive tasks (switching 
between responding to numbers or letters; see Task Switching above) in their 
participants, but at a cost to response latency and accuracy (often combined to 
create an efficiency score; see e.g., Ellefson et al, 2006). Additionally, they specify 
that while participants were able to manage both cognitive tasks effectively, the 
cost was incurred only when they were required to switch. Thus, it is the act of 
task-switching that causes the cost, not the cognitive activity per se. 
Interestingly, this cost was mitigated to some extent when participants were able 
to prepare for the switch, highlighting a possibility to ‘manipulate’ (or improve) 
performance with improved CF (Monsell, 2003) via training or naturally occurring 
individual difference. 
Traditional Measures of CF 
As is hopefully clear by this stage, CF as a concept has been investigated 
in a broad range of fields. Therefore, by extension, a ‘bank’ of paradigms and 
procedures have been developed to measure CF, most typically with a view to 
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measuring impaired or lower CF (in individual difference or neuropsychological 
contexts; e.g., The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task).  
Behavioural Tasks. The Trail Making Test (TMT; Army Individual Test 
Battery, 1944, for a review see e.g., Kortte et al., 2002; Sánchez-Cubillo et al., 
2009) is a visual attention and task switching test designed to measure CF. 
Generally used as a neuropsychological assessment of brain damage, the task 
involves two parts. Part A requires participants to connect a series of circles 
numbered 1-25 in ascending numerical order, while part B incorporates letters 
(e.g., 1-A-2-B-3-C etc.,) and is used as the more direct measure of CF (see Figure 
4 below). Specifically, a participant indicates lower levels of CF if they perform 
worse on Part B, as they are unable to switch between differing target types (i.e., 
cognitive sets, See Task Switching Section). Performance is evaluated via task 
completion (i.e., Part B, mean performance = 75s for ‘normal’ participants, and > 
273s for cognitively impaired participants). However, the TMT has been criticised 
for the lack of precision on its construct validity (Sánchez-Cubillo et al., 2009), 
with evidence to suggest that Part B measures WM more closely (i.e., 
manipulating information in mind).  
 
Figure 4. Simplified example of part A and B of the TMT 
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The Wisconsin Card Sorting Task (WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948) assesses CF 
in task switching (for reviews see e.g., Monchi et al., 2001; Nyhus & Barceló, 
2009). Echoing TMT, the WCST was developed to assess cognitive deficit 
(typically as a result of brain damage). The task requires participants to match 
cards based on colour, shape, or number to reference cards, to establish the 
‘correct rules’ of how the cards a classified (i.e., these are not made explicit). 
Participants receive feedback after each trial (i.e., if they have used the correct 
classification), and the classification rule is also changed after ten trials. Thus, CF 
is measured by a participants’ ability to identify the classification rule, and adapt 
(or ‘set-shift’) when the rule is changed. Scores are based on total number of 
errors, with sub-categories of perseveration (i.e., applying incorrect classification 
error), and non-perseveration errors (e.g., genuine mistakes). The WCST is used 
specifically to assess prefrontal brain function, with some debate about its 
specificity to this region (e.g., Nyhus & Barceló, 2009). Taken as a whole, this 
reinforces the role of the WCST as a neuropsychological tool, rather than a 
technical assessment of CF per se.  
 
Figure 5. Example of a WCST trial, adapted from Monchi et al, (2001). The ‘test card’ 
(one blue star) has three potential matches: Number (black triangle), Shape (green 
stars), and Colour (blue crosses) 
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Gonzalez et al., (2013) built on TMT, WCST, and Figueroa & Youmans’ 
2012 ‘clock task’ (designed to assess vigilance)6, in order to address some of the 
limitations of previous measures (e.g., simple dependent variables limiting the 
scope of the application). The puzzle task developed by Gonzalez et al. required 
participants to ‘move’ through a grid of tiles, each containing a figure with a 
specific colour, shape, and background colour. As with the WCST, participants 
needed to match their next choice with an undisclosed ‘rule’ (i.e., shape, 
background colour, shape colour). Similarly, the rule (i.e., to identify the correct 
choice) changed at random intervals. Participants were provided with practice 
trials before completing the task. Gonzalez et al. found that this measure 
correlated strongly with TMT performance, although not with self-report 
measures of CF (e.g., Cognitive Flexibility Scale; see CF Questionnaires below). 
Thus, the puzzle task was asserted to be an effective way to assess individual 
differences in CF, specifically in context of its application to human-computer 
interaction (HCI; e.g., how people interface with computers). 
The inception of the tasks above were developed for application in 
clinical settings, with the intention of identifying CF impairment (e.g., 
perseveration). Intuitively, this may indicate that well-established CF measures 
may not adequately gauge increase in CF, especially when considering 
enhancement beyond baseline/ typical CF performance. For example, evaluation 
of the tasks outlined above and their basis in neuropsychology research (e.g., 
Sánchez-Cubillo et al., 2009), suggests they may be grounded more in 
perseverance function than CF per se (Gonzalez et al., 2013). Ongoing 
perseveration (i.e., when stimuli should provoke a change in behaviour) has been 
connected with specific CF deficit; indeed, CF and perseveration could be 
considered antithetical (Youmans et al., 2011). However, measures that more 
intuitively allow for assessment of enhanced CF (e.g., questionnaires) do not 
typically correlate with traditional behavioural measures (Gonzalez et al., 2013). 
That said, self-response questionnaires (e.g., Cognitive Flexibility Scale) may take 
 




account of the more positive effects of CF (i.e., problem solving, decision making, 
creativity). 
CF Questionnaires. Generally, CF questionnaires are broader and provide 
a more general insight into related behaviour (i.e., communication flexibility and 
attribution style; see e.g., Martin & Rubin, 1995; Peterson et al., 1982), asking 
participants to self-identify CF related traits (e.g., creativity, adapting to new 
situations). The Cognitive Flexibility Scale (CFS; Martin & Rubin, 1995) was 
designed for determining levels of CF, measuring an individual’s awareness and 
willingness to adapt in any given situation, as well as their underlying self-
efficacy in that flexibility. The scale has 12 items (e.g., “I can communicate an 
idea in many different ways”, “ I am willing to work at creative solutions to 
problems”), measured on a 6-point likert scale (1: strongly disagree, 6: strongly 
agree). Moreover, this questionnaire is considered a reliable, well- validated 
measure of CF (i.e., a test-retest score of r = .83; see e.g., Martin & Anderson, 
1998). The CFS showed a positive relationship between self- report and 
friendship- rating, in addition to more general positive association with effective 
communication skills. That said, CFS has limited application due to its 
communication contextualization, and focus on the participants’ willingness to 
be flexible in interactions. Consequently, the CFS has equally limited value for 
our understanding of CF and its behavioural and cognitive implications. 
 With these limitations in mind, Dennis and Vander Wal (2010) developed 
the Cognitive Flexibility Inventory (CFI) to comprise three distinct CF 
components; 1) perception of difficult situations as controllable,  2) the ability to 
parse different reasons for behaviours and life events, and 3) the ability to 
consider different solutions to problems. A strength of the measure is its focus 
on the more typical aspects of CF (e.g., adapting and when presented with 
changing information). The questionnaire is also slightly more detailed, with 20 
items (e.g., “I consider multiple options before making a decision”, “I am capable 
of overcoming difficulties in life that I face”) measured using a 7-point likert scale 
(1: strongly disagree, 7: strongly agree). 
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However, the CFI was also designed and validated within clinical 
populations (e.g., people with depression), echoing other established measures 
of CF above (e.g., WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948; see Nyhus & Barceló et al, 2001). 
Specifically, these focus on application of impaired CF. Further, both the CFS, and 
CFI are limited (as all self-report questionnaires are by design) in capturing actual 
human behaviour, rather than an idealised attribute (i.e., the items are 
intuitively socially desirable; e.g., “I am capable of overcoming the difficulties in 
life that I face”).  
Following the literature, the overarching difficulty in defining CF is clear 
and it follows that isolating the behaviour or attributes in question would also be 
difficult. As it stands, these questionnaires present an idealised, non-specific 
version of CF which is socially desirable (e.g., “I often look at a situation from 
different view points”; Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). This lack of specificity might 
even be considered an advantage of a questionnaire, enabling the questionnaire 
to be more accessible to more people. Nevertheless, this also limits their scope 
in capturing CF ‘in action’ (i.e., in what situations does an individual consider 
different viewpoints, or what difficulties are they capable of overcoming? etc.). 
Therefore, behavioural paradigms (whether laboratory or real-world based) may 
be a more effective and ecologically sounds way of measuring CF.  
CF in ‘The Real World’. As alluded to above, CF can be observed beyond 
specified measures. For example, CF can be studied by using ‘indirect’ tasks that 
require cognitive flexibility for successful performance, such as the Stroop task 
(Stroop, 1935; see e.g., Moore and Malinoswki, 2009). This, and similar tasks are 
an effective measure for CF as they impose a distinction between automatic-
controlled behaviour (MacLeod, 1992); in other words, an individual has to 
supress an automatic response in favour of a controlled, intentional one, within 
conscious awareness. However, this does not ensure that the task can measure 
CF without the ‘contamination’ of other real-world factors.  
For example, Phillips et al (2002) assessed the relationship between 
positive mood and CF, using both Stroop and fluency tasks, in this case three 
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versions were used, e.g., 1) listing as many words that begin a specific letter, 2) 
naming alternative uses for a specific item, and 3) alternating between naming 
items belonging to phonetic and semantic categories (see Chapter 3). In part, the 
methodology was designed to avoid the negative affect sometimes associated 
with CF tasks such as the WCST (Grand & Berg, 1948; e.g., frustration and 
distress). Phillips et al. found that positive mood actually impaired Stroop task 
performance, but, in contrast enhanced performance on the creative fluency 
task.   
 While paradigms like the Stroop task are useful for observing aspects of 
CF in specific cognitive domains (i.e., here, attention), other paradigms are more 
explicitly related to the theoretical concepts explored above, such as task-
switching (see Task switching above; or Monsell, 2003 for a review). An example 
of a task-switching paradigm employing CF are alternating-runs style tasks 
(Rogers & Monsell, 1995), where participants have to switch between two task-
sets at specific intervals. By using an alternating runs paradigm, one can explore 
how efficiently a participant is able to switch, thereby determining how flexible 
they are. Olfers and Band (2018) identified a connection between CF and 
increased performance (i.e., faster RTs) on an alternating-runs task, specifically 
indicating less impact of distracting items. Here, the advantage of using 
behavioural paradigms (e.g., task-switching) as an indirect measure of CF is more 
clear; findings are more reflective of CF in the ‘real-world’. Moreover, this allows 
insight into the impact of individual differences on CF, such as targeting specific 
populations potentially demonstrating more CF (e.g., video gamers; see Olfers & 
Band, 2018; Colzato, 2010). Thus, the behaviour and abilities attributed to CF are 
not abstract ideas, but instead have an everyday application connected with 
enhanced ability.  
Further,  by avoiding explicit orientation to CF and CF-related behaviour  
(e.g., in questionnaires; see Phillips et al., 2002; above), researchers can avoid 
incidental/inadvertent prompting participants into inauthentic CF, especially 
where their objective is to understand CF in action. Finally, if the research goal is 
understanding how CF can be modified by specific circumstances, ‘reverse 
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engineering’ a paradigm (i.e., starting with the behaviour, rather than the 
abstract measure) may reveal a more ecologically valid behaviour. In particular, 
this would allow for increased granulation in CF measurement, situated in 
applied contexts, without the subjective bias that often accompanies 
questionnaires (i.e., demand characteristics; Orne, 1962; Nichols & Maner, 
2008). 
What Do We Know About CF Now? 
Taking this information into account, it seems fair to conclude that the 
title CF emphasizes its most characteristic component, flexibility. We have seen 
that CF encompasses a vast range of cognitive, behavioural, theoretical and 
pragmatic issues- and that the literature reflects this. Moreover, CF as a research 
arena is evolving, with competing views of its application and definition (e.g., 
Diamond, 2014; Cañas et al., 2003; Braem & Egner, 2018). However, while 
debate persists in the wider literature concerning conceptualization of CF (e.g., 
domain specific versus domain general), for the purpose of this thesis we can 
arrive at a clear way forward for the empirical work to follow.  
 In light of the contents of this chapter, the importance of arriving at a 
clear working definition of how this thesis will conceptualize CF is overwhelming. 
Here, I will focus on CF in its everyday function; as the capability of an individual 
to think and behave adaptively in different environments. This definition has the 
most intuitive connection with BBH and T-AR (Fredrickson, 2001; see Chapter 1). 
Additionally, this builds on the most widely-accepted understanding of CF (e.g., 
Diamond, 2014), and moves away from literature focused on functional deficit 
(i.e., WCST, Grant & Berg, 1948), or CF as an idealised characteristic (i.e., CFI; 
Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010). Finally, and possibly most important for the 
empirical work to follow, this definition also allows for our understanding of CF 
to be enhanced through novel applications.  
 In addition to extending understanding of T-AR, this evaluation of CF 
literature and measurement provides a useful opportunity to explore practical 
applications of enhanced CF. Much previous research (e.g., Muyan-Yilik & Demir, 
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2019; Yu & Lee, 2017; Koesten et al, 2009; Figueroa & Youmans, 2012) has relied 
on these well-established measures, often within clinical populations, without 
consideration of ecological validity or generalizability. Therefore, by using 
paradigms not typically associated with CF, but which indirectly employ 
behaviour we recognise as CF (i.e., exploring the literature detailed in this 
chapter), we have a chance to add to that literature as well the our primary focus 
of this thesis (i.e., the impact of positive individual differences on cognitive 
abilities/CF).  
Overlapping Psychological Theories 
 As established above, one of the primary aims of this thesis is to explore 
the potential extension of BBH (Fredrickson, 2001) to CF. After a thorough 
exploration of each concept (i.e., BBH in Chapter 1, and CF, here), it is readily 
apparent that overlap exists between these distinct psychological approaches. 
Therefore, for the remainder of this thesis, an overarching aim will be to support 
convergence of these concepts, through both empirical evidence and theoretical 
discussion. This is exemplified by the definition used here for CF (see What do we 
know about CF now?), chosen partly because it is complementary to BBH, and 
because it allows these fields to be brought together.  To this end, Chapter 3 will 




Chapter 3: Bringing Hope and Cognitive Flexibility Together: Methodological 
Issues for this Thesis 
In Chapter 1, character strengths generally, and hope, more specifically, 
have been linked with numerous positive behavioural and cognitive factors (e.g., 
coping with stress, decision making); arguably, these can be suggested to 
indicate high levels of behavioural adaptivity (i.e., thought-action repertoire). 
Positive Psychology (PP) frameworks have fostered development of theories 
(e.g., BBH; Fredrickson, 2001), which enable us to make the case for behavioural 
adaptivity more strongly. In Chapter 2, Cognitive Flexibility (CF) was explored as a 
construct, linking the cognitive functions normally discussed alongside BBH (e.g., 
attention, memory), with higher order processing, such as executive functions 
(EF). Finally, I identified potential overlaps between the operation of BBH and 
cognitive mechanisms included under the conceptual CF ‘umbrella’. While 
cognitive functions typically linked to BBH in the literature do not align perfectly 
with higher-order functions (i.e., ‘CF-type’ processing; see above), that is not to 
say they are not relevant. In fact, this point highlights one of the key aims of this 
project. 
 In this chapter I will outline the most important methodological 
approaches that will be used to explore the aims of this thesis. First, an overview 
of mixed methods (MM) research will be provided, detailing the rationale for its 
application in this inquiry. This is followed by a summary of the specific 
methodology and paradigms used in subsequent studies, providing a ‘road map’ 
for the commonalities across the empirical chapters to follow. 
Mixed Methods (MM) Research 
 The concept of convergence (i.e., bringing together distinct phenomena 
to better understanding human behaviour) has been highlighted as a 
fundamental driver for this research; naturally, this will be reflected in any 
methodology adopted. MM designs employ a mix of qualitative- and 
quantitative-related techniques (e.g., viewpoints and perspectives, data 
collection and analysis techniques; Johnson et al., 2007) in order to obtain the 
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optimal understanding of the behaviour in question. Notably, MM is not only a 
flexible, able-to-be-tailored methodology, but also reflects an epistemological 
perspective to enable holistic understanding and corroboration of phenomena 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017). Thus, the concept of integration is considered a 
hallmark of MM research (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017; Johnson et al., 2007; 
Östlund et al., 2011); the goal is not to collect two different types of data related 
to the same phenomena, but instead to assimilate these (via data collection, 
analysis, and/or interpretation) in order to have a more complete understanding. 
In other words, while data reflect traditional qualitative and quantitative 
characteristics (e.g., words and numbers), these need to be carefully integrated 
(e.g., mixed or combined), rather than keeping data (and subsequent findings) 
separate (Bryman, 2007).  
Why Use a MM Approach?  
According to Creswell and Plano Clark (2017), there are a number of 
scenarios which are particularly well suited to MM designs. Firstly, one might 
need to corroborate results to provide a more complete understanding of a 
phenomena, which cannot be done through the use of qualitative or quantitative 
methods alone. For example, a singular method may not provide sufficient 
insight into the issue under review, or the data generated may be limited. 
Secondly, one may need to explain results of an initial study in more depth 
(typically, in the case of quantitative data); here, use of qualitative data will 
enable a more applied understanding of what a set of statistical results mean in 
the real world. Conversely, a research question may require a more dispersed 
initial focus. In this case, using qualitative methods to gain a more general 
understanding will enable the researcher to gain insight into the types of 
quantitative measures best suited for more in-depth investigation. The 
quantitative data can then supplement initial qualitative findings and facilitate 
generalization of results.  
In terms of common applications, MM designs are able to describe and 
compare different groups particularly effectively. In this instance, quantitative 
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measures can provide the measurable objective differences between groups, 
while qualitative data can ‘translate’ these differences into real world meaning 
This latter point is particularly relevant to aspects of my work, since MM 
approaches are useful in evaluating interventions, assessing  effectiveness (i.e., 
does the intervention have the intended effect?), as well as exploring 
participants’ subjective experience of the intervention and its viability (and 
suitability) for use beyond the work in question. 
Regardless of any technical rationale for using MM approaches, intuitively 
while a single-focus approach may yield relevant findings, use of multiple foci 
suggests a more comprehensive understanding is likely to be achieved. This idea 
may appear critical of single method approaches, but instead emphasizes a 
situational need for approaches to be integrated (i.e., to ensure data are 
corroborative and lead to a more complete understanding) According to the 
methodological literature (e.g., Cresswell and Plano Clark, 2017), there are no 
‘rules’ which determine the scope or extent of qualitative or quantitative 
elements within any specific study, but rather this is represented by a continuum 
, on which research is located,  depending on pragmatism and technical 
requirements (see Figure 6 below).  
Creswell and Plano Clark (2017; see also Morse, 2003; Plano Clark, 2005; 
Nastasi et al, 2007) have suggested a mnemonic using capital/lower case letters 
to signify the balance of qualitative and quantitative strands in a study. For 
example, QUAN + QUAL indicates equal emphasis on each strand of the research, 






Figure 6. The spectrum of mixed methods research, from qualitative-dominant to 
quantitative- dominant, adapted from Johnson et al (2007) 
Types of MM Methodologies  
 Broadly, there are three core methodological designs utilised in MM 
research: convergent, explanatory sequential, and exploratory sequential 
(Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017)7. One advantage of MM research is avoidance of 
the typical constraints/rigidity that might accompany single-approach designs. 
For example, quantitative research may ignore the role of the individual in 
research, not attributing value to their voice or experience (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2017), allowing for a level of pragmatism in MM research (Morgan, 2007). 
However, adhering to established paradigms/study designs within each ‘school’ 
ensures that sufficient validity and robustness is built into the methodology, and 
errors that might lead to confounds or poor research practice can be avoided 
easily. Speaking less formally, this type of design enables a researcher to obtain 
‘the best of both worlds’ or to ‘have their cake and eat it’.  
 Convergent Designs. This is widely- held to be the most frequently used 
mixed methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017; see Moseholm & Fetters, 
2017). Here, researchers collect both qualitative and quantitative data in order 
to combine/compare results to gain enhanced overall understanding. The 
convergent design enables a reciprocal relationship between data types, allowing 
each to validate, confirm, and amplify the other. Characteristically, convergent 
 
7 Although, as alluded to above this is not necessarily a complete list, but rather covers the ‘core’ principles 
















approaches use a QUAN + QUAL design, although it is possible to place less 
emphasis on the second strand (e.g., QUAN + qual). Regardless of data strand 
dominance (DSD), focus is always on integration/convergence of findings. 
Typically, data is collected simultaneously, and analysed separately, before 
results from each data strand are merged. Content relevant to both data strands 
can be discussed (by researchers to parse out meaning) to integrate, highlight 
similarities, differences and/or comparisons in findings, or convert data to one 
format (e.g., transform qualitative data from themes into frequency).  
 Explanatory Designs. Generally speaking, explanatory MM designs adopt 
a QUAN + qual design, although it is possible to place equal emphasis on both 
data strands (Ivankova et al., 2006). The focus of this design type is sequential 
data collection. Quantitative data is usually collected first, followed by the 
qualitative strand- which is used to explain (or offer further insight) into 
quantitative findings. The explanatory design is often used to study phenomena 
or research questions considered better suited to quantitative data (e.g., 
changes in education practices; Li et al., 2015), or where the researcher has 
sufficient time/resources to include qualitative elements in secondary data 
collection. Importantly here, this approach offers an additional perspective 
where the qualitative strand approach (e.g., design, data analysis) can be 
informed by quantitative findings. While the data will still be assimilated, 
qualitative findings may give a unique insight not easily attainable if data are 
collected simultaneously. However, this can also limit the richness of qualitative 
data as they must be based on, or derive from a need to explain some element of 
the quantitative data.  
 Exploratory Designs. Contrary to the previous design type, exploratory 
designs frequently have a QUAL + quan focus, although again the two strands 
can be emphasised equally (Bryman, 2006; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017). 
Typically, exploratory designs are sequential in nature (similarly to explanatory 
designs) and indicated from its name, the focus here is to explore a concept or 
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phenomena qualitatively, in order to better understand it8. For example, a 
researcher may use this approach to develop new theories or measures via 
qualitative findings, and subsequently, to collect more accurate quantitative 
data. This design can be used where previous understanding of a phenomena is 
limited, or if existing models and measures are not considered valid or robust. 
The quantitative data are then collected based on this deeper understanding, to 
ensure the findings can be generalized. 
MM Research in Practice 
 MM designs have been used in a variety of research fields. Examples 
range from nursing and health (e.g., Östlund et al., 2011), occupational and 
management research (e.g., Azorin & Cameron, 2010), marketing (e.g., Harrison 
& Reilly, 2011), social sciences (e.g., Collins et al., 2006), and (as indicated by its 
use here) psychology (e.g., Powell et al., 2008)9. 
 MM designs have proven to be an effective approach within PP research. 
Akhtar and Boniwell (2010) explored intervention development (utilising 
character strengths such as optimism and gratitude) in the treatment of 
alcoholism. Their research emulated an exploratory design10, focusing primarily 
on qualitative data collected via semi-structured interviews supplemented and 
generalized via quantitative data (e.g., questionnaires). Interestingly, the 
researchers were able to validate their intervention program through the 
convergence of each data strand (i.e., participants both objectively improved, 
and enjoyed or at least could recognise the benefit of participation in the 
intervention, suggesting it to be a program they would continue to use).  
Another example of MM research in PP is seen in Yeager et al (2012), who 
explored the impact of different goal motivations on long term career success 
and life satisfaction. In contrast to Akhtar and Boniwell (2010), Yeager et al.’s 
 
8 Harrison and Reilly (2011) conducted a content analysis of 2,166 marketing journal articles where a MM 
approach was used and found that exploratory designs were the most common (47%). 
9 Although, there is some suggestion (see e.g., Hanson et al., 2005) that psychology in general focuses too 
much on experimental or quantitative methods  




design was more typical of an explanatory approach, focusing on quantitative 
data (primarily derived from questionnaires), and supplemented with semi-
structured interviews. However, more pertinent to the studies presented in this 
thesis, the MM data assimilation provides further insight that might not 
otherwise be garnered through a single-design approach. Yeager et al (2012) 
identified through the qualitative data that participants were not processing 
goals at a deep enough level (i.e., less defined, considered less important), 
providing a potential explanation for the type of goals recorded in the 
quantitative data (which considered alone were unexpected). Here, the 
convergence of the data strands allowed the researchers to better understand 
the phenomena under investigation. 
 Taking as a whole (i.e., the methodological philosophy, examples from 
the literature), MM designs provide a robust and pragmatic framework through 
which the aims of the current studies can be actualised. Additionally, the 
overarching theme of convergence detailed throughout this chapter is matched 
in MM research with the emphasis on integration. Given that a rationale for an 
MM design has been thoroughly explored, the following sections will detail some 
of the more specific methodological choices (e.g., paradigm selection). 
Methodological Choices and Paradigms 
The overarching emphasis on ‘convergence’ and depth understanding of the 
behaviour examined in this work is probably already clear to the reader. 
However, it is also important to show how these decisions will impact on more 
specific choices made for each study/cluster of studies. In general terms, a 
convergent MM approach utilising a ‘QUAN + qual’ design has been adopted for 
the empirical work to follow in this thesis. While both strands have been 
collected simultaneously, the primary source of data (and subsequent analysis) in 
each study has been quantitative. In this way, qualitative data can be considered 
supplementary. In most cases, this has been analysed via content analysis (Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005), and used to: 1) gain insight into participants’ subjective 
experience, and 2) offer ‘real world’ context for the laboratory studies. Reflecting 
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a personal scientific ‘philosophy’, this approach also ensures the value of 
participants’ subjective experience is acknowledged, thereby avoiding 
oversimplification of human behaviour, and its reduction to a point where it 
lacks all ecological validity (Miller, 2008). 
That said, one empirical study presented as part of this thesis (i.e., a diary 
study; see Chapter 8), changes the DSD to QUAL + QUAN, mainly due to a change 
in research question focus. Given this was a longitudinal intervention-based 
study, more qualitative data collection was required. In turn, these data 
necessitated a change in analysis style (i.e., here, thematic analysis; Braun & 
Clarke, 2006). Nevertheless, the focus remained on data assimilation; the 
‘success ‘of the intervention was evaluated via convergence of both qualitative 
and quantitative data strands. 
These methodological choices have affected the empirical work of this thesis. 
As a starting point, the laboratory studies reported in this thesis have used well-
established cognitive paradigms (e.g., The Navon Task, Navon, 1981; The 
Adaptive Choice Task, Irons & Leber, 2016; The Alternative Uses Task; Guilford et 
al., 1978). By using previously validated paradigms, it becomes more 
straightforward to differentiate subtle behaviour elicited by novel interventions 
and to explore application of the BBH to character strengths (i.e., hope; Snyder 
et al, 1991). 
This is especially relevant when subjective interpretation and expression is 
embedded within the qualitative aspects of this research (e.g., participants are 
asked to ‘sort’ their own character strengths). Even more importantly, current 
literature on hope-based intervention has highlighted that, when ‘successful’, 
such interventions are likely to elicit small, albeit statistically significant, 
increases in hope levels (e.g., Weis and Speridakos, 2011; see Chapter 1). Thus, it 
appears pertinent to select paradigms where typical findings/effects are 
relatively predictable, and a laboratory testing environment offers some level of 
control. In addition, these paradigms have been chosen due their direct or 
analogous links with the CF and BBH literatures. For example, The Navon Task 
(Navon, 1981; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005) speaks directly to global and local 
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perceptual processing (see Navon Task), while BBH points to expanded (literally, 
broadened) T-AR in response to positivity. 
Thus, these selections serve two purposes. The first is that their use may 
extend the BBH literature to demonstrate impact on higher cognitive functions 
(cf effects on memory/attention etc; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). To this end, 
three paradigms will be used to demonstrate the range of cognitive function that 
can potentially be categorized as CF (e.g., perceptual processing, optimization of 
visual search performance, divergent thinking tasks). Second, and more 
specifically, the extension of BBH to character strengths (hope, in particular), 
rather than positivity more generically, may require the same predictability and 
control as alluded to above. 
Overview of Empirical Work 
 In total, six laboratory-based studies have been conducted to explore the 
effect of two character strengths interventions; 1) a Card Sorting Task (CST; see 
Chapter 4), and 2) a Goal Reflection Task (GRT; see Chapter 5). As mentioned 
above, this has involved use of three paradigms: The Navon Task (NT; Navon, 
1977), The Adaptive Choice Task (ACT; Irons & Leber, 2016), and The Alternative 
Uses Task (AUT; Guilford et al., 1978). Each paradigm draws on cognitive function 
that represents CF (see Chapter 2). For example, the NT requires inhibition and 
task-switching for successful performance, whereas the AUT utilizes 
fluency/rapid processing and divergent thinking/creativity. However, given the 
differing levels of cognitive sophistication and/or control required for successful 
performance in each task, potentially, these may give more insight into how BBH 
can affect higher order cognition. The studies have been clustered by 
intervention, in order to reflect the parallel nature of both phases of work, and 
to show how the low-impact hope interventions have been developed more 
clearly.  
Finally, a seventh empirical study will be presented, which uses a diary 
study format and an extended intervention (e.g., daily goal reflection). This study 
builds on data collected in Studies 1-6, by asking participants not only to reflect 
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on past achievements or strengths, but also focus on future goals. The 
conceptual basis of Study 7 will be outlined in Chapter 8.  
Focus on The Paradigms 
Navon Task (NT). This perceptual processing task (Navon, 1977, 1981) is 
based on the cognitive mechanism of ‘zooming in’ on stimuli (or perceptual 
components of stimuli), to optimize processing via attentional focus on global 
(general) or local (specific) features. The process indicated in Navon’s original 
work (i.e., an individual’s initial perception of a scene comprises little distinction 
between items, but is followed by focus on specific details) was illustrated by his 
choice of title- alluding to the folk psychology of whether humans are able to 
‘see the wood for the trees’. In fact, Navon’s findings demonstrated the reverse; 
perception begins at the global, general level, and progresses to a local, specific 
level. Further, this global precedence effect typically shows that local targets are 
responded to slower, and less accurately (Navon, 1981), which illustrates a clear 
behavioural cost to narrowing the attentional focus to local targets.  
Since its original inception, NTs have been used widely within the 
cognitive psychology literature (e.g., Prosopagnosioa; Duchaine et al., 2007; 
cultural differences in cognitive development; Davidoff et al., 2008). Most 
pertinently here, Fredrickson and Branigan (2005; see also Chapter 1) adopted 
this paradigm as part of their work on BBH, with a clear ‘expanded attention’ 
effect (i.e., promoting global processing) elicited via increased positive affect.  
That said, recent research has highlighted how positivity can also alter these 
cognitive responses. For example, Noguchi and Tomoike (2016) saw faster 
responses to local stimuli following positive mood induction. While this contrasts 
with Fredrickson and Branigan’s (2005) findings, it does serve to confirm the NT 
as an effective measure for examining cognition in the context of PP.  
An additional advantage of the NT is its responsiveness to intervention, as 
illustrated in both Fredrickson and colleagues’ and Noguschi and Tomike’s work 
above. However, in this thesis, I also need to address the  introduction of higher 
task demands, where EF resources, such as task switching and inhibition, are 
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likely to be taxed (i.e., ‘alternating runs’ trials requiring a change in response 
type; see Rogers & Monsell, 1995). In this way, it is also possible to assert that 
task performance in this paradigm encompasses both simple low-level 
cognitions, and those functions indicative of CF. The lower-level functionality 
should provide an effective baseline by which intervention efficacy can be 
measured. 
Task Overview. Typically, an NT directs participants to identify a target 
letter which will be present at either the global or local level; an illustration is 
presented in Figure 7 below. In this example the target letter ‘H’ is presented in 
two forms: globally (i), and locally (ii). During NT performance, a participant 
would typically have several targets they search for in each trial, responding as 
quickly but accurately as possible as soon as they have identified the targets 
level. 
 
Figure 7. Example of Navon task stimuli, with global T/local H & global H/local T 
The NT used in the current studies was adapted to have a higher demand 
on CF resources in Chapters 4 & 5 (i.e., to avoid ceiling effects, and to ensure 
engagement of higher order cognitive mechanisms). Therefore, in addition to the 
target identification, a change in response was also required (see Figure 8 
below). Here, the keyboard key used to indicate a target level has been identified 
changed every eight trials (e.g., Figure 8: from ‘H’ to ‘J’). To increase demand on 
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CF resources, response changes were not tracked in the program (i.e., indicated 
to participants), instead participants were required to count and track when a 
change in response was required, swapping response-type back and forth every 
eight trials. 
 
Figure 8. Example of a typical NT trial for both target letters, with the changes in 
response alignment 
 The Adaptive Choice Task (ACT). The Adaptive Choice Task (ACT; Irons 
and Leber, 2016, 2018) has been used to explore attentional control in dynamic 
visual environments. Here, participants are asked to choose between available 
visual search (e.g., Wolfe, 2015) targets, in arrays adapted to make one target an 
optimized choice (i.e., fewer distractor items of the same type). Some 
participants in the original study were able to navigate the changing visual field 
flexibly, switching targets to remain optimal in their selection. However, these 
results were not shown across the sample, with some participants slower at 
switching to optimal targets, while remaining highly accurate. Most importantly 
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for this project, the authors highlighted the role of individual participant 
differences in their subsequent study. The effort and efficacy (in switching 
targets) perceived by participants was found to be a predictor of their target 
choice optimality.  
As with the NT, the ACT has not formally been used as a measure of CF 
previously. Nevertheless, behaviour required for effective performance reflect 
those characteristic of CF (i.e., dynamic, adaptive functioning within changing 
environments, agency in behavioural choices, etc; Diamond, 2014). Furthermore, 
the impact individual differences on task performance, in addition to the task’s 
demonstration of CF-type function (e.g., task switching; Monsell, 2003) make the 
ACT a useful vehicle for examining the behaviour of interest here. 
Task Overview. Figure 9 below is a typical ACT trial. The aim of the task is 
to identify a target (here, a red or blue square with a number between 2-5) from 
an array of distractors; red and blue squares numbered between 6-9, and green 
squares numbered between 2-9. Indicative of the task name, a choice is available 
between two correct targets (here, a red ‘4’, and a blue ‘3’). The red and blue 
target will never be the same number within a trial (i.e., if the red target is 2, 
then the blue must be 3, 4, or 5). Further, distractor targets vary predictably 
across trials, which from a participant’s perspective means that some trials will 




Figure 9. Typical ACT trial. Two correct target trials are outlined, participant would press 
‘B’ for the blue target, and ‘N’ for the red target 
 Once a target has been found, participants indicate this by pressing a 
predetermined keyboard key (e.g., if the target is a number 3, participants press 
the ‘B’ key). Participants are instructed to respond as quickly but accurately as 
possible. In addition to measuring the typical RT and Accuracy, the ‘choice’ 
element of the task is measured by two variables: Optimal Switching (i.e., does 
the participant search for the target efficiently by searching the colour least 
represented), and Proportional Switch (i.e., the frequency with which 
participants switch targets as colour proportions change). Thus, the task enables 
a researcher to measure how flexibility participants are able to adapt to a 
changing environment.  
The Alternative Uses Task (AUT). In Chapter 2, CF processing has been 
examined in the light of fluency-based tasks (see Diamond, 2014). The AUT 
(Guilford et al., 1978) requires participants to create alternative uses for 
household items. In turn, this signposts CF-style processing, such as fluid 
intelligence (see Au et al., 2015), and divergent thinking (DT; see Ritter & 
Mostert, 2017). In this way, the AUT provides a distinctive third additional to the 
tasks already outlined above. In contrast to the NT and ACT, this paradigm been 
77 
 
used previously to measure CF per se (see Dippo & Kudrowitz, 2013; for a 
review)11. The AUT has frequently been used as a measure of flexible thinking 
across a variety of literature, in (somewhat ironically) divergent research (e.g., 
correlating DT with increased eye blinks, Ueda et al., 2016; computational 
models to ‘solve’ creative thinking; Olteţeanu & Falomir, 2016, ). 
Task Overview. The AUT asks participants to think of alternative 
(creative, or novel uses) for household items. A description for the typical use of 
the item is provided (e.g., the example in Figure 10 below, the description would 
be “Water Bottle: used to drink water”), and the alternative uses must be 
different from the original. Three household items are presented per section, 
and a time limit of 4 minutes is given for each section. 
 
Figure 10. Diagram showing potential responses to a hypothetical AUT item. i) has four 
responses that are different from the original uses (to hold water), in ii) the four 
responses are rejected for either being too similar to the original use (e.g., carry and 
pour), not clear what the use is (e.g., melt), or impossible without further information 
(e.g., balloon) 
 
11 Dippo and Kudrowitz suggest the AUT is not a measure of creativity, but of novelty. While 
creative thinking is employed, the task on requires novel uses, but not necessarily that these are 





As a weapon if 
made of metal
Vase to display 
flowers











The AUT differs in its exploration of CF from the NT and ACT, in that its 
focus rests clearly on creative and divergent thinking. To measure CF, while a 
time limit is still placed on participants, the AUT is the least temporally restrictive 
task; participants can choose where and for how long to focus on each item 
which in and of itself is demonstrable of CF (i.e., are they able to balance and 
deal with multiple items). Furthermore, the AUT has several outcome measures 
(see Chapters 4 and 7, for a full description of the AUT analysis procedure). The 
main outcome, Fluency, measures how many acceptable uses are generated (in 
Figure 10 i, four acceptable uses are listed); the alternative uses are different 
from the original use, and from each other. In contrast, a less successful example 
is demonstrated in Figure 10 ii, with four rejected suggestions.  
Accuracy is calculated based on how many uses are accepted; a use may 
be rejected if it is too similar to the original use, or if it is nonsensical (e.g., 
making a balloon from a water bottle). Additionally, other factors such as 
Flexibility (i.e., the type of category associated with the alternative uses), 
Elaboration (i.e., the amount of detail included), and Originality (i.e., across the 
whole sample, the originality of the uses) are also measured. Take as a whole, 
the AUT can be considered to provide unique insight into the creative, novel 
thinking associated with CF. 
Diary Studies. Study 7 (Chapter 8) diverges from the format used in 
Studies 1-6. As a ‘stand-alone’ study, the main body of methodological detail will 
be presented alongside the study itself (including the full literature review and 
justification of the study). This is because the study has been published (Hodson, 
MacCallum, Watson, & Blagrove, 2021), and preserving the peer-reviewed 
format of the paper as much as possible appears useful. The study itself builds on 
the findings of earlier studies presented above, and seeks to explore the daily 
goal setting, attainment, and reflection (in an adapted format of the GRT). 
However, to provide consistency with other empirical work presented here, a 




The efficacy of PP interventions, especially those based on hope (see 
Weis & Speridakos, 2011), have already been established in Chapter 1. 
Additionally, examples found in related literature demonstrate the use of diary 
studies in the investigation of character strength and intervention exploration 
(e.g., gratitude journaling; Schnitker & Richardson, 2018; hope in the workplace, 
Ouweneel et al, 2012). Diary studies have also been used previously in 
combination with MM designs (e.g., see Amabile et al, 2005), particularly 
because they allow for the collection of qualitative data in a more natural 
environment (e.g., the participants home, with no researcher present).  
This is of particular interest in this thesis, as the relationship between the 
GRT and any subsequent changes in behaviour and/or affect will allow further 
insight into its efficacy and application beyond a laboratory setting. Finally, a 
discussion of different outcomes between the longer intervention application 
(i.e., the diary study) and the single session application (i.e., empirical laboratory 
studies) can be facilitated. Specifically, there is some debate within the goal-
oriented/hope-based intervention literature (see Weis & Speridakos, 2011) 
about the effectiveness of single-session versus sustained inventions, and a short 
term diary study may allow the gap between each approach to be bridged. 
Summary of Thesis Structure for Empirical Chapters (Chapters 4- 9) 
 Chapter 4 presents a cluster of three studies which employ the CST 
paradigm detailed above. Building on these findings, Chapters 5, 6, and 7 apply 
the GRT to the same paradigms, with the inclusion of additional measures of 
individual differences (i.e., hope questionnaires), plus more detailed qualitative 
analysis. Chapter 8 presents the application of the GRT in a diary study. Finally, 
Chapter 9 reviews the findings of all three types of empirical work, evaluating the 
interventions used, and the theoretical and practical implications of these 
findings, beyond the scope of this thesis. 
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Chapter 4: Exploring Character Strengths and Cognitive Flexibility 
Character Strengths as an Intervention 
 By now, the overarching aim of the current research is hopefully clear.  
That is, to explore and extend application of BBH, specifically investigating the 
extent to which ‘positive’ individual differences (i.e., character strengths; 
Peterson & Seligman, 2004) enable the same behavioural and cognitive 
advantages as positive affect (see Fredrickson, 2001). It is important, at this 
point, to highlight that character strengths have also been associated with 
facilitation of the positive affect typically connected with BBH (Martínez-Martí & 
Ruch, 2016). However, the gap between facilitating positive affect (i.e., robustly 
linked to the operation of the BBH) and character strengths per se is yet to be 
closed convincingly. 
Character strengths interventions are one way in which this research aim 
can be pursued. Such interventions have previously been linked to increased life-
satisfaction and social skills (Proctor et al, 2011; Seligman et al, 2009; see 
Chapter 1). Importantly, these interventions typically drive participants to 
actively engage with their strengths, fostering recognition of the positive impact 
of each strength without imposing a value ‘hierarchy’ (i.e., each strength is 
equally valuable). 
In a review, Meyers et al (2012) defined PP interventions as intentional 
activities based on: 1) cultivating positive individual experiences, 2) building 
positive traits, and 3) building positive institutions and civic virtues, with the 
literature ranging from personal impact (e.g., improving mood and personal 
resources; Cohn and Fredrickson, 2010) to more general wellbeing (e.g., Niemiec 
201812).  Niemiec also specifies five factors by which to gauge intervention 
(especially character strengths intervention) efficacy: naturalness, enjoyment, 
value, guilt avoidance and situation. While naturalness (i.e., engagement ‘feels’ 
natural) and enjoyment (i.e., activity is enjoyable, interesting or fun) appear fairly 
 
12 Niemiec (2018) also notes a lack of empirical evidence to support nuanced definitions and classifications 
of PP and character strengths interventions. 
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superficial (and intuitive), the remaining factors are arguably more existentially 
relevant. For example, whether an intrinsic value is seen in the activity, 
regardless of outcome, may depend entirely on personal belief set. Equally, 
avoiding guilt/anxiety or feeling otherwise compelled to act (i.e., situation) may 
relate to an individual’s traits and/or worldview, and are unlikely to promote 
positivity in any event.  
In summary, PP interventions typically require an active participant and 
an intention to generate a general positive experience. Thus, the task here (i.e., 
Card Sorting Task, CST; see Card Sort below) might be better considered an 
‘intervention-light’, or ‘quasi-intervention’ (for lack of a better term). The task is 
passive (i.e., non-directive, reflection on character strengths is unconstrained), 
and any ‘interventional effects’ derive from implicit, self-guided reflection. 
Further, the CST builds on assumptions that character strengths are inherently 
positive (e.g., Peterson & Park, 2009), and aims to uncover whether ‘implicit’ 




 Card sorting, as an activity, has been applied in varied settings, from 
evaluating CF (i.e., WCST; see Chapter 2) to assessing development of 
mathematical abilities (Eli, Mohr-Schroeder & Lee, 2011). Particularly relevant, 
character strengths cards have been validated as a ‘tactile resource for passive 
reflection’ (i.e., interacting with character strengths cards in order to 
engage/reflect on them) by Resnick and Rosenheck (2006). Patients were 
provided with signature character strength cards for “…direction and 
encouragement during treatment planning sessions, clinical groups, and even 
casual conversation” (pp. 122).  
For the current studies, the Card Sorting Task (CST) has been adapted 
from a Positive Psychology (PP) coaching resource (Capp & Co, 2015). The cards 
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are typically used in gamified exercises (i.e., by strengths practitioners), enabling 
reflection on personal strengths in a dynamic and interactive way. Each of the 60 
cards display a different character strength (e.g., creativity; see Method: Card 
Sorting Task below).  The cards are well validated as part of a wider Strengths 
Profile (Capp & Co, 2015; mean Cronbach’s alpha across 60 strengths = .82). The 
task requires participants to review the 60 named character strengths (e.g., 
Resilience, Bravery, Love, Leadership, Prudence, Feedback etc; Capp & Co, 2015; 
See Appendix 1), and sort them into relevant categories (i.e., Realised Strengths, 
Weaknesses) based on how they relate to themselves personally. The cards were 
originally designed as a tool for individuals to identify and explore their character 
strengths using a tactile and dynamic method (Capp & Co, 2015), and have 
primarily been used in occupational settings (e.g., recruitment). In addition, the 
standard procedure has been adapted to include a simple ‘engagement-focus’ 
process, in which participants are asked to select the two most representative 
cards from each category. In this way, it is possible to draw attention to the most 
subjectively relevant character strengths in the deck (i.e., implicitly reinforcing a 
minimal level of personal reflection, without increasing the risk of bias, such as 
demand characteristics, social desirability etc.).  
Use of a Free-Response Questionnaire  
 To support the aim of convergence of qualitative and quantitative data 
strands mentioned earlier (Chapter 3), an open-ended questionnaire was 
included at the end of each study (see Materials below). Three prompts 
encourage participants to, 1) describe the experience of strengths reflection, 2) 
consider any connection between the CST and CF paradigms, and 3) describe any 
general thoughts or ideas elicited during the task. The free-response 
questionnaire allows data from their subjective experience of the task to be 
recorded alongside quantitative data, alongside more evaluation of CST efficacy 
as an intervention. 
The tasks used to explore character strengths are detailed below, 
followed by three studies in which connections between character strengths 
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(and implicitly, the BBH) and CF are explored. Three paradigms (Chapter 3) have 
been selected to gauge impact of character strengths on CF. Study 1 explores CST 
impact on a straightforward CF application: a Navon Task (1981; adapted to 
include an alternating-run-task-switch, Rogers & Monsell, 1995). Study 2 uses a 
more complex CF paradigm: The Adaptive Choice Task (Irons & Leber, 2015). As 
well as traditional performance measures (i.e., RT, Accuracy), this evaluates 
optimality of participant choices (i.e., how effectively participants engage with 
their environment). Finally, in Study 3, higher-level aspects of CF are examined 
(i.e., creativity, fluency, novelty-based problem solving) using the Alternative 
Uses Task (Guildford et al, 1978). For each study, a typical reporting format will 
be followed. After Study 3, the CST will be evaluated across all three studies.  
Bayesian Analysis 
On a practical note, Bayesian Analysis have also been included to 
replicate the frequentist analysis. Here, the purpose of the Bayesian analysis is to 
account for both experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the 
number of analyses required by a complex design. It is of note that the 
understanding and application of Bayesian statistics, particularly in regards of 
analyses more advanced than t-tests (i.e., ANOVAs) is ongoing (see 
Wagenmakers et al, 2018), and prudence should be exercised when considering  
the results. Nevertheless, the value here of Bayesian analysis is to indicate how 
much evidence there is to support an effect, or indeed evidence to support there 
not being an effect.  
Here, the intention is not to delve into this complex area of research (see 
va de Schoot et al, 2017 for a review), but instead to highlight the basic 
parameters in which Bayesian analysis is applied and interpreted in this thesis. 
Analysis of Effects are reported in text as BF10, which compares evidence in 
support of the alternative hypothesis (H1) to evidence in support of the null 
hypothesis (H0). These analyses are described in terms of their strength of 
support for either H1 or H0 using the system recommended by Wagenmakers et 
al (2018; Table 2). For transparency, evidence that is moderate or stronger is 
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considered important; in contrast anecdotal evidence denotes that there is not 
sufficient evidence to meaningfully support either hypothesis.   
Table 2. A descriptive classification system for interpreting Bayes Factors from 
Wagenmakers et al (2018) 
Bayes Factor Evidence category 
> 100 Extreme 
30 - 100 Very Strong 
10 - 30 Strong 
3 – 10 Moderate 
1 – 3 Anecdotal 
1 No evidence 
0.33 – 1 Anecdotal 
0.10 – 0.33 Moderate 
0.03 – 0.10 Strong 
0.01 – 0.03 Very Strong 
< 0.01 Extreme 
Study 1: CST and Navon Task (NT) 
The NT (Navon, 1977; 1981, see Chapter 3 for more details) is a 
perceptuo-attentional task typifying the lower-level cognition examined 
alongside the BBH in previous research (Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). In 
practical terms, its use here will allow for an effective baseline measure of 
performance in conjunction with the CST. However, we should also note that 
because it lacks the characteristic behavioural components linked with CF above 
(e.g., adapting to environmental changes, see Chapter 2) - an additional 
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response-switching element was added, to ensure cognitive complexity/task 
demand was sufficient to engage higher order cognition.  
 The preliminary aim of this study is to evaluate the efficacy of the CST 
character strengths ‘light’ intervention in enhancing cognitive performance. 
Thus, the key research question is whether participants who complete the CST 
perform better on the NT than control counterparts. Additionally, it may be 
important to evaluate whether individual differences in CST engagement (i.e., 
the frequency with which cards are assigned to the different categories e.g., 
strengths, weaknesses etc.) correlate with RT and accuracy performance in the 
NT.  
 The qualitative data will allow insight into participants’ subjective 
experience of the CST. More generally, these data will be analysed to assess 
participants’ introspection on the CST (and more general character strength 
reflection); given the positive subject matter, the experience is likely positive. 
Additionally, qualitative data will be used to explore whether participants 
identify a connection between CST and NT performance.  
Method 
Participants. Fifty participants were recruited for this study (44 female); 
age ranged from 18-20 years (M = 18.86; SD = 0.71). Forty-one (82%) of the 
participants self-reported English as their first language, a further three as 
Chinese (6%), and two as Romanian (4%); the remainder reported German, 
Spanish, Polish, and Malay (2% each). Participants were recruited from a panel of 
first year undergraduate psychology students at the University of Warwick, who 
each received course credit for their participation. 
Measures and Stimuli 
Card-sort Task (CST). This task required participants to sort all 60 cards 
depicting character strengths into different categories (see Procedure section 
below). The four quadrants (Figure 11) which cards were sorted into were: 1) 
‘Realised Strength’ (i.e., considered to be something the participant was good at, 
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enjoyed, and was most representative of themselves). 2) Unrealised Strengths 
(i.e., something thought to be good at, albeit underused and/or representing an 
area for development). 3) Learned Behaviour (i.e., something done well, but not 
enjoyed and done through necessity). Finally, 4) Weaknesses (i.e., something not 
done well, and leaving the individual demotivated or feeling negative; Capp & 
Co, 2015).  
 
Figure 11. Adapted version of the quadrant from Capp & Co (2015), with a brief of what 
each category relates to. The quadrant is used as both a practical aid for participants 
(i.e., where to sort each card), as well as a reminder throughout the task to what each 
quadrant refers. 
In addition, cards were grouped conceptually into five categories of 
strengths (i.e., “strengths families” which allow strengths to be clustered around 
a behaviour, activity, or interaction; Capp & Co, 2015). The categories are set out 
in Table 3 below. Note, the classification of these strengths, and how they are 
grouped is different (as well as the amount of named character strengths) 
compared to the more typical classifications used in PP literature (i.e., 24 
strengths itemised in the Values in Action Inventory of Strengths; Peterson & 





Table 3. The five categories of strengths within the CST 
Category No. Definition Example 
Being 14 How an individual interacts with 
their wider world 
Curiosity, 
Gratitude, Pride 








Relating 11 Relationships with others Empathic, 
Connector, 
Enabler  
Thinking 14 How an individual attends to and 
approaches situations  
Creativity, 
Resolver, Planner 
A standard deck of 52 playing cards was used in the control condition, 
with inclusion of eight random ‘duplicate’ cards (i.e., eight random cards taken 
from a second deck to bring the total number 60) of cards to match the 
experimental deck. 
Navon Task. The NT is a computer-based visual task, in which participants 
are asked to find a pre-specified letter, presented as either a large (global) letter, 
or within a collection of smaller (local) letters (Figure 12). The program was 
presented using Blitz 3D (Blitz Research Ltd; Version 1.64), full screen on a 
Windows 7 64-BIT computer, using a HANNS.G screen with resolution of 1400 x 
900 and a standard QWERTY keyboard. The computer was positioned at eye 
level, with an approximate viewing distance of 65cm.  
Letters were approximately 67mm in width, and 76mm in height. The 
task presents a combination of letters which always included either an F or H, 
combined with either T or L. Trials were presented in three blocks, each 
comprising 112 trials, with 56 of each response type. Each combination of letters 
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(i.e., HL, HT, LH, TH, FL, FT, LF, TF) was presented seven times per block, in 
randomised order. Participants were instructed to search for and respond to the 
letters F and H.  
However, in addition, they were instructed to change key-responses from 
F and H to D and J respectively, switching between response types every eight 
trials. No signal was provided to indicate when to switch, and participants were 
instructed to count and track when a change in response type needed to be 
made. 
 
Figure 12. Example of a typical NT trial for both target letters, with the changes in 
response alignment. 
Free-Response Questionnaire. To assess participant experience of the 
CST, qualitative data were collected via a free-response questionnaire. 
Participants received three prompts; 1) “Describe any thoughts or feelings you 
may have had during any aspect of the task”, 2) “Comment on how the card 
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sorting task may have effected your behaviour”, and 3) “Share any more 
comments or thoughts you may have about the task generally”. Participants 
could provide as much detail/feedback as they chose, without any time 
limitation, explicit or implicit. 
Design. A MM design was used for this study. For the experimental 
aspect (i.e., CST effect on task performance), a 2 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design 
was used. The between participants factor was Condition (Experimental, 
Control), and within participants factors were stimulus Perceptual Level (Global, 
Local, i.e., targets were either the large letter/small distractors, or the smaller 
letter/large distractor; see Figure 12), Response type (Normal, Changed; i.e., if 
the responded responding with F and H, or D and J). Dependant variables were 
Reaction Time (RT) and Accuracy (percentage error rate). For the observational 
element of the study, frequency data for CST quadrants (i.e., number of cards in 
a given quadrant; e.g., Realized Strengths), and card category within each 
quadrant (e.g., percentage of Communication cards in Realised Strengths) was 
collected. For the qualitative component, the free-response questionnaire was 
administered to all participants. These data were collected to address two 
specific questions; 1) what connection, if any, do participants discern between 
the CST and the NT; and 2) how participants experience the CST and resulting 
reflection on character strengths. 
Procedure. Participants were randomly allocated to one of the Conditions 
(Experimental, Control) and were given an information sheet, before fully- 
informed consent was sought. Testing took place in individual sound- attenuated 
laboratory cubicles. To begin, detailed instructions (see Stimuli & Measures 
section above) were provided for either the CST (i.e., Experimental), or the 
control task.  
CST Procedure. In the Experimental condition, participants were oriented 
to the deck of 60-character strength cards, with printed instructions describing 
the four CST quadrants (Figure 11). Participants were instructed to sort through 
the cards, assigning each to a quadrant, based on how they thought it related to 
them. They were requested to sort at a relaxed, but efficient pace, responding on 
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the basis of their first thought or impression. Once sorted, the experimenter 
asked participants to revisit their sorted cards, and select two from each 
quadrant they felt were most representative of themselves. In the control 
condition, participants were given a deck of standard playing cards plus eight 
additional ‘duplicate’ cards, and advised that these were in random order. 
Participants were instructed to sort cards into the four different sets (i.e., hearts, 
diamonds). Once sorted, participants were requested to sort through each set 
again to remove the duplicate cards. 
NT Procedure. Following completion of the CST, participants were 
provided instructions for the NT. As depicted in Figure 12 above, they were 
informed verbally that, for each trial, a large capital letter (formed from smaller 
capital letters) would be presented, and participants should indicate whether an 
‘F’ or ‘H’ was present (at either global or local level) by a key press corresponding 
to the letter presented. Participants were instructed that an ‘F’ or ‘H’ would 
always be presented (but never within the same trial), and requested to perform 
the task as quickly, but as accurately, as possible. Participants were also 
informed they would need to change the response keys every eight trials (F to D, 
H to J). They were instructed that no external indication for this change would 
occur, and they would need to track and change the response keys 
independently. If a response error was made participants were altered via an on-
screen message. Participants were given opportunity to clarify task instructions 
at this point, then undertook a brief practice block (16 trials, eight for each 
response type). 
Finally, participants were given the free-response questionnaire. Here, 
they were asked to reflect on the study as a whole, and describe any thoughts or 
feelings that occurred to them at any point. In particular, participants were asked 
to consider what, if any, connection they detected between the CST and NT. 
More generally, participants were asked to comment on their experience of the 
CST, and any resulting thoughts and/or feelings that arose.  
Following data collection, frequentist analyses were conducted using 
SPSS (IBM Corporation, 2016). Bayesian statistical analyses were also conducted, 
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using the free software JASP (version 0.9.0.1) and default priors (JASP Team, 
2017).   Free-response data were collated using nVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 
2012), and analysed using a content analysis methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005; Mayring, 2000).  
Results 
In order to simplify the structure of the following findings, this section has 
been divided into three subsections. Firstly, descriptive statistics are outlined, 
followed by questionnaire and experimental data (i.e., descriptive statistics for 
the NT, and subsequent inferential analyses). Next, Bayesian analysis is reported 
on NT data, to ensure a full and robust statistical approach to the data13.  To 
avoid repetition of statistics, only noteworthy findings from the Bayesian 
analyses will be reported in detail. Finally, qualitative data will be explored using 
a Content Analysis methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), with textual 
presentation of the findings. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Card Sorting Task. Table 4 below displays the percentage of cards sorted 
into each quadrant (i.e., Realised Strengths, Weaknesses, Learned Behaviours, 
and Unrealised Strengths), reported by Strengths category (i.e., Thinking, 
Communication, Relating, Being, and Motivation). The Realised Strengths 
quadrant was populated most, with 32.92% of all cards being sorted here; 
conversely Unrealised Strengths was the least popular category, with 17.51%. Of 
particular interest, 50.54% of Relating were sorted to the Realised Strengths 
category.  
 To validate experimental CST data against convenience sorting (i.e., 
chance), a one-sample t-test was used to compare overall means for each 
quadrant to the 25% chance level. Realised Strengths, t (24) = 4.38, p = < .001, 
and Unrealised Strengths, t (24) = 5.07, p = < .001, were found to be significantly 
 
13 Both in terms of experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the number of analyses 
required by a complex design; Analysis of Effects are reported as BF10. 
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different from chance, although Weakness and Learned Behaviour were not (t’s 




Table 4. Mean percentage (Standard Deviation in brackets) of cards by Strengths category and Quadrant. 
Category  Quadrant 
Realised Strengths Weaknesses Learned Behaviours Unrealised Strengths 
Mean 32.92 (9.03) 24.93 (6.64) 24.62 (6.58) 17.51 (7.37) 
Thinking 21.71 (12.1) 34.28 (11.48) 28.28 (15.07) 15.71 (10.51) 
Communication 33 (18.7) 27.5 (16.53) 20 (13.01) 19.5 (16.95) 
Relating 50.54 (20.17) 11.27 (9.19) 22.9 (17.23) 15.27 (13.04) 
Being 36.28 (15.41) 20.85 (8.72) 24.85 (14.74) 18 (13.69) 





NT Data. No outliers were removed from the data (screening was on the 
basis of pre-determined conservative ranges of between < 150ms to > 5,000ms 
for RT, and Error Rate of > 15%). Descriptive statistics for Navon performance are 
below in Tables 5 and 6, followed by a short summary of each variable. Briefly, 
the descriptive data suggests mixed findings, with the Experimental condition 
generally slower but more accurate.  
Reaction Time. Across all factors, RTs for the Control condition were 
faster (m = 764.10ms, SD = 134.21), than the Experimental condition (m = 
788.40ms, SD = 132.26). As expected, both conditions were faster for Global 
trials (m = 746.38ms) compared to Local ones (m = 806.13ms).  
Table 5. RTs in milliseconds (ms) for NT performance, by Perceptual Level, Response Type 
and Condition 
Level Response Type Condition* 
Experimental Control 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Global Normal 771.83 139.74 730.62 134.09 
Changed 744.54 118.62 738.52 152.13 
Global mean 758.19 129.18 734.57 143.11 
Local Normal 821.33 161.36 803.26 143.84 
Changed 815.89 137.35 784.01 130.97 
Local mean 818.61 149.36 793.64 137.41 
 Overall mean 788.40 132.26 764.10 134.21 
*N = 25 per Condition 
Accuracy. In contrast to the RT data, the Experimental condition was, on 
average, more accurate (m = 94.94%, SD = 3.91) than the Control condition (m = 
94.75%, SD = 4.11), although the numerical difference was negligible (0.19%). 
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Also in line with expectations, both conditions were more accurate for the Global 
trials (m = 95.66%) compared to Local (m = 94.04%). 
Table 6. Error Rate in percentage (%) for NT performance, by Perceptual Level, Response 
Type and Condition 
Level Response Type Condition* 
Experimental Control 
Mean SD Mean SD 
Global Normal 96.10 2.91 94.62 4.04 
Changed 96.00 3.18 95.90 4.14 
Global mean 96.05 3.05 95.26 4.09 
Local Normal 93.81 4.84 94.48 4.35 
Changed 93.86 4.70 94.00 3.90 
Local mean 93.83 4.77 94.24 4.13 
 Grand mean 94.94 3.91 94.75 4.11 
*N = 25 per Condition 
Inferential Statistics 
RT Data 
Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on NT RTs 
(see Table 7), with within participant factors of Perceptual Level (Global, Local) 
and Response Type (Changed, Normal), and between participants factor 
Condition (Experimental, Control). There was a significant main effect of 
Perceptual Level with moderate evidence that global trials were faster than local 
trials, F (1,48) = 45.94, p = <.001, p2 = .49, BF10 = 4.23. There was also a three-
way Perceptual Level x Response Type x Condition interaction, F (1,48) = 4.60, p = 
.04, p2 = .08 (Figure 13). However, in contrast, the Bayes analysis indicated very 
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strong evidence for the factors not interacting (BF10 = 0.01). No other significant 
effects were found (all F’s < 2.74, all p’s > .10), with anecdotal evidence in 
support H0 (all BF10 0.15 - 0.24). 
Table 7. Results of an ANOVA comparing RTs for Perceptual Level (PL), Response Types 
(RsT), and Condition, plus corresponding Bayes Factor 
 F df p p2 BF10 
PL 45.94 1, 48 <.001 .49 4.23 
RsT 2.75 1, 48 .10 .05 0.24 
Condition 0.42 1, 48 .52 .01 0.27 
PL * RsT 0.05 1, 48 .82 .00 0.17 
PL * Condition .01 1,48 .94 .00 0.18 
RsT * Condition 0.65 1,48 .43 .01 0.15 
PL * RsT * 
Condition 
4.61 1, 48 .04 .09 0.01 
 
 
Figure 13. Graph showing RTs, between Perceptual Level and Response Type by 
Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
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Predictiveness of CST sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to scrutinize the data for any relationships between 
RT performance and CST categories (i.e., to establish the appropriateness of 
subsequent regression analyses). There were no significant relationships; all rs < 
.36, all ps > .08, therefore, no regression analyses were calculated. Subsequent 
Bayesian analysis suggested anecdotal evidence (all BF10 0.41 – 0.64). 
Accuracy data 
Frequentist Analysis. Similarly to RT analysis, a mixed 2 x 2 x 2 ANOVA 
was conducted on NT Error Rates (%; see Table 8), with within participant factors 
of Perceptual Level (Global, Local) and Response Type (Changed, Normal), and 
between participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). A significant 
main effect for Perceptual Level with extreme evidence to suggest higher 
Accuracy for Global trials than Local, F (1,48) = 13.39, p = .001, p2 = .22, BF10 = 
503.40. There were no other interactions/effects (all Fs < 4.05, all ps > .14), and 
evidence was anecdotal (all BF10 0.16 - 0.47). 
Table 8. Results of an ANOVA comparing RTs for Perceptual Level (PL), Response Types 
(RsT), and Condition, plus corresponding Bayes Factor. 
 F df p p2 BF10 
PL 13.39 1, 48 .001 .22 503.40 
RsT 0.39 1, 48 .54 .01 0.16 
Condition 0.04 1, 48 .84 .00 0.47 
PL * RsT 1.16 1, 48 .29 .02 0.35 
PL * Condition 1.81 1,48 .19 .04 0.21 
RsT * Condition 0.49 1,48 .49 .01 0.27 
PL * RsT * 
Condition 





Figure 14. Graph showing Accuracy, between Perceptual Level and Response Type by 
Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of CST sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to assess any relationship between Accuracy and CST 
categories prior to any regression analyses. No significant relationships were 
found (all rs < .32, all ps > .18), therefore, no regression analyses were 
undertaken. Subsequent Bayesian analysis indicated anecdotal evidence in 
support of the null (all BF10 0.28 – 0.80). 
Qualitative Data 
Participants’ responses to the free response questionnaire were analysed 
using Content Analysis (CA; Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000). A directed 
‘top-down’ approach was taken in analysing the data, extracting categories as 
reported by participants, with a view to addressing specific questions (e.g., “how 
do participants feel about reflecting on their character strengths?”; see 
Measures and Stimuli/Design above). For categories to be classified, codes had to 
occur across the across the data set and represent common ideas. Categories 
created from participants’ responses, together with any additional 
categories/codes emerging after primary analysis, were also been identified and 
reported below. Finally, frequency data are not reported with the CA below for 
two reasons. The first is to keep the distinction between qualitative and 
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quantitative data strands concrete; “qualitative research is about meaning, not 
numbers” (Braun & Clarke, 2013, pg. 20). This is not to say transformation, or 
triangulation of qualitative data is not situationally useful (Creswell & Plano 
Clark, 2018), but here it is important to focus on the subjective experience of the 
CST. Second, the frequency information available for the categories is 
inconsistent (i.e., not all participants contribute to all categories), meaning any 
inferences that may be drawn about prevalence of categories are limited at best. 
To this end, the inclusion of frequency data may unfairly attribute more (or less) 
value to any given category.  
Connection Between the Tasks. Four categories were identified from 
Experimental participants responses, plus a single category from Control 
participants (see Table 9 below). The most frequent category was that 
undertaking the CST had beneficial impact on NT performance (i.e., the Beneficial 
category; see Table 9 for examples). The Detrimental category did not necessarily 
contrast to the Beneficial, suggesting instead more ‘emotional’-style response 
which potentially affected approach to (or performance in) the NT. Similarly, 
Reflective State focused on identification of contemplation-oriented disposition 
following the CST. Finally, a small (but no less meaningful) proportion of 
participants saw no perceived connection between the CST and NT. Somewhat 
surprisingly, Control participants also suggested that their card sorting activity 




Table 9. Examples from each sub-category relating to the Connection between the tasks. 
Sub-category Example 
Beneficial  “May have impacted on the computer task as it makes you more 
determined to complete the task accurately and spend time to 
ensure you are answering correctly” 
Detrimental “This did make me feel quite sad actually, which carried over to 
the cognitive task” 
No Connection “I don’t think it seemed to have a lasting effect on me” 
Reflective State “… so when the cognitive task began to bore me a little my 
attention began to slip and I was reminded of the weakness pile, 
which knocked my confidence a little” 
Positive Control “It also partially set my brain in motion since it is still morning” 
Character Strengths Reflection. In considering how participants 
experienced reflecting on their character strengths, three categories were 
identified (Table 10). Generally, responses suggested that participants enjoyed 
the CST itself, indicating a positive/pleasant experience. Beyond experience of 
the task itself, the remaining categories focused on two individual factors; Focus 
on Strengths and Focus on Weaknesses. 
Items within the Focus on Weaknesses category generally suggested 
participants became preoccupied with their own weaknesses, either as a 
detrimental characteristic, and/or something to be overcome/compensated for. 
In contrast, the Focus on Strengths category highlighted the advantages in 
opportunities to reflect and acknowledge traits as strengths, particularly where 




Table 10.  Examples of each of the Sub-Categories relating to the Reflecting on Character 
Strengths Category. 
Sub-category Example 
Strengths “this task made me realise that I’m much more resilient and to 
some extent compassionate, compared to what I first thought” 
Weaknesses “Sorting task made me focus on my weaknesses- made me reflect 
on what kind of person I am” 
Enjoyment “It felt good to reflect on my strengths and choose my top two, it 
boosted my ego” 
Discussion 
 In considering quantitative findings alone, little difference is seen 
between conditions; Experimental and Control participants showed similar NT 
performance (both RTs and accuracy), with no relationship between CST 
frequency data and NT performance. Across the whole sample, NT data was as 
predicted (i.e., faster and more accurate on Global and Normal trials; Navon, 
1978). Moreover, Bayesian analysis provides cautionary support for these 
findings (i.e., evidence supporting the faster/more accurate Global trials, 
anecdotal evidence for other interactions/effects). This suggests the NT worked 
as intended, but there is not sufficient evidence to say the CST failed to have an 
effect. 
 Qualitatively, the findings are also somewhat mixed. The CST was 
described as a broadly positive, enjoyable task, however some participants 
suggested a detrimental (or at least less positive) experience. Interestingly, 
participants also described a generally reflective state; this supports CST efficacy 
in enabling reflection on character strengths, at least at an anecdotal level.   
 Converging the data strands, it appears these findings are inconclusive 
overall. The CST proved effective in facilitating reflection on personal strengths, 
although the behavioural benefits postulated by the BBH are not evident. It is 
possible to suggest that NT demands were not sufficient to highlight robust 
behavioural differences (i.e., we saw ‘ceiling-style’ effects, in terms of the CF 
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needed for successful performance).  However, given the NT was chosen for its 
alignment with the previous BBH literature (i.e., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005), 
and potential ability to establish baseline CF demands levels, this does not 
indicate these data are not useful (i.e., they provide a useful foundation from 
which a better understanding can be built). The next step to clarify these findings 
is to combine the CST with a task comprising higher CF demand.  
Study 2: Card Sorting Task, and Adaptive Choice Task 
 The NT allowed for initial exploration of CST efficacy, using a simple 
paradigm that both aligned with the previous literature (e.g., Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005) and addressed CF needed to engage/manipulate lower-level 
cognition (i.e., perceptuo-attentional processing). However, the findings suggest 
that cognition engagement necessary for effective NT performance may not have 
been sufficient to create a ‘cognitive landscape’ where CF was required. Overall, 
the behavioural and cognitive benefits that the BBH leads us to expect, did not 
emerge in Experimental participants.  
This presents two options; perhaps the CST ‘intervention’ is not strong 
enough to elicit a positivity response via engagement with personal character 
strengths (cf participants focusing on strengths and enjoying the CST), and needs 
increased impact/robustness. Alternatively, the task demands of the cognition 
required (i.e., in the NT; Study 1) are insufficient for CF to emerge clearly.  To 
focus on this second argument, use of the Adaptive Choice Task (ACT; Irons & 
Leber, 2015 Chapter 3 for more details) presents an opportunity to explore CST 
efficacy in a more cognitively-demanding task (i.e., dynamic, adaptive cognitive 
function in a changing environment). 
The Current Study: Research Questions and Predictions 
 Similarly to Study 1, this study aims to evaluate the CST as an effective 
intervention to elicit positivity-based differences in cognitive performance (i.e., 
following BBH; Fredrickson, 2001). To repeat the primary research question 
outlined in Study 1, do Experimental participants perform better on the Adaptive 
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Choice Task (ACT) than their control counterparts? In addition, do subjective 
differences in CST engagement evidenced via qualitative analysis (e.g., category 
frequency) support enhanced ACT performance? Additionally, it may be 
important to evaluate whether individual differences in CST engagement (i.e., 
the frequency with which cards are assigned to the different categories e.g., 
strengths, weaknesses etc.,) correlate with RT, Accuracy, or Optimality 
performance in the ACT.  
The qualitative data collected will allow for insight into the subjective 
experience of completing the CST. More generally, these data will be analysed to 
see how participants feel about the act of reflecting on character strengths; 
given the subject matter is positive of itself, the experience is expected to be 
positive. Additionally, the qualitative data will be used to explore what 




 Fifty participants were recruited for this study (39 female); age ranged 
from 18-21 (M = 18.88, SD = 0.85). Thirty-seven (74%) self-reported their first 
language as English, a further two as Chinese, Cantonese, Lithuanian, and French 
(4% each), and one each as Finnish, Tamil, Romanian, Arabic, and Italian (2% 
each). Participants were recruited from a panel of first year undergraduate 
psychology students at the University of Warwick, who each received course 
credit for their participation. 
Measures and Stimuli 
Card-Sort Task and Free Response Questionnaire. An identical CST 
intervention and free-response questionnaire as in Study 1, were used in Study 1 
(see Study 1: Methods above). 
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Adaptive Choice Task (ACT; Irons & Leber, 2015). The ACT is a computer-
based visual search task in which participants are instructed to find target stimuli 
in an array of distractors. The program was presented using MATLAB (The 
MatWorks, Inc; Version R2018a), in full screen mode on a Windows 7 64-BIT 
computer, using a HANNS.G screen (resolution of 1400x900) and a standard 
QWERTY keyboard. The computer was positioned at eye level, with an 
approximate viewing distance of 65cm.  
In each trial, participants were instructed to identify a target (here, a red 
or blue square numbered between 2-5; integers only) from an array of 
distractors (red and blue squares numbered between 6-9, and green squares 
numbered between 2-9). Participants were asked to choose between two targets 
(circled in Figure 15; red ‘4’, or blue ‘3’). A red and blue target was included in 
every trial, although the target number was always made numerically distinct 
(i.e., if red was 3, then blue would be 2, 4, or 5).  
Distractor targets varied predictably across trials, with each colour 
ranging in its proportional representation within the array (i.e., more blue or 
more red distractors). Participants were instructed to make a key press to 
indicate a target had been found/selected (i.e., V = 2, B = 3, N = 4, M = 5). If a 
participant responded incorrectly, a visual cue was presented to indicate this 
(i.e., “Incorrect”). Participants completed three blocks of 84 trials each, with an 
option to take a self-paced break between each block, and were instructed to 




Figure 15. Typical ACT trial. Two correct target trials are outlined, participant would 
press ‘B’ for the blue target, and ‘N’ for the red target. 
 As per the original study by Irons and Leber (2013), three additional 
questions were administered to participants directly after ACT performance, in 
order to understand participant strategy for selecting targets. Participants were 
asked three questions; 1) “During the cognitive task, how did you decide which 
target to search for? Were there any particular factors that made you want to 
respond to one instead of the other?”. Next, they were asked, 2) “Did you switch 
between the two targets? If so, what made you decide to switch?”, and 3) “On 
some trials, there were more blue items in the display, and other times there 
were more red items. Did you get the impression that this change occurred 
abruptly, or gradually?”. Participants were able to provide as much 
detail/feedback as they chose, without any explicit or implicit time limitation. 
Design 
 A MM design was used for this study. For the experimental aspect (i.e., 
CST effect on task performance), a 2 x 3 mixed factorial design was used. The 
between participants factor was Condition (Experimental, Control), and within 
participants factor was Block (One, Two, Three). Dependant variables were 
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Reaction Time (RT, ms), Accuracy (error rates, %), and Optimality (%; proportion 
of switches made by participants to less dominant target, e.g., from red to blue 
when more distractors are red). For the observational element of the study, 
frequency data for the CST quadrants (e.g., number of cards in Realised 
Strengths), and frequency of card category within each quadrant (e.g., 
percentage of Communication cards in Realised Strengths) was recorded. 
For the qualitative component of the study, the free-response 
questionnaire was administered to all participants. These data were collected to 
address two specific questions; 1) what connection, if any, did participants 
discern between the CST and the ACT; and 2) how did participants experience 
the CST and any resulting reflection on character strengths. As indicated above, 
three additional ACT strategy questions were asked to address target selection 
strategy. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to a Condition (Experimental, or 
Control), and followed the same procedure for the CST/control task as described 
in Study 1 (see pg. 88).  
Following completion of the CST/control task, participants were 
instructed for the ACT. They were informed verbally to read the instructions 
carefully, and to signal the researcher if they had any questions before starting 
the task. Instructions were presented on screen, specifying that, for each trial, 
two targets would appear; one red square (with a number between 2 and 5), and 
one blue square (with a number between 2 and 5). All other squares would be 
red, green, or blue and have a number greater than 5. There would always be a 
red and blue target to find, but it was their choice which one they selected as 
their ‘found’ target. To indicate a target had been found, participants were 
instructed to press the key ‘V’ for 2, ‘B’ for 3, ‘N’ for 4, and ‘M’ for 5. A visual 
depiction of these instructions was also included, similar to Figure 15 above. 
Finally, participants were told that the targets for each trial would not be the 
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same number (i.e., if the red target was 2, then the blue had to be 3, 4, or 5), and 
that they should respond as quickly, but as accurately, as possible. 
Finally, participants were given the free-response questionnaire. Here, 
they were asked to reflect on the study as a whole, and describe any thoughts or 
feelings that occurred to them at any point. In particular, participants were asked 
to consider what, if any, connection they detected between the CST and ACT. 
More generally, participants were also asked to comment on their experience of 
the CST, and any resulting thoughts and/or feelings that arose.  
Following data collection, Frequentist analyses were conducted using 
SPSS (IBM Corporation, 2016) and Bayesian statistical analyses were also 
conducted, using the free software JASP (version 0.9.0.1) and default priors (JASP 
Team, 2017). Free-response data were collated using nVivo (QSR International 
Pty Ltd, 2012), and analysed using a content analysis methodology (Hsieh & 
Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000). 
Results 
In order to simplify the structure of the following findings, this section has 
been divided into three subsections. Firstly, descriptive statistics are outlined, 
followed by questionnaire and experimental data (i.e., descriptive statistics for 
the ACT, and subsequent inferential analyses). Next, Bayesian analysis is 
reported on ACT data, to ensure a full and robust statistical approach to the 
data14.  To avoid repetition of statistics, only noteworthy findings from the 
Bayesian analysis will be reported in detail. Finally, qualitative data will be 
explored using a Content Analysis methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), with 
textual presentation of the findings. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Card Sorting Task. Table 11 shows the percentage of cards sorted by 
quadrant (i.e., Realised Strengths, Weaknesses, Learned Behaviours, and 
 
14 Both in terms of experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the number of analyses 
required by a complex design; Analysis of Effects are reported as BF10. 
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Unrealised Strengths), and then by Strengths category (i.e., Thinking, 
Communication, Relating, Being, and Motivation15). The Realised Strengths 
quadrant was populated most, with 33.59% of all cards being sorted here; 
Unrealised Strengths was the least popular category, with 17.38%. Echoing 
previous results (see Study 1), nearly half (49.82%) of Relating were sorted to the 
Realised Strengths category. 
To validate experimental CST data against simple convenience sorting 
(i.e., chance), a one-sample t-test was used to compare overall means for each 
quadrant to the 25% chance level. Both Realised Strengths, t (24) = 5.65, p = < 
.001, and Unrealised Strengths, t (24) = 5.61, p = < .001, were significantly 
different to chance (Weaknesses and Learned Behaviours; both ts <0.07, both ps 
> .47).  
 




Table 11. Mean percentage (Standard Deviation in brackets) of cards by Strengths category and Quadrant. 
Category  Quadrant 
Realised Strengths Weaknesses Learned Behaviours Unrealised Strengths 
Mean 33.59 (7.6) 24.13 (5.91) 24.9 (6.61) 17.38 (6.79) 
Thinking 26.29 (11.79) 32 (12.9) 25.43 (10.73) 16.29 (12.63) 
Communication 35.5 (15.6) 25 (13.98) 23 (14.29) 16.5 (11.25) 
Relating 49.82 (16.41) 13.82 (10.2) 20 (14.37) 16.36 (10.5) 
Being 35.43 (15.9) 24 (13.34) 23.14 (10.57) 17.43 (13.38) 
Motivation 20.92 (11.44) 25.85 (12.93) 32.92 (15.78) 20.31 (13.3) 
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ACT Data. Outliers were removed from the data automatically (see Irons 
and Leber, 2013); for RT screening was on the conservative ranges of < 300ms to 
more than 3 standard deviations about the individuals RT mean, and Error Rate 
of > 15%. Tables 12 below includes descriptive statistics for ACT performance, 
coupled with a short summary of each variable.  
Reaction Time. RTs were generally faster in the Experimental condition 
(m = 2962.95ms, SD = 483.79), although Control RTs showed minimal numerical 
difference (m = 3043.82ms, SD = 767.95); numerical RT difference between 
conditions was 80.87ms. No consistent differences were seen between 
conditions for block-dependent RT performance (i.e., both conditions were 
fastest on Block 3; Experimental m = 2714.12ms, Control m = 2839.30).  
Accuracy. Again, both conditions have comparable Accuracy, with only 
0.67% numerical difference between conditions (Experimental: m = 96.78%, SD = 
3.33; Control: m = 96.11%, SD = 3.67). In the Control condition, Accuracy 
increased across the experiment duration (Block 1 m = 94.48%, Block 3 m = 
97.00%), whereas the Experimental condition had the highest Accuracy for Block 
2 (m = 97.29%).   
Optimality. Considering the frequency of switches to the least 
representative colour, participants in the Experimental condition displayed 
higher Optimality (m = 58.03%, SD = 15.72), compared with Control participants 
(m = 56.78%, SD = 14.87), although again, this difference was insubstantial in 
numerical terms. Overall, there was no clear pattern of optimality according to 
block-by-block analysis; both conditions improved between Blocks 1 and 2 
(increase across both conditions m = 4.49%), but declined between Blocks 2 and 




Table 12. ACT RT (ms), Accuracy (%), and Optimality (%), by Block and Condition.
Condition* Block Dependant Variable 
RT Accuracy Optimality 







1 3392.53 1014.14 94.48 5.59 56.02 16.84 
2 2899.63 714.05 96.86 2.89 59.29 15.03 
3 2839.30 623.23 97.00 4.05 54.99 16.54 








1 3270.46 600.96 96.24 3.87 53.90 14.94 
2 2904.27 543.40 97.29 3.68 59.60 17.57 
3 2714.12 415.19 96.81 5.01 57.78 21.60 





Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on ACT RTs 
(Figure 16), with within participant factor of Block (1, 2, 3), and between 
participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). There was a main effect 
of Block, although only with anecdotal evidence, F (1.46,70.20) = 59.59, p = 
<.001, p2 = .55, BF10 = 1.08 16. Planned post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed 
that Block 3 was faster than both Block 1 (p = <.001), and Block 2 (p = .001), and 
Block 2 was faster than Block 1 (p = <.001). No main effect was found between 
Conditions with anecdotal evidence for H0, F (1,48) = 0.20, p = .66, BF10 = 0.40. 
Finally, no interaction, with anecdotal evidence for H0, between Condition and 
Block was seen F (2,96) = 0.97, p = .39, BF10 = 0.38. 
 
Figure 16. Graph showing RTs by Block and Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard 
error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to assess any relationship between RT and the CST 
 
16 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, 2 (2) = 
21.54, p = <.001, therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction has been used 
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categories. No significant relationships were found; all rs < .23, all ps > .26. 
Subsequent Bayesian analysis suggested anecdotal evidence in support of H0 (all 
BF10 0.32 – 0.52). 
Accuracy data 
Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on ACT error 
rates (%; Figure 17), with within participant factor of Block (1, 2, 3) and between 
participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). There was a main effect 
of Block17, although with anecdotal evidence for H0, F (1.60,76.91) = 4.97, p = 
.009, p2 = .09, BF10 = 0.11, with highest accuracy in Block 2 and lowest in Block 
1. Planned post-hoc pairwise comparisons by Block revealed no difference 
between Blocks 2 and 3 (p = .72), increased accuracy in both compared to Block 1 
(p = .004, p = .04 respectively). No main effect was found between Conditions 
with anecdotal evidence in for H0, F (1,48) = 0.45, p = .50, BF10 = 0.17. Finally, 
strong evidence in support of H0 indicated Condition and Block do not interact, F 
(2,96) = 1.39, p = .26, BF10 = 0.05. 
 
Figure 17. Graph showing Accuracy, Block by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard 
error of the mean. 
 
17 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, 2 (2) = 
13.41, p = .001, therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction has been used 
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Predictiveness of CST sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to assess any relationship between Accuracy and CST 
categories. A moderate positive correlation was found between Strengths and 
Accuracy, r (25) = .45, p = .02, but no other significant relationships were found; 
all rs < .25, all ps > .24, all BF10 0.30 – 0.48. Subsequently, simple linear regression 
revealed number of cards categorised as Realised Strengths was a predictor of 
Accuracy (t = 32.09, p = .02, R2 =0.20), Accuracy was equal to 90.10 + (0.002 x 
strengths cards); see Figure 18. Subsequent Bayesian analysis suggested 
moderate evidence for H1 in support of the relationship between Realised 
Strengths and Accuracy (BF = 3.80). 
 
Figure 18. Scatterplot depicting relationship between categorised Realised Strengths 
cards and Accuracy. 
Optimality data 
Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 3 x 2 ANOVA was conducted on ACT 
Optimality (%; Figure 19), with within participant factor of Block (1, 2, 3) and 
between participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control).  There was a 
main effect of Block, although with anecdotal evidence for H0 18, F (1.61,77.24) = 
 
18 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, 2 (2) = 
13.07, p = .001, therefore the Greenhouse-Geisser correction has been used 
115 
 
3.91, p = .03, p2 = .08, BF10 = 1.24; highest Optimality was shown in Block 2, with 
lowest in Block 1. Planned post-hoc pairwise comparisons by Block showed less 
optimality in Block 1 than Block 2 (p = .007), although not in Block 3 (p = .48). In 
addition, more optimality was demonstrated in Block 2 than Block 3 (p = .02). No 
main effect was found between Conditions with anecdotal evidence for H0, F 
(1,48) = 0.00, p = .94, BF10 = 0.36. Finally, no interaction, with anecdotal evidence 
for H0, between Condition and Block was seen F (2,96) = 1.32, p = .33, BF10 = 0.22. 
 
Figure 19. Bar graph showing Optimality by Block and Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to assess any relationship between Switch Optimality 
and CST categories. No significant relationships were found; all rs < .28, all ps > 
.16, all BF10 0.25 – 0.62. In slight contrast, anecdotal evidence for H1 was found to 
support a negative relationship between Unrealised Strengths and Optimality, r = 
-.45, BF10 = 2.77. 
Qualitative Data 
ACT Strategies. Qualitative data was collected, in the same way as in 
Irons and Leber (2016), to explore participants’ selection strategies during the 
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ACT. Given the brief, highly focused nature of responses, a content analysis 
procedure (e.g., Hseish & Shannon, 2005) was used to convert data into 
frequency categories. Responses to the three questions (see Study 2: Materials 
section) are shown below. Notably, participants were able to respond freely, 
therefore not all responses were coded (or codable), and some participants 
provided multiple answers to each question. In this latter case, responses were 
coded to their most representative category. 
Target Selection Strategy. When asked about their target selection 
strategy, six categories were identified across the two conditions (Table 13 
below). The majority of participants (n = 24) indicated an aim of optimality, 
searching only for the target within colour domain with the lowest proportion of 
distractor targets. However, 18% (n = 9) of participants decided to focus on one 
colour only, and a further 34% suggested less useful strategies. This ranged from 
complete strategy absence, to simple search until a target of either colour was 
found. 
Table 13. Responses and frequency data for the Sub-Categories Relating to Target 
Selection, separated by Condition. 
Sub-Category E C Examples 
Blue Focus 4 2 “I felt that the colour blue jumped out at me 
more” 
Red Focus 1 2 “I always looked for the red” 
No Focus 2 5 “Started with whatever caught my eye” 
Top Down 1 0 “Looking at it from the top to bottom” 
First to Find 4 2 “Which ever one I saw first” 
Smallest 
Proportion 
13 11 “I chose the colour which was represented 
less” 
Note. E = Experimental condition, C = Control condition 
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Target Switching. Exploring target switching strategies (i.e., from red to 
blue and visa versa), four categories were evident (see Table 14 below). Half the 
participants (25) adhered to expected optimisation behaviour (i.e., switching 
when one colour formed a larger proportion of the distractors). The second most 
popular strategy (n = 12) was to avoid switching, followed by less optimal 
approaches, such as exhaustive searches (e.g., searching every block 
systematically). 
Table 14. Responses and frequency data for the Sub-Categories Relating to Target 
Switching, separated by Condition. 
Sub-Category E  C Examples 
Proportion of 
Colour 
13 12 “Mostly went for blue but switched depending 
on how many numbers of a colour were 
present” 
No Specific Reason 4 3 “I'm not sure why - possibly for variation, or to 
see if I found one colour faster than the other” 
Exhaustive Switch 4 2 “If I couldn’t find a correct number on one 
colour I’d switch to the other” 
Location 2 2 “I did switch between red and blue, mainly if a 
red target was in my immediate eye line when 
the trial started” 
No Switch 6 6 “No” 
Note. E = Experimental condition, C = Control condition 
Distractor Changes. Three categories emerged when participants’ 
awareness of distractor stimuli in each trial was probed; in other words, if 
participants noticed changes and change onset (see Table 15 below). The 
majority of participants (n = 34) suggested that the distractors switched abruptly, 
while a further 14 suggested the switch was more gradual. An additional five 
reported no awareness of distractors changing. 
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Table 15. Responses for each of the Sub-Categories Relating to Distractor Changes, by 
Condition. 
Sub-Category E  C Examples 
Abrupt 19 15 “Abruptly” 
Gradual 7 7 “Gradually” 
Unaware 2 3 “Didn’t notice” 
Note. E = Experimental condition, C = Control condition 
Free Response Questionnaire. Participants’ responses to the free 
response questionnaires were analysed using a Content Analysis methodology 
similar to Study 1. A ‘top-down’ approach was adopted to address two specific 
questions; 1) “how do participants feel about the CST?”, and 2) “what, if any, 
connection do participants perceive between the CST and the ACT?”. 
Importantly, qualitative analysis procedures recommend acknowledgement of 
implicit bias arising from prior analyses. Thus, while the content analysis here 
was conducted following standardised procedures, findings from Study 1 use of 
the CST have influenced (or are highly likely to have influenced) this analysis. On 
a pragmatic level, categories identified in previous analyses do not constrain this 
analysis (i.e., new, previously undefined categories have been used), but where 
similarities have occurred, this has been noted (e.g., via identical category 
names). 
Connection Between the Tasks. In considering what, if any, impact of the 
CST participants perceived on ACT performance, two categories emerged for 
each Condition (see Table 16 below). In the Experimental condition, participants 
were divided between positive impact on ACT performance (Impactful), and 
perceiving no relationship between the tasks (No Connection). In the Control 
condition, responses were again divided, but here, between positive impact 




Table 16. Examples from each sub-category relating to the Connection between the tasks 
category. 
Sub-category Example 
Impactful  “I had attributed determination and various intelligent 
qualities to myself in the card-sorting exercise, I set myself 
a goal to get 100% in every block” 




“As there was so many cards, there was a sense of 
tiredness/boredom from doing the task” 
Impactful Control “Prepared me for it” 
Character Strengths Reflection. One overarching category emerged when 
evaluating the reflection process itself. This Positivity category presented three 
sub-categories; 1) Focus on Strengths, 2) Positivity Enhancement, and 3) 
Motivation and Determination (Table 17 below). The most widespread sub-
category (Focus on Strengths) illustrated that participants thought the CST 
facilitated focus on personal strengths. This extended beyond simple listing of 
strengths, into a general evaluation of strengths and their implications. The two 
other sub-categories were more evenly present throughout the dataset, and 
highlighted a more general positivity induced by the CST (i.e., an overall 
enhancement or boost). Similarly, reflecting on strengths was considered 
motivational in terms of the subsequent task, particularly in respect of current 









“Made me rethink my cards, for example, attention to detail 
is actually a strength” 
Positivity 
Enhancement 
“During the card-sorting task, I felt very reflective of who I 
am as a person which brought up various emotions but 
boosted my positivity” 
Motivation & 
Determination 
“…using it as proof of my goal setting/determination. I was 
proud each time I got 100% in a block, even though I knew it 
wasn't any kind of exam, it gave me some validation of the 
qualities I had admired in the card-sorting exercise.” 
Discussion 
 Quantitatively, the data suggest that while performance on the ACT is as 
anticipated within the literature (i.e., faster, more accurate and more optimal 
over time), very little difference is seen between the conditions. In other words, 
undertaking the CST appears to have no direct impact on ACT performance. 
More, Bayesian analysis for the most part was anecdotal, suggesting there is not 
sufficient evidence to say the CST failed or succeeded to impact on ACT 
performance. However, some evidence for an indirect relationship is seen; when 
more cards are sorted into the Strengths category, an increase in Accuracy is 
seen. 
 The qualitative data indicate a small difference in experience between 
conditions, with more experimental participants mentioning enhanced ACT 
performance. In addition, the CST itself was mostly considered to be a positive 
activity. Content analysis categories highlighted motivational impact of character 
strength reflection, and insight that participants enjoy focusing on realised 
strengths (as opposed to areas for development, or weaknesses). Moreover, the 
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CST was generally considered advantageous (or at worst, neutral), in facilitating  
ACT performance; a clear contrast with the control task. Taking both data strands 
together, greater focus on Strengths predicts more accurate, and arguably, 
amore cognitively flexible, performance; these conclusions were supported by 
Bayesian analysis, however, this support was not unequivocal. 
Reviewing the CST 
Here, a disagreement is seen between qualitative and quantitative 
results. Thus far, the impact on CF performance (i.e., via the NT and ACT) has 
been mixed, and in practical terms, this means the behavioural differences  we 
would expect  in accordance with the BBH have not been supported in any 
robust way. However, this lack of impact can be argued to reside mainly with the 
quantitative data (e.g., RT, accuracy, optimality data etc.) In contrast, the 
qualitative data suggests that Experimental participants report a more positive 
experience overall, as well as a general belief that the CST has a beneficial impact 
on subsequent task performance. Importantly for a holistic perspective, these 
data indicate this belief is preserved as cognitive task demand increases (e.g., 
when the task demands require more than a simple decision on perceptual 
stimuli etc.). 
Following the debate detailed at the start of this study (i.e., regarding CST 
strength vs cognitive task complexity, see Study 2: Card Sorting Task, and 
Adaptive Choice Task) this divergence between data strands may emanate from 
both cognitive tasks selected. Studies 1 and 2 have employed well-validated 
perceptuo-attentional tasks (e.g., Brand & Johnson, 2014; Navon, 1981; Noguchi 
& Tomoike, 2016; see Chapter 3). Importantly, this type of cognitive task was 
originally used by Fredrickson and Branigan (2005), where enhanced attentional 
focus was demonstrated with positively valenced stimuli. However, the ACT 
requires an additional level of cognitive sophistication (i.e., with optimality, 
switches and individual differences in awareness of these components), which 
may account for less marked divergence between qualitative and quantitative 
findings for the ACT (Irons & Leber, 2016).  
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That said, this does not indicate that our current ‘intervention’ is working 
in a manner robust enough to impact on subsequent task performance; nor does 
it negate its use in a conclusive way. Thus, given that increasing the task 
demands of the cognitive task (i.e., in terms of the complexity and sophistication 
of the cognition required for performance) appears to indicate some enhanced 
engagement with CF, this avenue will be pursued. However, given the apparent 
need to probe cognition beyond perceptuo-attentional processing (i.e., in Studies 
1 and 2), a traditional divergent thinking (i.e., Alternative Uses Task, Guildford et 
al, 1978; see Chapter 3 for use in previous literature) paradigm will be used in 
Study 3. This final change in paradigm should allow clearer evaluation of CST 
impact on CF, but where the cognition required for baseline performance moves 
beyond lower level processing. 
Study 3: CST and Alternative Uses Task 
The original BBH research (Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005) has been 
characterized in this chapter so far by its use of perception- and attention-driven 
tasks (e.g., the NT, Navon, 1977). However notably, they also included a 
paradigm to measure impact on the thought-action repertoire (T-AR) beyond 
these lower-level cognitive processes (i.e., participants who experienced positive 
emotions also recorded more numerous thought-actions; Fredrickson & 
Branigan, 2005). The Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford et al, 1978; see 
Chapter 3) was developed to explore explicit flexibility and creativity in responses 
to a ‘divergent thinking’ task.  
In this study, AUT use will change the focus on the type(s) of cognition we 
examine in relation with CF. Specifically, enhanced CF has been supported by 
qualitative data in Studies 1 and 2, but this paradigm will allow for more abstract 
broadening of the T-AR to be measured, and for the CF involved in abstract task 
performance to be evaluated. However it is important to note that the AUT will 
be presented in similar conditions to the cognitive tasks in Studies 1 and 2. For 
example, participants will complete the task in segments (similar to experimental 
blocks) and under time constraints within a laboratory environment. While 
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arguably, this may ‘constrain creativity’ in lay terms, pragmatically speaking, it 
supports consistency between the three tasks in this chapter.  
The current study: Research questions and predictions 
Based on the findings of Studies 1 and 2 (and the BBH literature, e.g., 
Fredrickson and Branigan, 2005), behavioural benefit in task performance is 
predicted for participants in the Experimental group. For example, we anticipate 
more acceptable alternative uses (and fewer rejections) in Experimental 
participants. In addition, we would expect increases in flexible, elaborative, and 
original uses proposed by this group.   
As in Studies 1 and 2, qualitative data will give insight into participants’ 
subjective experience of the CST. More specifically, we will ask whether 
individual (subjective) differences in CST engagement (i.e., category frequency) 
result in enhanced overall AUT performance (i.e., more alternative uses for the 
household items). Evaluation of character strength reflection itself and CST 
potential as a real-world intervention will be explored via Content Analysis (Hsieh 
& Shannon, 2005). Our focus is whether the CST is a pleasant activity and/or 
whether participants would engage in character strengths reflection (more 
generally, perhaps) on their own initiative; based on the previous studies, it is 
expected that participant will enjoy the CST. 
Method 
Participants 
 Originally fifty participants were recruited, however four were removed 
having failed to follow the instructions. Of the remaining forty-six participants 
(38 female), age ranged from 18-27 years (M = 19.13; SD = 1.43). Thirty-five 
participants (76.09%) self-reported English as their first language, a further six 
(13.04%) reported Cantonese as their first language. The remainder reported 
Russian, French, Spanish, Malay, and Korean as their primary languages (2.17% 
or one each). Participants were recruited from a panel of first year 
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undergraduate psychology students at the University of Warwick, who each 
received course credit for their participation. 
Measures and Stimuli 
Card-Sorting Task and Free Response Questionnaire. An identical CST 
and free response questionnaire (i.e., as in Studies 1 & 2; see Card Sorting Task) 
were used in Study 3. 
Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford et al., 1978). Here, participants 
were asked to generate novel uses for household items (e.g., a newspaper). The 
task was separated into four sections, each containing four different items; 
participants are given a time limit for task performance (4 minutes per Section). 
Five measures are taken from participants to reflect functions of 
creativity/fluency (and by extension CF). These comprise two that focus on 
quantitative aspects of performance; 1) Fluency (total number of acceptable 
responses) and 2) Flexibility (number of categories acceptable uses related to). 
The remaining three focus on the quality of the responses themselves; 3) 
Elaboration (how much participants elaborated on their answers), 4) Originality 
(how original the suggested use was compared to the rest of the sample), and 5) 
Accuracy (how many suggested uses were considered acceptable). 
AUT Analysis. Initially, responses were coded by one researcher (see 
Guilford et al., 1978 handbook), however to ensure objectivity/consistency, the 
analysis was reviewed by a second coder (i.e., to verify accepted/rejected 
responses). Responses were rejected if they met one of the following two 
conditions; firstly, this occurred if the response was a repetition of a previous 
answer in the same part of the task (e.g., A or B) by the same participant. For 
example here,  ‘safety pin’ and ‘key’ might both be used as jewellery, but if the 
participant had just stated ‘jewellery’ or phrased the use in the same way for 
both, it would be rejected the second time. Secondly, responses were also 
rejected if the proposed use was not feasible, or did not make sense without 
further explanation. For example, an unacceptable response would be ‘glasses- 
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start a fire’, however, ‘glasses- lens used to focus light and start a fire’ would be 
accepted.  
Fluency was calculated as the total acceptable responses for each section, 
with accuracy representing total rejected responses. The elaboration score was 
determined based on the detail included in an acceptable response. Thus, 
‘bedsheet-protect furniture’ would receive no elaboration points, whereas 
‘bedsheet- protect furniture when painting’ would receive one point. Flexibility 
scores were obtained by summing the different use categories for each item. In 
this case, ‘shoe- used as a plant pot’, ‘shoe- used to squash bugs’, and ‘shoe- 
used as a weapon’ would receive two flexibility points; one for decoration, and 
one for weapon. Finally, originality was scored by comparing the frequency of 
accepted responses across the whole participant sample. For example, a use 
provided by fewer than 1% of the sample (in this instance, once) would accrue 
two points, and by fewer than 5% (twice), one point.  
Design 
A MM design was used for this study. For the experimental aspect (i.e., 
CST effect on AUT performance), a 2 x 4 mixed factorial design was used with the 
between participants of Condition (Experimental, Control), and within 
participants factor Section (1, 2, 3, 4). The dependant variables were Error Rate 
(%), Fluency, Flexibility, Originality, Elaboration and. For the observational 
element of the study, frequency data for CST quadrants (e.g., number of cards in 
Realised Strengths), and frequency of card category within each quadrant (e.g., 
percentage of Communication cards in Realised Strengths) was recorded. 
For the qualitative component of the study, the free-response 
questionnaire was administered to all participants. These data were collected to 
address two specific questions; 1) “what connection, if any, do participants 
discern between the CST and the AUT?”; and 2) “how do participants experience 





Participants were randomly allocated to a Condition (Experimental, or 
Control), and followed the same procedure for the CST/control task as described 
in Study 1 (see pg. 88).  
Following completion of the CST, participants were presented with 
written instructions for the AUT. Participants were informed that they would be 
presented with some common objects with a defined use (e.g.., newspaper; used 
for reading), and that their task was to think of up to six alternative uses for each 
item. Participants were provided with a completed example (i.e., six alternative 
uses) for newspaper and instructed to note each of the uses listed were different 
from each other and from the primary use. Participants were presented with 
three items per section, with four minutes for each section. They could complete 
all three items in each section simultaneously, but they could not return once the 
four minutes were complete. Participants were given a chance to ask questions 
before the first Section started. 
Finally, participants were given the free-response questionnaire in which 
they were asked to reflect on the study as a whole, and describe any thoughts or 
feelings that occurred to them at any point. In particular, participants were asked 
to consider what, if any, connection they detected between the CST and ACT. 
More generally, participants were also asked to comment on their experience of 
the CST, and any resulting thoughts and/or feelings that arose.  
Following data collection, Frequentist analyses were conducted using 
SPSS (IBM Corporation, 2016). Bayesian statistical analyses were also conducted, 
using the free software JASP (version 0.9.0.1) and default priors (JASP Team, 
2017). Free-response data were collated using nVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 
2012), and analysed using a content analysis methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 





In order to simplify the structure of the following findings, this section has 
been divided into three subsections. Firstly, descriptive statistics are outlined, 
followed by questionnaire and experimental data (i.e., descriptive statistics for 
the AUT, and subsequent inferential analyses). Next, Bayesian analysis is 
reported on AUT data, to ensure a full and robust statistical approach to the 
data19.  To avoid repetition of statistics, only noteworthy findings from the 
Bayesian analysis will be reported in detail. Finally, qualitative data will be 
explored using a Content Analysis methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), with 
textual presentation of the findings. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Card Sorting Task. Table 18 below displays the percentage of cards sorted 
into each quadrant (i.e., Realised Strengths, Weaknesses, Learned Behaviours, 
and Unrealised Strengths), and then by Strengths category (i.e., Thinking, 
Communication, Relating, Being, and Motivation20). The Realised Strengths 
quadrant was populated most, with 38.89% of all cards being sorted here; 
conversely Unrealised Strengths was the least popular category, with 15.69%. Of 
particular interest, 56.13% of Relating were sorted to the Realised Strengths 
category. 
To validate experimental CST data against convenience sorting (i.e., 
chance), a one-sample t-test was used to compare overall means for each 
quadrant against a 25% chance level. Three quadrants’ frequencies were 
significantly different to chance; Realised Strengths, t (22) = 5.35, p = < .001, 
Learned Behaviour, t (22) = 4.02, p = .001, and Unrealised Strengths, t (22) = 6.09, 
p = < .001. However, sorting into the Weaknesses quadrant was not different to 
chance, t (22) = 0.53, p = .60. 
 
19 Both in terms of experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the number of analyses 
required by a complex design; Analysis of Effects are reported as BF10. 




Table 18. Mean percentage (Standard Deviation in brackets) of cards by Strengths category and Quadrant. 
Category  Quadrant 
Realised Strengths Weaknesses Learned Behaviours Unrealised Strengths 
Mean 38.89 (12.46) 25.91 (8.20) 19.51 (6.55) 15.69 (7.33) 
Thinking 33.23 (19.93) 32.92 (14.72) 19.57 (11.24) 14.29 (10.77) 
Communication 39.13 (20.75) 28.80 (15.28) 16.85 (14.89) 15.22 (14.08) 
Relating 56.13 (21.87) 15.02 (14.40) 13.04 (13.93) 15.81 (15.07) 
Being 38.20 (16.90) 22.36 (12.80) 22.36 (12.24) 17.08 (11.55) 
Motivation 27.76 (17.47) 30.43 (20.68) 25.75 (14.60) 16.05 (10.61) 
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AUT Data. No outliers needed to be removed from the data. Descriptive 
statistics for AUT performance by dependant variable are displayed in Table 19; 
each variable is followed by a short summary.  
Fluency. Collapsed across Section, higher Fluency score were seen in the 
Experimental condition (m = 2.41, SD = 0.63), compared to the Control (m = 1.79, 
SD = 0.76). A small numerical improvement in Fluency over time was evident for 
the Experimental condition (Section 4; m = 2.51, SD = 0.77; Section 1, m = 2.46, 
SD = 0.80). In contrast, Control participants Fluency decreased steadily after 
Section 1 (m = 1.99, SD= 0.85; Section 4 m = 1.71, SD = .82). 
Flexibility. As with Fluency, when collapsed by Section the Experimental 
condition had the highest Flexibility score (m = 1.64, SD = 0.33) compared to the 
Control condition (m = 1.24, SD = 0.43). For both Conditions, the highest 
flexibility score was achieved in Section 1 (Experimental m = 1.75, SD = 0.58; 
Control m = 1.42, SD = 0.48). 
Elaboration. Elaboration scores were generally low (m = 0.53 collapsed by 
all factors), the Experimental condition (m = 0.68, SD = 0.37) continues to 
outperform the Control condition (m = 0.38, SD = 0.33). Unexpectedly, Section 3 
saw the highest Elaboration scores for both conditions (Experimental; m = 0.72, 
SD = 0.57; Control; m = 0.42, SD = 0.40). 
Originality. Originality scores were also low. Collapsed across Section, the 
Experimental originality scores were higher (m = 0.81, SD = 0.68), with the best 
score for Section 1 (m = 0.97, SD = 1.10). Highest Originality performance for the 
Control condition was also seen in Section 1 (m = 0.78, SD = 0.90), with a grand 
mean of 0.66 (SD = 0.69) across all Sections. 
Error Rate21.  Finally, as with the data reported above, a lower error rate 
(m = 22.38%, SD = 12.62) was seen in the Experimental data, compared to 
Control (m = 37.39%, SD = 20.87). Both Conditions had the lowest error rate for 
Section 1 (Experimental; m = 14.35%, SD = 17.13; Control; m = 27.30%, SD = 
 
21 If a participant failed to provide any alternative uses for an item, then the Error Rate was 
recorded as 100%. 
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19.67). Overall, performance in the Control condition was weaker in accuracy 
terms with nearly half of the suggested uses rejected in Section 2 (m = 41.40%, 








Fluency Flexibility Elaboration Originality Accuracy (%) 







1 1.99 0.85 1.42 0.48 0.35 0.34 0.78 0.90 27.30 19.67 
2 1.54 0.89 1.13 0.59 0.42 0.43 0.54 0.66 41.40 32.63 
3 1.94 0.95 1.23 0.50 0.42 0.40 0.62 0.79 36.72 21.73 
4 1.71 0.84 1.17 0.56 0.35 0.42 0.71 0.82 37.39 20.87 








1 2.46 0.80 1.75 0.58 0.71 0.66 0.97 1.10 14.35 17.13 
2 2.38 0.79 1.75 0.53 0.62 0.54 0.90 0.88 20.22 18.06 
3 2.29 0.72 1.45 0.48 0.72 0.57 0.64 0.80 28.87 17.37 
4 2.51 0.77 1.62 0.43 0.67 0.45 0.74 0.71 22.38 15.80 
Grand mean 2.41 0.63 1.64 0.33 0.68 0.37 0.81 0.68 22.38 12.62 





Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 2 X 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT 
Fluency scores (Figure 20), with within participant factor of Section (1, 2, 3, 4), 
and between participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). There was 
a main effect and moderate evidence for a difference between Conditions, F 
(1,44) = 9.02, p = .004, p2 = .17, BF10 = 7.55, with better Fluency in the 
Experimental condition. No main effect with anecdotal evidence was found for 
Section, F (3,132) = 2.04, p = .11, BF10 = 0.34. Finally, no interaction with 
anecdotal evidence was seen between Section and Condition, F (3,132) = 2.44, p 
= .16, BF10 = 0.68.  
 
Figure 20. Graph depicting the differences in Fluency scores between Section and 
Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness Of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to assess any relationship between Fluency and CST 
categories. No significant relationships were found; all rs < .39, all ps > .07. 





Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT 
Flexibility scores (Figure 21); with within participant factor of Section (1, 2, 3, 4), 
and between participants factor, Condition (Experimental, Control). A main 
effect with only anecdotal support for the differences between Sections, F 
(3,132) = 3.05, p = .03, p2 = .06, BF10 = 1.20; however, although Section 1 had 
the highest Flexibility score, a Bonferroni post-hoc test revealed no differences 
between Sections (all ps > .08). In addition, there was a main effect with strong 
support for the differences between Conditions, F (1,44) = 12.89, p = .001, p2 = 
.23, BF10 = 32.26, with better Flexibility in the Experimental group. There was no 
interaction of these factors, although anecdotal evidence in support H1 was seen; 
F (3,132) = 2.06, p = .11, BF10 =1.21. 
 
Figure 21. Graph depicting differences in Flexibility scores between Section and 
Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness Of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was run to assess potential relationship between Flexibility and CST 
categories. No significant relationships were found; all rs <.30, all ps > .17. 




Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT 
Elaboration scores (Figure 22), with within participant factor of Section (1, 2, 3, 
4), and between participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). There 
was moderate support for a main effect of Condition, F (1,44) = 8.15, p = .007, 
p2 = .16, BF10 = 4.42, with higher Elaboration scores in the Experimental 
condition. No main effect with Strong evidence indicates no difference between 
Sections, F (3,132) = 0.24, p = .87, BF10 = 0.03. Finally, very strong evidence 
indicates Section and Condition did not interact, F (3,132) = 0.35, p = .79, BF10 = 
0.01. 
 
Figure 22. Graph depicting differences in Elaboration scores between Section and 
Conditions. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness Of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to explore any potential relationship between 
Elaboration and CST categories. No significant relationships were found; all rs 
<.22, all ps > .30. Subsequent Bayesian analysis suggested anecdotal evidence in 





Frequentist Analysis. Similarly, a mixed 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on 
AUT Originality scores (Figure 23), with a within participant factor of Section (1, 
2, 3, 4), and between participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). No 
effect was found for Condition, F (3,132) = 0.55, p = .46, BF10 = 0.28, or Section, F 
(3,132) = 1.48, p = .22, BF10 = 0.11, both received anecdotal evidence. No 
interaction was found between the factors with moderate evidence to support 
H0, F (3,132) = 1.03, p = .32, BF10 = 0.03. 
 
Figure 23. Graph depicting differences in Originality scores between Section and 
Conditions. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness Of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was conducted to assess any relationship between Originality and the 
CST quadrants. No significant relationships were found; all rs <.30, all ps > .17. 
Subsequent Bayesian analysis suggested anecdotal evidence in support of the 
null hypothesis (all BF10 0.26 – 0.63). 
Accuracy  
Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 2 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT 
Accuracy (%; Figure 24) with within participant factor of Section (1, 2, 3, 4), and 
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between participants factor of Condition (Experimental, Control). There was a 
main effect with extreme evidence in support of Section, F (3,132) = 7.25, p = 
<.001, p2 = .14, BF10 = 115.90; post-hoc Bonferroni analysis revealed fewer 
errors in Section 1 (m = 20.82%), than Section 2 (m = 30.81%, p = .03), Section 3 
(m = 32.79%, p = .003), and Section 4 (m = 35.11%, p = < .001). No other 
differences were found (all ps = 1.00). There was also a main effect with 
moderate support for Condition, F (1,44) = 8.70, p = .005, p2 = .17, BF10 = 7.74, 
with lower error rates in the Experimental condition. No interaction with 
anecdotal evidence was found, F (3,132) = 1.57, p = .20, BF10 = 1.07.  
 
Figure 24. Graph depicting Error Rates (%) between Conditions by Section. Error bars 
indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness Of CST Sorting Quadrants. A Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlation was run to assess the relationship between Error Rate and the CST 
categories. No significant relationships were found; all rs <.355, all ps > .097. 
Subsequent Bayesian analysis suggested anecdotal evidence in support of the 





Participants’ responses to the free response questionnaires were 
analysed using a Content Analysis methodology as in Study 1 (see Study 1: 
Qualitative Data). A ‘top-down’ approach was adopted to address two specific 
questions: “how do participants feel about the CST?”, and “what, if any, 
connection do participants perceive between the CST and the AUT?”. Similarly to 
the caveat presented in Study 2, while the content analysis here was conducted 
following standardised procedures, findings from Studies 1 and 2 use of the CST 
have influenced (or are highly likely to have influenced) this analysis. On a 
pragmatic level, categories identified in previous analyses do not constrain this 
analysis (i.e., new, previously undefined categories have been used), but where 
similarities have occurred, this has been noted (e.g., via identical category 
names). 
Connection Between the Tasks. In considering what, if any, connection 
participants perceive between the CST and the AUT, four distinct categories were 
identified: 1) Impactful, 2) No connection, 3) Harmful, and 4) Control Harmful 
(see Table 20 below). The most representative category for Experimental 
participants was that CST had a beneficial (i.e., Impactful) influence on the AUT, 
enhancing creativity in task performance. While noticeably less common, the CST 
was also identified by some as Harmful to performance. However, this is not to 
say that CST limited AUT performance per se, but that perceived lack of specific 
strengths (i.e., Creativity) identified in the CST subsequently impaired 
performance. Finally, the Control task was also identified as inhibiting AUT 
performance. Here, being able to flexibly switch between tasks was considered 




Table 20. Examples from each sub-category relating to the Connection between the tasks 
category. 
Sub-category Example 
Impactful  “The card sorting task made me think about all the things I 
had listed as a strength to make sure I was going by that so I 
could prove I had those attributes” 
No Connection “I forgot about the card sorting task and was driven to think 
of new out of the box uses for the objects” 
Harmful “I also noticed that I was not creative, and I was thinking 
about this as I completed the second task, so this may have 
made me think of less uses for objects, as I did not believe I 
was creative enough to do so.” 
Control 
Harmful  
“I went from a relatively simple task, to a relatively 
demanding one, meaning I was used to order and function, 
but then I had to think outside the box” 
Character Strengths Reflection. One overarching Positivity category was 
identified for subjective CST experience. As with Study 2, two sub-categories 
emerged from the data; 1) Focus on Strengths, and 2) Overcoming Weaknesses 
(see Table 21 below). Generally speaking, the CST was considered a pleasant 
activity, with the majority of participants highlighting benefits of reflecting on 
personal strengths. Interestingly, a smaller (but meaningful) portion of the 
responses highlighted a focus on weaknesses; however, this was in the context 









“it also made me think about the many strengths I feel I have 
and therefore this task has given me a quite positive outlook” 
Overcoming 
Weaknesses 
“The card sorting task was quite eye opening when finding 
cards which I felt were a weakness but would like them to be a 
strength” 
Discussion 
 Examining the quantitative data first, strong support for the main 
hypothesis was found. Specifically, participants undertaking the strengths-based 
CST performed better on the AUT, compared to a control. Participants produced 
more alternative uses with fewer errors, across wider categories of uses (i.e., 
flexibility) and higher levels of elaboration. Notably, this did not apply to the 
originality measure, however, this could be attributable to either a lack of CST 
impact on this specific factor or a result of compression at the lower end of the 
score range (i.e., the sample size meant it was difficult to achieve high originality 
scores- and the overall range reflected this). In addition, CST behaviour (i.e., 
distribution of cards into categories) was not a predictor of AUT performance. 
Overall, while there is some evidence for impact on CF is seen, subjective CST 
differences appear to have little influence. Bayesian analysis provided interesting 
insight, where main effects were found Bayesian analysis was generally 
confirmatory, suggesting sufficient evidence was available to support the 
differences, particularly relevant when comparing the effects of both card tasks. 
Simply, both types of analyses suggest the CST had a beneficial impact on 
participant CF as measured by the AUT (c.f. Originality).  
An interesting outcome from the content analysis is increased 
homogeneity in categories; participants’ responses were more consistent, 
suggesting similar experience during the task. Further, beyond a general 
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expression of positive experience, participants indicate reflection on strengths to 
beneficial, with increased sense of wellbeing and motivation. However, less 
substantial differences in experience are also of interest. Some participants 
appear to focus more on negative connotations of strengths (i.e., if it is not a 
strength it must be a weaknesses). Potentially, this may be driven by the 
inclusion of a Weakness category in the sorting procedure, however this 
influence has not been tested. 
Overall, there is general support for CST efficacy; the activity is generally 
experienced positively, and Experimental participants are more creative; in terms 
of this paradigm, demonstrating higher levels of CF. However, while the 
subjective experience data offers important insight, it also raises questions about 
the design of the CST as an intervention. Indeed, when CST data is considered 
across all three paradigms in Studies 1-3, support for its effectiveness could be 
considered somewhat lacking, due to the inconsistent (and unpredictable) ways 
in which participants engage.    
CST: Reviewing the Evidence 
Statistical evidence for a difference between the Experimental and 
Control conditions in Study 3 provides an increased level of support for the 
overarching questions posed in this thesis. Specifically, this indicates that 
behavioural BBH benefit can be elicited via positive individual differences (i.e., 
character strengths), rather than positive affect only. However, the question of 
intervention robustness has emerged consistently as Studies 1-3 are compared, 
and given prior evaluation of the cognitive tasks used, we need to turn our 
attention to the intervention we adopt.   
Speaking more generally, the qualitative results from Study 3 provide an 
interesting direction for future research. Control participants typically 
experienced their task to be negative or neutral, whereas Experimental 
participants reported a positive experience. Moving forwards, a more positive 
and focused intervention may be required to fully explore this relationship.   
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Comparing with the most directly-applicable literature (i.e., Fredrickson 
and Branigan, 2005; see specifically enhanced T-AR), it appears that the CF 
required in AUT performance aligns more effectively with what we would expect 
with BBH. In other words, the AUT may actively engage the T-AR of participants 
(i.e., unlike the NT and ACT), which enables a ‘clearer view ‘of the impact of 
strengths-based intervention to emerge. In contrast, the more concrete tasks 
(e.g., NT, Navon, 1976; ACT, Irons & Leber, 2015) from Studies 1-2 may require a 
different form of CF or indeed, not engage the CF characteristic of enhanced T-
AR at all. Obviously, this would be observed as a lack of consistent intervention 
impact. Thus, as a whole Studies 1-3 may indicate a less domain-general 
enhancement than originally conceptualized in either the BBH or CF literatures, 
emerging in more domain-specific contexts, perhaps interacting with task 





Chapter 5: Exploring a Goal-Oriented Intervention and Cognitive 
Flexibility in a Navon Task 
Learning from the CST 
 Overall, findings from the CST quasi-intervention (Studies 1-3) were 
largely inconclusive. This can be summarized as 1) an absence of clear 
statistical differences between control and experimental groups across the 
studies (especially where task demand was low, in terms of higher order 
cognition / CF), and outstanding questions regarding intervention 
effectiveness raised by the qualitative data (e.g., CST breadth of 
application, participant fixation on weaknesses rather than strengths, etc.). 
Conversely, the arguably more demanding (at least in terms of creativity 
and novel thinking) AUT task offered clearer insight into Positive 
Psychology (PP) -based intervention (e.g., increased fluency). This indicated 
that character strengths may act similarly to positive affect in supporting 
improved cognitive performance (e.g., see BBH; Chapter 1). Further, the 
qualitative data highlighted a more focused, less negative experience when 
cognitive tasks were more demanding. Interestingly, the qualitative data 
also indicated that the implicit nature of the CST may have been a 
limitation on its efficacy. This suggests two possibilities; first, that any 
character strengths-based intervention used here will need more focus and 
specificity to work effectively. And/or second, that a passive and implicit 
intervention delivery may preclude impact on subsequent CF-based tasks. 
Taken as a whole, the lack of firm conclusions does not negate 
potential behavioural benefits of character strengths in relation to BBH 
operation (e.g., as a source of positivity). The following studies (Studies 4-
6) will explore this ‘potential’ by focusing on a specific character strength; 
hope. As detailed in Chapter 1, hope (represented behaviourally as goal 
planning and attainment) has been demonstrated as an effective strength 
to build PP interventions on (e.g., Cheavens et al., 2006; Klausner et al., 




(a goal-reflection task; GRT) will be used alongside the same (or similar) 
paradigms as before. In turn, this may help to address the issues of needing 
a stronger (and more targeted) positive intervention.  
Methodological Changes 
Explicit vs Implicit Goal-Orientation 
Most interventions / reflective activities in a variety of contexts 
(e.g., meditation, education; see Walsh & Shapiro, 2006 for a review) 
require purposeful engagement, with participant awareness of aims and 
potential outcomes. Further, previous evaluation of hope interventions 
suggests a more ‘direct’ connection increase efficacy (see e.g., Weis & 
Speridakos, 2011).  Thus, in addition to the experimental and control 
conditions from Studies 1-3, a third explicit (i.e., instructionally explicit) 
condition will be included here.  
The importance of direct vs indirect instruction is also indicated by 
the subjective experience of CST participants, who cited a lack of specificity 
as a limitation of the task) and the goal-related literature (e.g., Latham, 
Stajkovic, and Locke; 2010).  In the latter, a behavioural distinction 
between sub- and supraliminal priming has suggested the emergence of 
goals outside conscious awareness.  Therefore, inclusion of a condition 
where the intervention purpose/aims are made clear to participants will 
enable comparison between the two instruction types. In addition, this will 
enhance the ecological validity of the intervention, given that individuals 
may seek out similar positivity-boosting support in real-world settings (e.g., 
meditation, mindfulness activities; Moore & Malinowski, 2009). In 
summary, we can ask the question; do those who engage in an 






Targeted intervention- The Goal Reflection Task (GRT) 
Prima facie, this brief intervention was designed to address 
limitations of the CST22 discussed above. This task requires participants to 
reflect on achievement of a specific goal and associated behaviour (i.e., 
affect, cognitions, actions). In addition, a simple task engagement 
procedure is included, recording numbers of words written by participants. 
Previous studies (e.g., Morisano et al., 2010) have suggested this as an 
appropriate measure of engagement, specifically when relating positivity 
with achievement (here, academic attainment). 
Revision of the Questionnaire Battery 
Given the change to a more targeted intervention (i.e., examining 
only hope), closer examination of this component is needed. Two hope 
scales (state; SHS, and trait, THS hope; see Chapter 1, and below) will be 
included to measure hope pre- and-post intervention. In keeping with the 
MM philosophy (see Chapter 3), this allows for convergence of different 
data types. The GRT itself is qualitative, and resulting data gives insight into 
the subjective experience and impact of the reflective activity23. However, 
the inclusion of hope and general affect questionnaires (e.g., PANAS; 
Watson et al., 1988) provides a more objective measure, and captures any 
changes in hope as a result of the intervention.  
Adapting the Free Response Questionnaire 
As the GRT may elicit deeper reflective activity (i.e., than the CST), 
the free response questionnaire requires alignment with the new task (see 
Materials below). Three prompts encourage participants to, 1) reflect on 
the task overall, 2) consider the reflective activity per se, and 3) 
 
22 Pilot studies were conducted to check the most effective methodology for this intervention, 
including format and content of questions/prompts  
23 The GRT was piloted (n = 10) for the purpose of refining question and prompt format. For 
example, an iteration of “Please describe the goal you wanted to achieve” was “Please describe a 




predict/discuss any expected cognitive or behavioural changes as a result 
of the task. Similarly to Studies 1-3, this allows data from subjective 
experience to be considered alongside quantitative data, in addition to 
evaluation of the new intervention. 
The Current Study: Research Questions and Predictions 
 The primary aim is to explore how effectively hope is able to 
operationalise BBH, via a goal-oriented intervention. Moreover, this study 
also seeks to evaluate the efficacy of the new intervention in conjunction 
with cognitive performance. Thus, we can ask simply whether GRT 
participants perform better on the CF-based task (here, the Navon Task; 
NT) than control counterparts? And, if performance differences emerge, 
does instruction format (Explicit or Implicit) have any impact? 
 As improving hope is the focus of the GRT, it is important to 
evaluate this in relation to the new intervention. Primarily, it is expected 
that participants undertaking the GRT will show increased levels of hope, 
whereas the control group will not. GRT engagement measures (number of 
words written) may also show a relationship between increased 
engagement (i.e., more words, and therefore more time and effort 
reflecting) and increased hope. These two aspects will be combined to 
assess whether participants who engage more fully in the GRT also show 
better NT performance. Similar uses of hope, previously focusing on 
positive affect and the BBH (e.g., Ciarrochi et al, 2015; see Alarcon et al, 
2013), suggest that we should see both increased levels of hope (post 
intervention) and behavioural benefit to CF performance (defined in the NT 
by RT and Accuracy). Participant knowledge of these aims and predictions 
(e.g., Latham, Stajkovic, and Locke; 2010; see Weis & Speridakos, 2011) 
suggests that this will not hinder increased hopefulness (or subsequent CF 
performance), and may, in fact, boost it. 
 Overall, the qualitative data will allow insight into subjective 




practice of goal -reflection itself, and potentially validate any applied real-
world value of the intervention. In other words, evaluation of this 
intervention will not only indicate if it ‘works’, but also show whether it is 




 Seventy-eight participants were recruited (48 female); with age 
ranging from 18-25 (M = 19.41, SD = 1.76). Fifty-four participants self-
reported their first language as English (69.2%), three as Cantonese, 
Mandarin, and Hindi (3.8% each), two as Spanish, Malay, and Polish (2.6% 
each); the remainder reported Urdu, Bahasa Indonesian, Chinese, French, 
Romanian, Bulgarian, Punjabi, Lithuanian, and Tamil (1.3% each). 
Participants were recruited from a panel of first year undergraduate 
psychology students at the University of Warwick, who each received 
course credit for their participation, or from University of Warwick 
volunteers, paid £6 for their participation.  
Measures and Stimuli 
 Goal Reflection Task (GRT). This task required participants to 
describe and reflect on a goal they had previously achieved (see Procedure 
below). Participants were presented with a series of questions/statements 
to which they were asked to respond, as displayed in Table 22 below. In 
the control condition, participants were asked to describe and reflect on 
their ‘typical day’, and presented with a similar series of questions/ 
statements. Participants were instructed to provide as much detail as they 







Table 22. Questions presented to participants in the GRT, and equivalent control 
‘typical day’ task 
GRT 1 “Please describe the goal you wanted to achieve” 
2 “Why did you want to achieve this goal? Describe any reasoning 
or justifications behind it” 
3 “Please describe any obstacles which you overcame in order to 
reach the goal, thinking about what you originally planned, any 
issues that developed and how you dealt with them” 
4 “Finally, reflect on how it felt to achieve the goal at the time, and 
how you feel now describing and thinking about it” 
Control 
task 
1 “Please describe your typical day, providing details on things or 
activities that you would normally engage in” 
2 “Please add any extra information or details about your typical 
day that you might consider relevant” 
3 “Finally, reflect on how it feels to think about a day that you 
would typically have”.  
 
 Navon Task. An identical NT procedure was used to that in Study 1. 
More details of the rationale for use of this paradigm are included in the 
overview of the methodological issues for this thesis (see Chapter 3). 
Questionnaire Battery 
State Hope Scale (SHS). The SHS (Snyder et al, 1994) was used to 
measure state hope. This scale consists of six statements, for which 
participants indicate how true these statements are, based on how they 
feel at that time. The scale runs from 1 (Definitely False) to 8 (Definitely 
true) and includes such questions as ‘There are lots of ways around any 
problem that I am facing now’ and ‘At the present time, I am energetically 
pursuing my goals’.  
Trait Hope Scale. The THS (Snyder et al., 1991) was used to 
measure trait hope. This scale consists of twelve statements, with 




how they felt at that time. Again, this measure used an 8-point Likert scale 
(1=Definitely False to 8= Definitely true) and included questions such as ‘I 
energetically pursue my goals’ and ‘I meet the goals that I set for myself’. 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS). The PANAS 
(Watson et al., 1988) was used to measure participant mood at both Time 
1 (i.e., before the NT) and Time 2 (i.e., after the NT). This scale consisted of 
20 words (e.g., Interested, Alert, Afraid), and participants were asked to 
indicate the extent to which they ‘felt’ this term at that point in time (i.e., 
1= very slightly, to 5= extremely). Two values were calculated from the 
questionnaire, a positive score (PP), and a negative score (PN). 
Free-Response Questionnaire. To assess participant experience of 
the GRT, qualitative data were collected via a free-response questionnaire. 
Participants were prompted with three questions; 1) “ How did it feel to 
think about and reflect on a goal you have previous achieved?”, 2) “Do you 
think reflecting on times when you successfully completed a goal will help 
you achieve goals in the future? If so, why?”, and 3) “Please share any 
thoughts or idea you might have about the task in general”. Participants in 
the Control condition were also asked question 3, in addition to an 
amended question 1 (i.e., “How did it feel to think about and reflect on a 
typical day”). Participants were able to provide as much detail/feedback as 
they chose, without an explicit time limitation. 
Design 
A MM design was used for this study. For the experimental aspect 
(i.e., GRT effect on task performance), a 3 x 2 x 2 mixed factorial design was 
used. The between-participants factor was Instructional Condition (Implicit, 
Explicit, and Control), and within-participants factors were Perceptual Level 
(Global, Local; i.e., targets were either the global or local letter component 
of the stimulus; see Figure 25 below) and Response type (Normal, 
Changed; i.e.,  response keys of F and H, or D and J). Dependant variables 




observational element (i.e., exploration of GRT-related behaviour), 
engagement was measured by the number of words written by the 
participant. All questionnaires were completed twice, once before 
completing the GRT (T1), and once after finishing the CF task (T2). 
For the qualitative component of the study, the free-response 
questionnaire was administered to all participants. These data were 
collected to address two specific questions; 1) what connection, if any, do 
participants discern between the GRT and the NT? And 2) how do 
participants experience the GRT and reflection on goal achievement? 
 
Figure 25. Example of a typical NT trial for both target letters, with the changes in 
response alignment. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the Instructional 




were given an information sheet, before fully informed consent was 
sought. Testing took place in individual sound- attenuated laboratory 
cubicles. To begin, all participants completed the SHS, THS, and PANAS 
(T1). Detailed instructions (see Stimuli & Measures section above) were 
then provided for either the GRT (i.e., Implicit, Explicit), or typical day (i.e., 
Control) task.  
GRT Procedure. In the Implicit instructional condition, participants 
were given an instruction sheet for the GRT, where they were asked to 
reflect on a goal they had previously achieved. No parameters for the goal 
were indicated, simply that is should be meaningful to the participant and 
had been achieved. Completion of the GRT was self-paced, and undertaken 
alone, with instructions to inform the researcher when finished. The 
Explicit instructional condition was identical to the Implicit condition, with 
one additional step. Before starting the GRT, participants were informed 
(by the researcher using a script) why they were being asked to complete 
the GRT, and what the expected outcomes were (e.g., increased hope, 
better performance on the subsequent NT). In the Control condition, 
participants given instructions for the typical day task, where they were 
asked to describe what they would consider to be a typical day. Similarly, 
once instructed, task performance was self-paced in isolation, with 
instructions to inform the researcher when finished. 
NT Procedure. Please note the procedure for the NT was identical 
to Study 1. Following completion of the reflective task, participants were 
instructed regarding the NT. As shown in Figure 25, they were informed 
verbally, that for each trial, a large capital letter (formed from smaller 
capital letters) would be presented, and they should indicate whether an 
‘F’ or ‘H’ was present (at either global or local level) by a key press 
corresponding to the letter presented. Participants were instructed that an 
‘F’ or ‘H’ would always be presented (but never within the same trial), and 
requested to perform the task as quickly, but as accurately, as possible. 




response keys every eight trials (F to D, H to J). They were instructed that 
no external indication for this change would occur, and they would need to 
track and change the response keys autonomously. Participants were given 
opportunity to clarify task instructions at this point, then undertook a brief 
practice block (16 trials, eight for each response type). 
Upon completion of the NT, participants were given the SHS, THS, 
and PANAS again (T2), plus the free-response questionnaire.  Here, they 
were asked to reflect on the study as a whole, and describe any thoughts 
or feelings that occurred to them at any point. In particular, participants 
were asked to comment on their experience of the GRT, and any resulting 
thoughts and/or feelings that arose.  
Following data collection, Frequentist analyses were conducted 
using SPSS (IBM Corporation, 2016). Bayesian statistical analyses were also 
conducted, using the free software JASP (version 0.9.0.1) and default priors 
(JASP Team, 2017, see Chapter 3: Bayesian Analysis). Free-response data 
were collated using nVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2012), and analysed 
using a content analysis methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 
2000). 
Results 
In order to simplify the structure of the findings, this section has 
been divided into two sections: quantitative and qualitative data. Firstly, 
descriptive statistics are outlined, followed by the questionnaires and 
experimental data (i.e., descriptive statistics for the NT, and subsequent 
inferential analyses). Note, Bayesian analysis is reported with NT data, to 
ensure a full and robust statistical approach to data24 analysis. Second, 
qualitative data are explored using Content Analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 
2005), with textual presentation of the findings. 
 
24 Both in terms of experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the number of 






 Descriptive Statistics. Table 23 shows the mean number of words 
written by participants; grand mean and then by item25. Participants in the 
Implicit condition wrote the most words (m = 61.89, SD= 34.54), while 
those in the Explicit conditions generally wrote the least (m = 47.67, SD = 
31.45); dispersion was substantial (collapsed mean across all conditions m 
= 53.00, SD = 39.76), but similar across all groups. 
Table 23. Mean number of words written by participants by Condition 
 Implicit Explicit Control 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Grand mean 61.89 34.54 47.67 31.45 49.65 35.30 
Q1 17.92 18.47 11.88 10.42 95.46 68.03 
Q2 48.88 35.52 44.81 48.86 13.31 22.15 
Q3 110.96 75.11 78.15 61.41 - - 
Q4 69.81 39.64 55.85 33.68 40.19 31.02 
Inferential Statistics. No differences with anecdotal evidence for 
the null were seen in the average words written between Instructional 
Conditions as determined by a one-way ANOVA, F (2, 77) = 1.35, p = 1.37, 
BFinc = 0.32. 
Questionnaire Data 
Descriptive Statistics. Participants completed each questionnaire at 
two time points, once before (T1) and once after (T2) the GRT and NT; the 
data are displayed in Table 24 below. Participants in the Implicit condition 
showed a general increase in ‘positivity’ between T1 and T2 (i.e., an 
increase in THS, m = 2.00; and a decrease in PN, m = -2.62). However 
notably, all instructional conditions decreased in positivity between T1 and 
 
25 Descriptive data for all questions reported in Table 24, although only the ‘overall’ figure will be 




T2 (i.e., overall decrease m = -0.81). In contrast, participants in the Control 
condition showed a general decrease in hope scores (i.e., THS differences; 
m = -.077), although they were also found to be less negative (i.e., PN 
difference; m = -1.92). Finally, and somewhat surprisingly, the Explicit 
condition had a more varied response, with small increases in THS and 
Pathway scores (m = 0.19, and m = 0.46 respectively) and small decreases 
in SHS and Agency (m = -0.04, and m = -0.27 respectively). 
Table 24. Responses for SHS, THS (Agency/Pathway subscales) and PANAS 
(Positive/Negative subscales), by both Time Point and Condition 
Questionnaire Condition 
Implicit Control Explicit 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
T1 
SHS 35.46 4.88 35.88 5.86 34.04 5.87 
PANAS Positive 34.04 6.53 32.62 7.98 31.04 9.54 
PANAS Negative 17.92 6.35 17.77 7.63 20.35 7.85 
THS 48.42 7.10 49.27 8.70 46.73 9.87 
THS Agency 23.77 4.29 24.31 5.00 22.58 6.25 
THS Pathway 24.65 3.71 24.96 4.28 24.15 4.51 
T2 
SHS 35.92 6.47 35.81 6.71 34.00 7.60 
PANAS Positive 33.35 8.61 31.54 10.67 30.38 10.84 
PANAS Negative 15.31 6.04 15.85 6.50 18.27 7.39 
THS 50.42 7.03 48.50 8.15 46.92 9.65 
THS Agency 24.77 4.01 23.85 4.51 22.31 5.70 








SHS 0.46 3.66 -0.08 3.77 -0.04 4.07 
PANAS Positive -0.69 4.08 -1.08 5.73 -0.65 4.87 
PANAS Negative -2.62 3.10 -1.92 4.31 -2.08 3.71 
THS 2.00 3.11 -0.77 2.89 0.19 3.50 
THS Agency 1.00 1.86 -0.46 1.68 -0.27 2.39 
THS Pathway 1.00 1.77 -0.31 1.76 0.46 1.79 





Difference Between Questionnaire Score at T1 And T2. A mixed 2x3 
ANOVA was conducted on the questionnaire data, with a within-participant 
factor of Time (T1, T2), and a between-participants factor of Instructional 
Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and Control); results are displayed in Table 25 
below and differences between T1 and T2 are depicted in Figure 26. 
For PN, a main effect with extreme evidence for an effect of Time 
was seen, F (1,75) = 27.15, p = <.001, 2 = .27, BFinc = 7079.08; responses 
were lower at T2 (i.e., less negative) than T1. An interaction was found 
between THS and Condition, although evidence was only anecdotal, F 
(2,75) = 5.10, p = .008, 2 = .12, BFinc = 2.03; both GRT conditions (Implicit, 
Explicit) increased in THS by T2, although the Control condition decreased. 
An interaction was also seen between both THS subscales: Agency, F (2,75) 
= 4.11, p = .02, 2 = .10, BFinc = 0.64, and Pathway, F (2,75) = 3.57, p = .03, 
2 = .09, BFinc = 0.94. While both GRT conditions also increased in Pathways 
between T1 and T2, only the Implicit condition had a higher Agency score 
ay T2; however as evidence was anecdotally in support of the null 
hypothesis these interactions should be considered with caution. No other 





Table 25. Mixed ANOVA results for differences between T1 and T2, by Instruction 
Condition 
Questionnaire Effect F df p 2 BFinc 
SHS Time 0.07 1,75 .79 .00 0.15 
Condition 0.74 2,75 .48 .02 0.29 
Time *Condition 0.16 2,75 .85 .00 0.02 
THS Time 1.74 1,75 .19 .02 0.69 
Condition 0.70 2,75 .50 .02 0.92 
Time *Condition 5.10 2,75 .008** .12 2.03 
Agency Time 0.16 1,75 .69 .00 0.26 
Condition 1.08 2,75 .35 .03 0.55 
Time *Condition 4.11 2,75 .02** .10 0.64 
Pathway Time 3.67 1,75 .06 .05 0.82 
Condition 0.23 2,75 .80 .00 0.53 
Time *Condition 3.57 2,75 .03** .09 0.94 
PP Time 2.09 1,75 .15 .03 0.31 
Condition 0.75 2,75 .48 .02 0.34 
Time *Condition 0.06 2,75 .94 .00 0.05 
PN Time 27.15 1,75 <.001** .27 7079.08 
Condition 1.29 2,75 .28 .03 0.44 
Time *Condition 0.25 2,75 .78 .00 0.21 









GRT Relationship with Questionnaire Variables. A Pearson’s 
Product Moment correlation was conducted to establish associations 
between questionnaire scores (at both T1 and T2) and GRT engagement 
(see Table 26 below). Where correlations were statistically significant, 
simple linear regression analyses were used to calculate predictiveness of 
GRT engagement on questionnaire responses (see Table 27 below). GRT 
engagement was a predictor of T2 THS, Agency, and Pathway scores (as 
shown in Figure 27 below), although evidence was only anecdotally in 
support of the alternative hypothesis (all BF10 1.37 - 1.91).  
Table 26. Correlational analyses between GRT engagement and questionnaires at 
T1 and T2 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS PP PN THS Agency Pathway 
T1 r 0.12 -0.04 -0.07 0.19 0.18 0.17 
p .29 .72 .54 .09 .12 .14 
T2 r 0.11 0.01 -0.13 0.25* 0.23* 0.23* 
p .35 .91 .27 .03 .05 .04 
* = Significant < .05 
Table 27. Regression analyses summary for GRT engagement predicting 
questionnaire scores at T2 
Questionnaire t p R2 B0 B1 BF10 
THS 2.22 .03 .05 45.39 0.06 1.91 
Agency 2.04 .05 .05 21.92 0.03 1.37 











Screening was on pre-determined conservative ranges of <150ms to 
>5,000ms for RT, and Error Rate of > 15%; no outliers were removed from 
the data). Descriptive and Inferential statistics for Navon performance are 
below, followed by a short summary of each variable. As a whole, these 
descriptive data suggest the GRT conditions, regardless of instructional 
type, showed comparable performance, with the control condition slightly 
slower. Accuracy was approximately equivalent across conditions.   
 RT Descriptive Statistics. Across all factors, RTs for the Implicit 
condition were faster (m = 1069.41ms, SD = 234.40), followed by the 
Explicit condition (m = 1088.23ms, SD = 249.40), and finally, the Control 
condition (m = 1220.25ms, SD = 402.59). Across all factors, the Implicit 
condition had the fastest mean RT (Global Normal trials; m = 975.61ms, SD 
= 194.04), and the Control condition has the slowest mean RT (Local 
Changed trials; m = 1290.07ms, SD = 545.24).  
Table 28. RTs in milliseconds (ms) for NT performance, by Perceptual Level, 




Implicit Explicit Control 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Global Normal 1056.53 282.01 1057.65 248.82 1201.98 438.07 
Changed 975.61 194.04 1030.59 268.90 1113.93 374.24 
Global mean 1016.07 234.40 1044.12 249.40 1157.96 402.59 
Local Normal 1168.25 386.44 1158.45 292.69 1275.03 491.08 
Changed 1077.27 247.81 1106.21 334.10 1290.07 545.24 
Local mean 1122.76 308.42 1132.33 283.98 1282.55 497.31 
 Grand mean 1069.41 267.62 1088.23 259.56 1220.25 435.39 




 RT Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was conducted 
on NT RTs (Figure 28), with within-participant factors of Perceptual Level 
(Global, Local), Response Type (Changed, Normal), and a between 
participants factor of Instructional Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and 
Control). There was a significant main effect of Perceptual Level with 
extreme evidence that global trials were faster than local trials, F (1,75) = 
29.36, p = <.001, 2 = .28, BFinc = 787385.14. Similarly, a main effect of 
Response Type with moderate evidence was demonstrated, F (1,75) = 
11.15, p = .001, 2 = .13, BFinc = 5.07, with Normal trials faster than Change 
trials. No difference was found between the conditions, with anecdotal 
support for the null, F (1,75) = 1.60, p = .21, BFinc = 0.29. No other effects or 
interactions were found (all Fs < 1.62, all ps > .20); note the interactions 
between Perceptual Level and Condition (BFinc = 0.09), and Perceptual 
level, Response Type, and Condition (BFinc = 0.003) had very strong and 
extreme evidence (respectively) for the null hypothesis, suggesting these 
factors do not interact.  
 
Figure 28. Graph showing RTs, between Perceptual Level and Response Type by 





Table 29. Results of an ANOVA comparing RTs for Perceptual Level (PL), Response 
Types (RsT), and Condition, plus corresponding Bayes Factor 
 F df p p2 BFinc 
PL 29.36 1, 75 <.001 .28 787385.14 
RsT 11.15 1, 75 .001 .13 5.07 
Condition 1.60 2, 75 .21 .04 0.29 
PL * RsT 0.47 1, 75 .50 .01 0.41 
PL * Condition 0.29 2, 75 .75 .01 0.09 
RsT * Condition 0.98 2, 75 .38 .03 0.19 
PL * RsT * Condition 1.50 2, 75 .23 .04 <0.01 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation 
was conducted to assess any relationship between RT and the GRT 
engagement. No clear association was evident, with anecdotal evidence in 
support of the null; r (78) .81, p= .48, BF10 = .25. Therefore, no regression 
analyses were calculated.  
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. Similarly, a series of Pearson’s 
Product Moment correlations were conducted to assess any relationships 
between RT and hope questionnaires (at both T1 and T2; see Table 30 
below). No relationship was found between RT and Agency at T1, and no 
relationships were found between RT and any T2 questionnaire variables; 





Table 30. Correlational analyses between questionnaires at T1 and T2, and RT 
(overall and collapsed across Perceptual Level and Response Type) 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS Agency Pathway THS 
T1 r 0.26* 0.17 0.23* 0.23* 
p .05 .10 .05 .05 
T2 r 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.18 
p .10 .23 .09 .12 
* = significant <.05 
For each significant correlation, a simple linear regression26 was 
used to provide further details of the relationships (see Table 31 below). T1 
SHS, Pathway, and THS were significant predictors of RT (see Figure 29 
below). However, it is also important to note that, in each case, the 
variance accounted for was low (all R2s = < 0.05), and significance was 
achieved at a non-conservative level (all ps = < .05 and > .04). More, 
evidence for each relationship was only anecdotal (all BF10 1.30 -1.40). 
Overall, this suggests a series of inconclusive findings, which should be 
taken with caution. 
Table 31. Regression analyses summary for T1 questionnaire scores predicting RT, 
collapsed across Perceptual Level and Response Type 
Questionnaire t p R2 B0 B1 BF10 
SHS 2.01 .05 .05 650.08 13.55 1.33 
THS 2.00 .05 .05 708.34 8.68 1.30 
Pathway 2.04 .05 .05 673.66 18.39 1.40 
Note: unless stated otherwise, all assumptions were met. Regression 
equation details only reported for significant predictors. 
 
26 A multiple regression could not be used as the questionnaires were too highly correlated, 









Accuracy Descriptive Statistics. For all conditions, error rates were 
similar, with a minimal range (1.02%) from the most accurate (Implicit; m = 
96.27%, SD = 3.15) to least (Explicit; m = 95.25%, SD = 2.87). Across all factors, 
the Explicit conditions had the lowest mean error rate (Local Changed trials; m = 
94.46%, SD = 4.18). In comparison the highest mean error rate was found in the 
Implicit condition (Global Changed trials; m = 96.61%, SD = 3.78).  
Table 32. Error rate in percentage (%) for NT performance, by Perceptual Level, Response 




Implicit Explicit Control 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Global Normal 96.61 3.78 95.60 3.87 95.97 4.64 
Changed 96.47 3.26 95.92 2.74 95.92 5.17 
Global mean 96.54 3.12 95.76 2.97 95.95 4.64 
Local Normal 95.83 3.47 94.46 4.18 94.46 5.93 
Changed 96.15 3.95 95.01 3.16 95.28 5.20 
Local mean 95.99 3.57 94.73 3.20 94.87 5.17 
 Grand mean 96.27 3.15 95.25 2.87 95.41 4.74 
*N = 26 per Condition 
Accuracy Frequentist Analysis. An identical mixed 2 x 2 x 3 ANOVA was 
conducted for Navon accuracy data (Figure 30). Within-participant factors 
comprised Perceptual Level (Global, Local) and Response Type (Changed, 
Normal); again, the between participants factor was Instructional Condition 
(Implicit, Explicit, Control). A main effect with Moderate evidence was found for 
Perceptual Level, F (1,75) = 10.94, p = .001, 2 = .13, was shown, with higher 
accuracy in Global trials. No difference was found between the conditions, F 
(1,75) = 0.58, p = .57, BFinc = 0.12 and no other effects or interactions reached 
significance (all Fs < 1.65, all ps > .20). There was moderate evidence in support 




extreme evidence to say that Response type and Condition do not interact (BFinc 
= 0.008). 
 
Figure 30. Graph showing Accuracy, between Perceptual Level and Response Type by 
Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. 
Table 33. Results of an ANOVA comparing Accuracy for Perceptual Level (PL), Response 
Types (RsT), and Condition 
 F df p p2 BFinc 
PL 10.94 1, 75 .001 .13 9.01 
RsT 1.09 1, 75 .30 .01 0.11 
Condition 0.58 2, 75 .58 .02 0.12 
PL * RsT 1.19 1, 75 .28 .02 0.11 
PL * Condition 0.40 2, 75 .68 .01 0.05 
RsT * Condition 0.14 2, 75 .87 .00 <0.01 
PL * RsT * Condition 0.16 2, 75 .86 .00 1.62 
 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 
conducted to assess any relationship between Accuracy and the GRT 




anecdotal evidence in support of the null hypothesis, therefore no regression 
analysis was calculated.  
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess relationships between Accuracy and 
questionnaires at both T1 and T2 (i.e., prior to regression analyses) A small, 
negative correlation was found between Accuracy and T1 SHS (r = -.25, p = .003). 
No other relationships were found (all rs < .22, all ps > .058, BF10 0.14 – 0.65). A 
simple linear regression showed T1 SHS was also predictive of Accuracy, F (1, 77) 
= 4.90, p = .03, R2 = .06. The results suggest a positive relationship between lower 
SHS scores and higher accuracy, although as with RT the strength of this 
relationship is very limited. A Bayesian linear regression analysis provided 
anecdotal evidence in support of the alternative hypothesis (BF10 = 1.90), again 
suggesting that this relationship should be treated with caution.  
Qualitative Data 
Free-response Questionnaire. Participants’ responses to the free 
response questionnaire were analysed using the same methodology as Studies 1-
3. However here, questions were adapted slightly; rather than direct prompting a 
comment on GRT and NT connection, participants were asked to reflect on any 
impact the GRT they believed it may have had generally. As outlined previously 
(See Chapter 4), a top-down content analysis was conducted to address two 
questions, 1) how do participants feel about the GRT task? And 2) what (if any) 
impact do they think it may have? 
Reflecting on a Goal. Example codes are displayed in Table 34 below. The 
most representative category (i.e., comprising most codes) highlighted the GRT 
as a positive experience. Sub-categories identified from the text included, 
increased awareness of previous accomplishments (i.e., previously forgotten), 
reflecting on success, and being a generally motivating exercise. Some negative 
experiences were also identified, with participants suggesting the GRT 
highlighted a lack of current direction/avenue for achievement, and concerns 




activity (see Methods above) also elicited a positive experience (e.g., participants 
enjoyed reflecting on their day). This suggested, at least on an anecdotal level, 
that more subjective and focused reflective activity (e.g., GRT) is more enjoyable 
for participants. 
 The ‘Motivational’ sub-category emphasized the positivity inherent in the 
GRT; specifically, participants reported feeling motivated by their own previous 
success. Interestingly, all items coded to the motivation sub-category emerged 
from Implicit condition data. Further, the ‘Lack of Direction’ sub-category was 
comprised entirely of Explicit condition data. While the remaining categories 
were more evenly represented by both groups, this may suggest that Implicit 
condition participants engaged with the task in a more meaningful way. Here, 
‘meaningful' could be aligned with a larger proportion of participants in the 
Implicit Condition responding with items coded within the ‘Awareness of 
accomplishments’ sub-category. In turn, this arguably indicates more profound 
reflection on their part. Alternatively, Explicit condition participants may have 
found the task a broadly positive experience, but trivial in context. This could be 





Table 34. Examples of each of the Sub-Categories relating to the reflective tasks 
Category Sub-category Example 
Positive Motivational “It felt great to reflect on my past actions 
and achievements. This helped remind me 
to stay focused and determined” 
Successful 
Reflection 
“It felt good to do this since I feel like 
usually once I have achieved something I get 
hung up over the next thing, rather than 
reflecting on what I have achieved” 
Awareness of 
accomplishments 
“It felt a little fulfilling when remembering 
something that I had previously achieved as 
it brought this into realisation” 
Control condition “It felt very therapeutic to be able to look 
back at my day and review my daily routine” 
Neutral No specific reaction “I did not feel a particular way about this” 
Negative Lack of direction “I feel like I haven’t set or achieved many 
goals in my life and I was a bit difficult for 
me to think of one” 
Progression 
Concerns 
“it made me stressed, but also made me 
realise that it's not as busy as I think” 
Impact of GRT. In considering what, if any, impact of the GRT participants 
perceive, two categories emerge. The first is an influence on general behaviour 
(i.e., beyond the scope of the study), and the second is specific impact on NT 
performance. Regarding general behaviour, two sub-categories were identified 
(see Table 35). The majority of participants suggested behavioural benefit; 
specifically, they considered enhanced achievement of their goals moving 
forward. Interestingly, in a similar vein, data from the Explicit condition formed 
the majority of the ‘No impact’ sub-category entries. Arguably, this supports the 




a broadly positive experience- albeit one that remained without personal 
relevance or meaning.  
Table 35. Example of each sub-category relating to the impact of the GRT generally 
Sub-category Example 
Impactful “Yes because it adds motivation to me, since I am able to see 
the greatness in past achievements and experiences and see 
that I was able to overcome past struggles, which will help me 
to believe that I can overcome present struggles to achieve 
future goals” 
No Impact “No, it makes me more sad [SIC] and actually I feel very 
unmotivated to do anything right now” 
 For specific impact on NT performance, two sub-categories were also 
identified (see Table 36). Similarly to earlier patterns from Explicit condition 
participants, the ‘Detrimental’ sub-category (i.e., GRT elicited a performance 
decrement) was mainly seen from Explicit condition participants. Conversely, 
most Implicit condition participants indicated a performance benefit. Taken as a 
whole, these data illustrate that participants’ lived experience of the GRT (i.e., 
evident from the qualitative data) can diverge in both affect and cognition. Most 
striking perhaps, is its divergence from the quantitative data (i.e., where no 
behavioural differences were highlighted), although Implicit participants were 









Helpful “I (think) I performed better. Afterwards, I felt strangely accomplished 
about the whole thing” 
Detrimental “The letter test was harder than I think [SIC] and it takes a lot more 
focus as I have to think about two things simultaneously” 
Discussion 
Considering first the quantitative findings only, a decrease in negativity 
was seen for all participants following GRT Intervention. However, only 
participants in the Implicit condition were consistently more hopeful after the 
reflective task, with a notable improvement in THS (both Agency and Pathway 
sub-scales). Furthermore, GRT engagement was established as a predictor of THS 
improvement (again, for both sub-scales). 
NT data was as expected (i.e., faster and more accurate on both Global, 
and Normal trials), although no differences were seen between Instructional 
conditions. Interestingly, baseline hope levels (specifically SHS, THS, and 
Pathways) was predictive of faster NT RTs; however, SHS was also predictive of a 
reduction in NT Accuracy. While no direct connection between GRT and NT 
performance was established, indirect support for this relationship may be 
identified via increases in hope (i.e., GRT predicted hope, and hope predicted NT 
performance). Bayesian evidence indicated NT data was in line with 
expectations, although does also imply that these predictive relationships should 
be treated with caution as evidence was generally only sufficient for anecdotal 
support.  
Considered alone, qualitative data suggest the GRT was an effective 
intervention (i.e., in improving hope and reducing negativity). However, some 




who were naive to the intervention’s purpose (i.e., Implicit condition) engaged 
more with the reflective task. 
Both data strands converge to confirm the GRT’s overall efficacy. The task 
was established as a generally positive activity for those in the Implicit condition. 
While this was also seen in the Explicit condition, the range of experiential data 
(i.e., the GRT was considered positive, but also detrimental) reinforces 
differences seen in the quantitative data (i.e., slower, less accurate NT 
performance). Taken as a whole, naivety to the GRT intent appears to influence 
its efficacy. However, the data here are not sufficiently definitive to support this 
conclusion fully.  
Chapter Summary 
 Preliminary evidence was found to support the GRT’s effectiveness in 
increasing levels of hope and decreasing negativity, and this was confirmed via 
convergence of both qualitative and quantitative data strands. However, no 
evidence was seen to suggest direct connection between GRT and NT 
performance, although indirect support might be suggested tentatively via 




Chapter 6. Exploring a Goal-Oriented Intervention and Cognitive Flexibility in 
the Adaptive Choice Task 
Introduction 
 In Study 2 (Chapter 4) we saw confirmation of the CST failure to enhance 
CF performance in the ACT (Irons & Leber, 2015). That is, the CST had little to no 
effect on ACT performance, and this held, regardless of whether CF performance 
was evaluated via relatively simple measures (i.e., RT/Accuracy) or more complex 
ones, such as optimality.  However, Study 2 ‘s qualitative data did serve to add 
understanding of participants’ subjective experience of the CST, when engaged in 
more complex aspects of a CF task. Thus, for the purposes of this thesis, the ACT 
(Irons & Leber, 2015) remains a more flexible paradigm, measuring a broader 
range of CF performance (see above).  
 Study 5 takes this further, by capitalizing on the flexibility of the ACT as a 
CF measure. By ‘spanning’ the range we could consider CF behaviour, this may 
enable the differentiation of CF to be examined more closely. Moreover, by 
replicating the GRT used in Study 4, we can also evaluate its efficacy in relation 
to more complex and/or dynamic tasks.  Specifically, here I will examine 1) the 
GRT’s effect of T2 questionnaires (i.e., SHS, THS, PANAS), 2) the extent to which 
the GRT impacts across the spectrum of CF behaviour, and 3) any impact 
instructional format has on performance (e.g., Implicit versus Explicit 
instructions; as established in Study 4). In Study 4, no simple CF differences (i.e., 
NT RT and/or Accuracy) were seen between experimental and control 
participants. However, by inclusion of complex performance measures such as 
Optimality (as well as traditional, simpler measures), we can also explore this 
more complex aspect of CF itself.   
The Current Study: Research Questions and Predictions 
The primary aim of this study is to investigate whether hope (instantiated 
here via operation of a goal-oriented intervention) can activate BBH-style 




continue to robustly evaluate the GRT. Thus, we can ask simply whether GRT 
participants perform better on the CF-based task (i.e., the ACT) than control 
counterparts. And, if performance differences emerge, do 1) they differ between 
CF performance types (i.e., simple versus complex)? or 2) does instruction format 
(Explicit or Implicit) have any impact? 
 Although preliminary evidence for GRT efficacy has been shown (see Study 
4), it is important to evaluate hope (as the specific character strength focus of this 
intervention) further in relation to GRT operation. Primarily, it is predicted that 
goal-reflection participants will show increased levels of hope, whereas controls 
will not. Based on Study 4, GRT engagement measures (i.e., number of words) may 
also reflect a relationship between increased engagement (i.e., more words, 
therefore more time/effort) and increased hope. These two aspects will be 
combined to assess whether participants who engage more fully in the GRT also 
show better ACT performance. It is expected that both increased levels of hope 
(post intervention) and behavioural benefit to CF performance (as defined by ACT 
Optimality) will be seen, but with little to no differences in RT or Accuracy (i.e., 
more simple CF-related performance). Participant knowledge of these aims and 
predictions (e.g., in the Explicit Instruction Group; see e.g., Latham, Stajkovic, and 
Locke; 2010; Weis & Speridakos, 2011) suggests that this will not hamper 
increased hopefulness (or subsequent CF performance), and may, in fact, boost it. 
 Again, qualitative data will give some insight into subjective experience of 
the GRT. Further, content analysis will enable evaluation of goal-reflection practice 
itself, potentially indicating applied real-world value for the intervention. In other 
words, evaluating this intervention will not only indicate if it ‘works’, but also show 








 Seventy-five participants were recruited for this study (56 female); age 
ranged from 18-23 years (M = 19.47, SD = 1.55). Forty-seven participants self-
reported their first language as English (61.3%), four as French (5.3%), three as 
Chinese and Malay (4% each), two as Polish, Russian, Greek, Czech, Mandarin, 
and Hindi (2.7% each); the remainder reported German, Tamil, Lithuanian, 
Bahasa Indonesian, Romanian, Cantonese, and Hungarian (1.3% each). 
Participants were recruited from a panel of first year undergraduate psychology 
students at the University of Warwick, who each received course credit for their 
participation, or from University of Warwick volunteers, paid £6 for their 
participation. 
Measures and Stimuli 
 Questionnaires and GRT. Following Study 4 (see Chapter 5), an identical 
questionnaire battery (i.e., SHS, THS, PANAS, free-response questionnaire), and 
GRT format was used. 
 Adaptive Choice Task. Following Study 2, an identical ACT (Irons & Leber, 
2015) procedure was used. More details of the rationale for use of this paradigm 
are included in the overview of the methodological issues for this thesis (see 
Chapter 3). 
Design 
A MM design was used for this study. For the experimental aspect (i.e., 
GRT effect on task performance), a 3 x 3 mixed factorial design was used. The 
between-participants factor was Instructional Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and 
Control), with a within-participants factor of Block (One, Two, Three). The 
dependant variables were Reaction Time (RT, ms), Accuracy (error rates, %), and 
Optimality (%). For the observational element (i.e., relationships between 




written. All questionnaires were recorded twice; before completing the GRT (T1), 
and after finishing the CF task (T2). For the qualitative component of the study, 
the free-response questionnaire was administered to all participants. These data 
were collected to address two specific questions; 1) what connection, if any, do 
participants discern between the GRT and the ACT? And 2) how do participants 
experience the GRT and reflection on goal achievement? 
In addition, as in the original ACT study (see Irons and Leber, 2013) and 
Study 2, participants were asked three additional questions directly after ACT 
completion, in order to probe participants’ strategy for selecting targets. The 
questions were; 1) “During the cognitive task, how did you decide which target to 
search for? Were there any particular factors that made you want to respond to 
one instead of the other?”, 2) “Did you switch between the two targets? If so, 
what made you decide to switch?”, and 3) “On some trials, there were more blue 
items in the display, and other times there were more red items. Did you get the 
impression that this change occurred abruptly, or gradually?”. Participants were 
encouraged to provide as much detail/feedback as they chose, without an 
explicit time limitation. 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the Instructional 
Conditions (Implicit, Explicit, or Control) and were given an information sheet, 
before fully informed consent was sought. Testing took place in individual sound- 
attenuated laboratory cubicles. To begin, all participants completed the SHS, 
THS, and PANAS (T1). Detailed instructions (see Stimuli & Measures section 
above) were then provided for either the GRT (i.e., Implicit, Explicit), or Typical 
Day (i.e., Control) task.  
GRT Procedure. In the Implicit instructional condition, participants were 
given an instruction sheet for the GRT, where they were asked to reflect on a 
goal they had previously achieved. No parameters for the goal were indicated, 




Completion of the GRT was self-paced, and undertaken alone, with instructions 
to inform the researcher when finished. The Explicit instructional condition was 
identical to the Implicit condition, with one additional step. Before starting the 
GRT, participants were informed (by the researcher using a script) why they were 
being asked to complete the GRT, and what the expected outcomes were (e.g., 
increased hope, better performance on the subsequent ACT task). In the Control 
condition, participants were given instructions for the Typical Day task, where 
they were asked to describe what they would consider to be a typical day. 
Similarly, once instructed, task performance was self-paced in isolation, with 
instructions to inform the researcher when finished. 
ACT Procedure. An identical procedure to Study 2 (pg. 105) for the ACT 
was used. Following completion of the reflective task, participants were given 
instruction for the ACT. They were informed verbally to read the instructions 
carefully, and to signal any questions before starting the task. Instructions were 
presented on screen. For each trial, two targets appeared, one red square with a 
number between 2 and 5, and one blue square with a number between 2 and 5 
(see Figure 31). All other squares were red, green, or blue and contain a number 
greater than 5. There was always a red and blue target for detection, but it was 
participants’ choice which one they selected. To indicate a found target, 
participants were asked to press the key ‘V’ for 2, ‘B’ for 3, ‘N’ for 4, and ‘M’ for 
5. Finally, participants were instructed that the targets for each trial would not 
be the same number (i.e., if the red target was 2, then the blue had to be 3, 4, or 







Figure 31. Typical ACT trial. Two correct target trials are outlined, participant would 
press ‘B’ for the blue target, and ‘N’ for the red target. 
Upon completion of the ACT, participants were given the SHS, THS, and 
PANAS again (T2), plus the free-response questionnaire.  Here, they were asked 
to reflect on the study as a whole, and describe any thoughts or feelings that 
occurred to them at any point. In particular, participants were asked to comment 
on their experience of the GRT, and any resulting thoughts and/or feelings that 
arose.  
Following data collection, Frequentist analyses were conducted using 
SPSS (IMB Corporation, 2016). Bayesian statistical analyses were also conducted, 
using the free software JASP (version 0.9.0.1) and default priors (JASP Team, 
2017; see Chapter 3: Bayesian Analysis). Free-response data were collated using 
NVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2012), and analysed using a content analysis 
methodology (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Mayring, 2000). 
Results 
In order to simplify the structure of the following findings, this section has 




descriptive statistics are outlined, followed by the questionnaires and 
experimental data (i.e., descriptive statistics for the ACT, and subsequent 
inferential analyses). Note, Bayesian analysis is reported with ACT data, to ensure 
a full and robust statistical approach to the data27. Second, qualitative data are 
explored using Content Analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005), with textual 
presentation of the findings. 
 Reflective Tasks 
Descriptive Statistics. Table 37 below displays mean number of words 
written by participants, grand mean, and then item by item28. Participants in the 
Implicit condition wrote the most words (m = 77.55, SD = 47.27), while the 
Control condition wrote the fewest (m = 52.52, SD = 35.80). Dispersion was 
substantial (collapsed mean, across all conditions; m = 63.84, SD = 42.91), and 
similar across all groups. 
Table 37. Mean number of words written by participants by Condition 
 Implicit Explicit Control 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Grand mean 77.55 47.27 61.46 45.65 52.52 35.80 
Q1 24.12 49.56 15.88 14.97 103.96 76.97 
Q2 78.96 60.48 56.24 44.92 13.32 20.52 
Q3 119.04 56.47 103.48 106.67 - - 
Q4 88.08 58.15 70.24 61.61 40.28 31.17 
Frequentist Analysis. No differences with anecdotal evidence for the null 
were seen in the average words written between Instructional Conditions as 
determined by a one-way ANOVA, F (2, 74) = 2.16, p = 1.23, BFinc = 0.59. 
  
 
27 Both in terms of experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the number of analyses 
required by a complex design. Analysis of Effects are reported as BFinc, and BF10 for correlational analyses. 
28 Descriptive data for all questions reported in Table 38, although only the ‘overall’ figure will be used from 





Descriptive Statistics. Participants completed each questionnaire at two 
time points, once before (T1) and once after (T2) the GRT and ACT; the data are 
displayed in Table 38 below. Participants in the Implicit condition showed an 
increase between T1 and T2 (i.e., increase in SHS and THS, for both subscales, 
and a decrease in PN); however, a decrease was also found in positivity (i.e., PP).  
The Control condition shows a similar pattern of results, although less 
pronounced (e.g., THS differences Control: m = 0.28 compared to Implicit: m = 
0.96). Finally, the Explicit condition saw an increase between T1 and T2 for SHS 
and THS (and subscales), a decrease for negativity, and was the only condition to 





Table 38. Response for SHS, THS (Agency/Pathway subscales) and PANAS 
(Positive/Negative subscales), by both Time Points and Condition 
Questionnaire Condition 
Implicit Control Explicit 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
T1 SHS 33.04 7.92 34.2 6.27 33.64 5.17 
PANAS Positive 33.72 6.87 32.12 6.11 31.6 7.10 
PANAS Negative 15.88 5.55 16.4 5.84 17.28 7.04 
THS 44.72 9.29 46.64 5.87 45.52 8.07 
THS Agency 21.88 4.68 23.24 3.15 22.76 4.44 
THS Pathway 22.84 5.14 23.4 3.78 22.76 4.40 
T2 SHS 34 8.43 34.28 6.18 35.04 5.81 
PANAS Positive 32 8.67 31.64 6.56 34.08 8.05 
PANAS Negative 13.56 3.28 14.92 5.54 14.76 6.48 
THS 45.68 10.16 46.92 6.41 47.4 8.17 
THS Agency 22.36 4.96 23.24 3.22 23.6 4.60 







s SHS 0.96 3.06 0.08 2.41 1.4 3.40 
PANAS Positive -1.72 6.55 -0.48 2.92 2.48 4.77 
PANAS Negative -2.32 3.65 -1.48 2.92 -2.52 3.06 
THS 0.96 4.08 0.28 2.59 1.88 3.41 
THS Agency 0.48 2.04 0 1.29 0.84 1.91 
THS Pathway 0.48 3.06 0.28 1.82 1.04 2.35 
*N = 25 per Condition 
Frequentist Analysis 
Difference between questionnaire score at T1 and T2. A mixed 2 x 3 
ANOVA was conducted on the questionnaires (Figure 32), with within-




Instructional Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and Control); the results are displayed 
in Table 39 below. 
Main effects of Time were seen for SHS, F (1,72) = 5.56, p = .02, 2 = .07, 
BFinc = 2.01; PN, F (1,72) = 32.04, p = < .001, 2 = .31, BFinc = 47337.52; THS, F 
(1,72) = 6.96, p = .01, 2 = .09, BFinc = 3.81; Agency, F (1,72) = 4.59, p = .04, 2 = 
.06, BFinc = 1.34, and Pathway, F (1,72) = 4.46, p = .04, 2 = .06, BFinc = 1.29. 
Responses at T2 were more ‘positive’ than T1 (i.e., increased hope, decreased 
negativity). Notably, only differences in PN and THS were associated with 
extreme and moderate evidence in support, respectively. An interaction with 
moderate evidence was found between PP and Condition, F (2,72) = 4.71, p = .01, 
2 = .12, BFinc = 4.19; the Explicit condition increased in PP between T1 and T2. 





Table 39. Mixed ANOVA results for Time (i.e., differences in questionnaire results from T1 
to T2), by Condition 
Questionnaire Effect F df p 2 BFinc  
SHS Time 5.56 1,72 .02** .07 2.01 
Condition 0.12 2,72 .89 .00 0.43 
Time * Condition 1.27 2,72 .29 .03 0.30 
THS Time 6.96 1,72 .01** .09 3.81 
Condition 0.28 2,72 .76 .00 0.50 
Time * Condition 1.38 2,72 .26 .04 0.28 
Agency Time 4.59 1,72 .04** .06 1.34 
Condition 0.58 2,72 .56 .02 0.54 
Time * Condition 1.41 2,72 .25 .04 0.33 
Pathway Time 4.46 1,72 .04** .06 1.29 
Condition 0.07 2,72 .93 .00 0.36 
Time * Condition 0.64 2,72 .53 .02 0.18 
PP Time 0.03 1,72 .87 .00 0.20 
Condition 0.17 2,72 .85 .01 0.26 
Time * Condition 4.71 2,72 .01** .12 4.19 
PN Time 32.04 1,72 <.001** .31 47337.52 
Condition 0.37 2,72 .69 .01 0.39 
Time * Condition 0.73 2,72 .48 .02 0.20 









GRT relationship with Questionnaires Variables. A Pearson’s Product 
Moment correlation was conducted to establish associations between 
questionnaire scores (at both T1 and T2) and GRT engagement (see Table 40).  
Table 40. Correlational analyses between GRT engagement and questionnaires at T1 and 
T2 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS PP PN THS Agency Pathway 
T1 r 23* .25* .02 .15 .23* .05 
p .05 .03 .88 .19 .04 .66 
T2 r .19 .18 -.11 .18 .25* .09 
p .11 .12 .37 .13 .03 .43 
* = Significant < .05 
Simple linear regression analyses were used to provide further details of 
the relationships (Table 41). Baseline (T1) SHS, PP, and Agency scores were 
predictive of GRT engagement; in addition, GRT engagement predicted T2 
Agency scores (Figure 33). However, in all cases only anecdotal evidence for the 
alternative hypothesis was obtained, and therefore these relationships, should 
be considered with caution.  
Table 41. Regression analyses summary for T1 questionnaire scores predicting GRT 
engagement, and GRT engagement predicting T2 questionnaire score 
Questionnaire t p R2 B0 B1 BF10 
T1 SHS 2.04 .05 .05 10.03 1.57 1.42 
T1 Agency 2.05 .04 .05 7.66 2.48 1.45 
T1 PP 2.23 .03 .06 10.00 1.66 1.98 










ACT Data  
Descriptive Statistics. Outliers were removed from the data automatically 
(as per Irons and Leber, 2013). For RT, screening was on the conservative ranges 
of < 300ms to more than 3 standard deviations about the individual’s RT mean, 
and for mean Error Rate > 15%. Descriptive statistics for ACT performance are 
displayed in Table 42, paired with short summaries of each variable. As a whole, 
these descriptive data suggest ACT performance was comparable across all 
measures, regardless of Instructional condition.  
Reaction Time. Collapsed across all blocks, RTs were faster for the Explicit 
condition (m = 2943.89ms, SD = 623.78), followed by Implicit and Control 
conditions (m = 3056.22ms, SD = 711.87; m = 3070.62ms, SD = 628.38 
respectively). With a mean RT range was only 126.73ms, GRT conditions were 
faster, but only by a negligible margin. 
Accuracy. For all conditions, error rates were similar, with a minimal 
range (0.52%) between the most accurate (Implicit; M = 98.49%, SD = 1.07) to 
the least (Explicit; M = 97.97%, SD = 1.54). Interestingly, both GRT conditions 
(Implicit and Explicit) improved slightly between Blocks 1 and 3 (Implicit 
difference = 0.95%; Explicit difference = 1.67%), however the Control condition 
decreased slightly in accuracy between Blocks 1 and 3 (difference = -0.14%). 
Optimality. Again, similar Optimality scores were seen across conditions; 
a small range (0.76%) between the most optimal condition (Implicit; m = 62.04%, 
SD = 15.14) and least optimal condition (Control; m = 61.28%, SD = 14.21). While 
GRT conditions were more optimal overall, all conditions increased in optimality 






Table 42. ACT RT (ms), Accuracy (%), and Optimality (%), by Block and Condition 
RT 
Frequentist Analysis. A mixed 3 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on ACT RTs 
(Figure 34), with a within-participants factor of Block (1, 2, 3), and between- 
participants factor of Instructional Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and Control). A 
main effect for Block was found as Block 3 had the fastest RT and Block 1 the 
slowest29, F (1.65,118.79) = 41.85, p = <.001, 2 = .37, BFinc = 9.91. Pairwise 
comparison by Block revealed that all Blocks were significantly different from 
each other (all ps <.001). No effect was found for Condition with anecdotal 
evidence for the null, F (2, 72) = 0.29, p = .75, BFinc = 0.26, nor an interaction 
between Condition and Block with anecdotal evidence for the null, F (4, 144) = 
1.04, p = .39, BFinc = 0.14. 
 
29 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, 2 (2) = 16.94, p = 





RT Error Rate Optimality 
Mean (ms) SD Mean (%) SD Mean (%) SD 
Implicit 1 3372.54 917.52 97.81 2.22 57.57 14.23 
2 2993.59 817.43 98.90 1.24 63.07 19.46 
3 2814.43 557.12 98.76 1.06 65.41 17.97 
Grand Mean 3056.22 711.87 98.49 1.07 62.04 15.14 
Explicit  1 3128.96 752.28 97.14 2.36 60.78 13.79 
2 2900.22 629.29 97.95 2.02 61.08 18.31 
3 2808.62 572.56 98.81 1.50 63.33 17.61 
Grand Mean 2943.89 623.78 97.97 1.54 61.73 15.10 
Control  1 3352.33 817.59 97.90 1.62 57.80 12.92 
2 3035.46 697.02 98.95 1.43 62.52 16.99 
3 2836.17 471.94 97.76 2.76 63.45 16.87 





Figure 34. Graph depicting Accuracy across Block, by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 
conducted to assess any relationship between RT and the GRT engagement. A 
negative, moderate relationship was found, r (75) = -.26, p = .02. Subsequently, a 
simple linear regression found GRT engagement predicted RT (t = 2.30, p = .02, R2 
=0.07, BF10 = 2.25), and RT was equal to 3269.00 + (-3.84 x word average); see 







Figure 35. Scatterplot depicting relationship between average words produced for the 
GRT and RT. 
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess relationships between RT and hope 
questionnaires at both T1 and T2; no relationships were found (all rs < .11, all ps 
> .33, BF10 <0.01 – 0.01). Therefore, no subsequent regression analyses were 
calculated. Bayesian evidence ranged from very strong to extreme in support of 
the null hypothesis, indicating that there was no predictive relationship between 
hope and RT.  
Accuracy 
Frequentist Analysis. An identical mixed 3 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on ACT 
accuracy data (Figure 36). A within-participants factor of Block (1, 2, 3), and 
between-participants factor of Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and Control). A main 
effect with very strong evidence for Block was found, F (1.76,127.03) = 8.62, p = 




the lowest30. Pairwise comparison by Block revealed that Block 1 (m = 97.62%, SD 
= 2.09) was less accurate than both Blocks 2 (m = 98.60%, SD = 1.64, p = <.001) 
and 3 (m = 98.44%, SD = 1.95, p = .005), although Blocks 2 and 3 did not differ (p 
= .441). Further, a Condition x Block interaction was shown, F (4,144) = 3.26, p = 
.01, 2 = .08, BFinc = 1.31, although this evidence was only anecdotal, suggesting 
caution in interpretation. Finally, no difference was found between the 
Conditions, with anecdotal evidence for the null, F (2,72) = 0.90, p = .410, BFinc = 
0.20. 
 
Figure 36. Graph depicting Accuracy across Block, by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Product Moment correlation was conducted to 
assess any relationship between Accuracy and GRT engagement. No reliable 
relationship was found (r = .23, p = .06), therefore no regression analysis was 
calculated. Notably, a Bayesian analysis suggested anecdotal evidence in favour 
of a positive correlation (BFinc = 1.38). 
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess any relationship between Accuracy and 
 
30 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, 2 (2) = 




hope questionnaires at both T1 and T2. No relationships were found (all rs < .23, 
all ps > .05), therefore no regression analysis were calculated. Subsequent 
Bayesian analysis yielded anecdotal evidence for the null across all 
questionnaires, BF10 0.28 – 0.83).  
Optimality 
Frequentist Analysis. An identical mixed 3 x 3 ANOVA was conducted on ACT 
Optimality (%; Figure 37), with within-participants factor of Block (1,2,3) and 
between-participants factor of Condition (Implicit, Explicit, Control). A main 
effect with strong evidence was found for Block, F (1.80,129.72) = 6.57, p = .002, 
2 = .08, BFinc = 13.07; Block 3 was most optimal while Block 1 was least31. 
Pairwise comparisons by Block revealed that in Block 1 (m = 58.72%, SD = 13.55) 
participants were less Optimal than Block 2 (m = 62.22%, SD = 18.05, p = .02), 
and Block 3 (m = 64.06%, SD = 17.28, p = .002), although Blocks 2 and 3 did not 
differ (p = .15). There was no effect of Condition, with anecdotal evidence in 
support of the null, F (2, 72) = 0.02, p = .98, BFinc = 0.16. Nor was there any 
Condition x Block interaction, F (4, 144) = 0.77, p = .55, BFinc = 0.06, with strong 
evidence in support of the null.  
  
 
31 Mauchly’s test of sphericity indicated that the assumption of sphericity was violated, 2 (2) = 






Figure 37. Graph depicting Optimality across Block, by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation between 
Optimality and GRT engagement found no significant relationship (r = .21, p = 
.08, BF10 = 0.95), therefore no regression analysis was calculated. Bayesian 
analysis indicated anecdotal evidence in support of the null hypothesis.  
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess any relationship between Optimality and 
hope questionnaires at both T1 and T2; this resulted in a high number of 
correlations (see Table 43 below). The only relationship not achieving statistical 
significance was T1 Pathway and Optimality (p = .07).  
For each significant correlation, a simple linear regression32 was conducted to 
provide further details of the relationship (see Table 44 below). Baseline hope 
(T1) score for SHS, Agency, and THS were predictors of Optimality (all ps < .04); 
see Figure 38. Additionally, ACT Optimality was a predictor of all hope 
 
32 A multiple regression could not be used as the questionnaires were too highly correlated, violating 




questionnaire scores at T2 (all ps < .04); see Figure 39. However, it is of note that 
in all cases above, the variance accounted for was low (all R2 = < 0.11), and none 
reached a high level of significance (i.e., all ps = > .001). Overall, this suggests 
hope and Optimality may have a predictive relationship, but caution should be 
taken in interpreting these findings. Only T1 and T2 SHS was found to have 
strong and moderate evidence (BF10 = 10.26, BF10 = 3.71 respectively) suggesting 
state hope predicts Optimality. 
Table 43. Correlational analyses between hope questionnaires (SHS, THS, plus Agency 
and Pathway sub-scales) at T1 and T2, and Optimality 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS Agency Pathway THS 
T1 r .34* .23* .21 .25* 
p .003 .04 .07 .03 
T2 r .30* .24* .25* .27* 
p .01 .04 .03 .02 
* = significant <.05 
Table 44. Regression analyses summary for T1 and T2 questionnaire scores predicting 
Optimality 
Time Questionnaire t p R2 B0 B1 BF10 
T1 SHS 3.05 .003 .11 .36 .01 10.27 
THS 2.16 .03 .07 .40 .01 1.28 
Agency 2.06 .04 .06 .43 .01 1.04 
T2 SHS 2.65 .01 .09 25.91 13.84 3.71 
THS 2.35 .02 .07 37.38 15.05 1.89 
Agency 2.15 .04 .06 18.65 7.17 1.25 















ACT Strategies. Qualitative data was collected as in Irons and Leber 
(2016), to explore participants’ selection strategies during the ACT. Given the 
brief, highly focused nature of responses, a content analysis procedure (e.g., 
Hseish & Shannon, 2005) was used to convert data into frequency categories. 
Responses to the three questions (see Study 5: Materials section) are shown 
below. Notably, participants were able to respond freely, therefore not all 
responses were coded (or codable), and some participants provided multiple 
answers to each question. In this latter case, responses were coded to their most 
representative category. 
Target Selection Strategy. When asked about their target selection 
strategy, five categories were identified across the three instructional conditions 
(displayed in Table 45 below). The majority of participants (45%) suggested they 
tried to optimise their behaviour, and search for targets with fewer options; here 
the Implicit group was represented slightly more. In contrast, slightly fewer than 
half (34%) the statements suggested arbitrary selection of a colour. 
Table 45. Responses and frequency data for each of the Sub-Categories Relating to 
Target Selection, separated by Condition 
Sub-Category Implicit  Control Explicit Examples 
Blue Focus 1 10 8 “I decided to only search for the blue 
colours” 
Red Focus 2 0 3 “I mainly choose red first” 
No Focus 4 4 3 “Didn't use any particular method” 
First to Find 3 2 3 “I just looked for the first one I could 
see” 
Proportion 14 10 10 “I was looking for the coloured target 
that had fewer squares overall” 
Target Switching. Exploring target switching (i.e., from red to blue, and 
visa versa), a larger proportion of participants (46%) adhered to expected 




larger). However, some participants were not optimised, searching exhaustively, 
switching randomly, or not switching at all. Table 46 below displays some 
examples of these categories, and their distribution between the instructional 
conditions.  
Table 46. Number of Responses by Sub-Category relating to Target Switching, by 
Condition 
Sub-Category Implicit  Control Explicit Examples 
Proportion of 
Colour 
16 10 9 “the proportion and distribution of 
the targets made me switch so as to 
find the one that stands out more” 
No Specific 
Reason 
1 1 2 “I just randomly switched” 
Exhaustive 
Switch 
4 2 3 “If I couldn't find the target of one 
colour easily then I would switch to 
looking for the other colour target” 
Location 3 2 5 “just based on which caught my eye 
first” 
No Switch 1 11 6 “No” 
Distractor Changes. In response to questions about participants’ 
awareness of distractor target colour in each trial (i.e., if participants noticed 
changes, and how abruptly changes occurred), the majority of participants (48%) 
suggested that the changes were abrupt. A further 32% suggested the switch was 
more gradual. Table 47 below displays examples of these categories, and their 





Table 47. Number of Responses by Sub-Category relating to Distractor Changes, by 
Condition 
Sub-Category Implicit  Control Explicit Examples 
Abrupt 11 11 15 “Abruptly” 
Gradual 9 10 6 “Gradually” 
Unaware 5 5 2 “I felt like the change happened 
both abruptly and gradually” 
Free-Response Questionnaire. Participants’ responses to the free 
response questionnaires were analysed using a Content Analysis methodology 
similar to Study 4. A ‘top-down’ approach was adopted to address two specific 
questions; 1) how do participants feel about the GRT task? And 2) what (if any) 
impact do they think it may have on performance?  
Importantly, qualitative analysis procedures recommend 
acknowledgement of implicit bias arising from prior analyses. Thus, while 
content analysis here was conducted following standardised procedures, findings 
from Study 4 use of the GRT will have influenced (or are highly likely to have 
influenced) this analysis. On a pragmatic level, categories identified in previous 
analyses do not constrain this analysis (i.e., new, previously undefined categories 
have been used), but where similarities have occurred, this has been noted (e.g., 
via identical category names). 
Reflecting on a Goal. The most populated category identified the GRT to 
be a positive activity, which was made up of two sub-categories: ‘Motivational’ 
and ‘Effective Reflection’. Motivational codes revealed participants to be inspired 
or focused to work towards current goals. Similarly, participants found the GRT 
to be effective at enabling a positive reflection on an accomplished goal.  
While far less common, a negative category was also identified, in which 
participants generally suggested the GRT caused a sense of concern or worry 




neutral codes suggested neither positive or negative experience, but instead 
highlighted practical issues of selecting a goal previously accomplished. 
Table 48. Examples of each of the Sub-Categories relating to the reflective tasks 
 Sub-category Example 
Positive Motivational “It made me feel more focused so that I can work 
towards achieving my goals now” 
Effective 
Reflection 
“It felt good to think back to a goal that I achieved 
and was proud of brought back sweet memories!” 
Control 
condition 
“It made me feel proud to realise I do not waste my 
days” 
Neutral Difficult task “it was hard to find a goal that was worthy enough 
to think about” 
Control 
Condition 
 “It felt normal to describe the experience because 
my days are very similar every week” 
Negative Concern “It made me realise how far off I am from where I 
should have been and how I should try harder for 




 Both GRT Instructional conditions (Implicit and Explicit) were represented 
in positive and neutral categories. However, the Explicit condition made up the 
majority of the negative category, even though it was a proportional smaller 
category overall. Finally, it is also notable that the Control condition also 
comprised responses that could have been coded into all three categories.   
 Impact of GRT. In considering what, if any, impact of the GRT participants 
perceived, two categories emerged: 1) General behaviour (i.e., beyond the scope 
of the study), 2) ACT task performance. Regarding general behaviour, two sub-
categories were identified (see Table 49 below). The majority of participants, 
evenly represented across conditions, suggested a general behavioural benefit to 




goal reflection suggested to have a positive effect (total 46 codes, equally divided 
across GRT conditions). Conversely, the No Impact category, while much smaller 
(only three codes), was mostly made up of items from Explicit condition 
participants (two out of three). 
Table 49. Example of each sub-category relating to the impact of the GRT generally 
Sub-category Example 
Impactful “Yes, probably. I think it's a reminder that hard things are 
doable and a slight boost of self-confidence” 
No Impact “I think focusing on goals I’ve already achieved distracts me 
from moving forwards” 
For ACT Task Performance category, two sub-categories were also 
identified (Table 50). The GRT was considered to be mostly helpful (i.e., it was an 
enjoyable task, or something that made participants feel better), again divided 
equally between GRT conditions. Interestingly, and in contrast to expectations, 
no evidence was found for a detrimental connection between tasks, although a 
small sub-category (six items) suggested no connection (i.e., the GRT and ACT 
were not linked).  
Table 50. Examples from each sub-category relating to the Connection between the tasks 
Sub-category Example 
Helpful “Either way, doing well on that test did also 
make me feel better so it worked. I enjoyed this 
task” 
No Connection “Nothing substantial” 
Discussion 
 Considering first the quantitative findings only, participants were 
consistently more hopeful (with SHS and THS improvements, including both THS 
sub-scales), and less negative after GRT engagement. A difference was also 




condition having a small increase in PN (i.e., increased negativity) post-
intervention. Bayesian evidence was particularly strong for the reduction in 
negativity (i.e., PN), suggesting this effect is reliable. In addition, baseline hope 
and positivity were established as predictors of GRT engagement, and GRT 
engagement as predictor of subsequent hope levels (particularly Agency).  
 ACT data was largely as expected (i.e., faster, more accurate, and more 
optimal as the task progressed) although no reliable differences emerged 
between Instructional conditions. Increased GRT engagement predicted faster 
RTs, although no relationships with Accuracy or Optimality were evident. 
However, hope and Optimality themselves were predictive; baseline State Hope 
levels predicted Optimality, and in turn, Optimality predicted Hope (State and 
Trait) by the end of the task. Bayesian evidence provided particular support for 
the predictive relationship between State Hope and Optimality, both pre-and 
post-intervention. Nevertheless, support for an association between Hope and 
CF was seen; those that are more hopeful, are also more Optimal (i.e., 
demonstrating flexibility in adapting to environmental changes).  
 The qualitative data consider alone suggest the GRT was an effective 
intervention, with no meaningful differences between Instructional conditions. 
However, the Explicit condition evidenced more mixed results, which highlighted 
both positive and negative aspects of goal-reflection. Focusing on AUT 
performance, Implicit condition participants appeared more aware of optimal 
behaviour, suggesting they switched targets as colour proportions changed. 
 Converging both data strands, participants who completed the GRT 
showed higher levels of ‘positivity’ (increased hope, decreased negativity), and 
behaviourally, demonstrated higher levels of CF. Naivety to GRT aims appears to 
have little effect, with only small differences between Instructional Conditions 
(for both qualitative and quantitative measures). Finally, given that GRT 
engagement correlated more optimal behaviour overall, (and optimality aligns 
most intuitively with CF performance in this paradigm), this provided more 




 Moving forwards, the impact of the GRT on AUT (Guildford et al, 1977) 
performance will be explored. This will allow the efficacy of the GRT to be further 
studied. Additionally, the impact of the GRT on more complex CF can be 
investigated as it has been established both here, and in Study 4, that little 
difference is seen in less complex CF (i.e., RT, Accuracy). 
Chapter Summary 
 In contrast to the CST, the GRT elicits a number of behaviours that 
indicate more sustainable performance benefits, although not across all 
behavioural measures (e.g., faster responses, less accuracy). Hope (state and 
trait) was a predictor of Optimality, which arguably is the most intuitive CF 
behaviour emanating from ACT performance. Finally, GRT efficacy in improving 




Chapter 7:  Exploring a Goal-Oriented Intervention and Cognitive Flexibility in 
the Alternative Uses Task 
Building on Previous Studies 
 Across CST Studies (1-3), the most successful CF improvement was seen 
in conjunction with the Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guildford et al, 1978). In 
summary, experimental participants performed better than controls in all 
measures, excepting Originality. Furthermore, qualitative data highlighted 
participant-perceived advantages of the intervention, with particular emphasis 
on Realised Strengths. Conversely, the negative impact of simple consideration 
of personal Weaknesses. Given the AUT was the only measure to demonstrate 
increased CF reliably thus far (and in relation to an admittedly low impact 
‘quasi- intervention) it is useful to test these previous behavioural and affective 
advantages alongside a more robust PP intervention; the GRT.  
 GRT efficacy (i.e., increasing hope, positivity, reducing negativity) has 
been substantiated in Studies 4 and 5. However, little to no evidence for 
improved CF was found. That said, in Study 5 a relationship between GRT 
performance and more complex CF behaviour (i.e., Optimality) emerged. 
Therefore, the pairing of the strongest PP intervention with the strongest 
instance of CF improvement may give clearer indication of the extent of this 
relationship. 
The Current Study: Research Questions and Predictions 
 The primary aim of this study is to examine whether hope (instantiated  
via a goal-oriented intervention) demonstrates similar impact on cognitive 
performance (here, CF) as positive affect (i.e., BBH; Fredrickson, 2001).  Thus, 
we can ask whether GRT assigned participants perform better on the CF task 
(here, the AUT; Guildford et al, 1977) than control counterparts? And, if 
performance differences emerge, does the instruction format (Explicit or 




Preliminary evidence for GRT efficacy has been established above (see 
Studies 4 and 5). Therefore, we would expect further validation of this 
intervention; that is, 1) hope levels will increase, and 2) CF performance will 
improve, when the intervention is undertaken. Based on Studies 4-5, GRT 
engagement measures (i.e., number of words written) may also show a 
relationship between increased engagement (i.e., more words, and therefore 
more time and effort spent on task reflection) and increased levels of hope.  
These two aspects will be combined in Study 6, to assess whether 
participants who engage more fully in the GRT also show better ACT 
performance. I anticipate both increased levels of hope post-intervention and 
enhancement CF performance (i.e., Fluency, Flexibility, Elaboration, and Error 
Rates); the same is not expected for Originality given previous findings (see 
Study 3). Participant knowledge of these aims and predictions (e.g., Latham, 
Stajkovic, and Locke; 2010; see Weis & Speridakos, 2011) suggests that this will 
not hinder increased hopefulness (or subsequent CF performance), and may, in 
fact, boost it. However, it is important to highlight that no evidence has 
supported this prediction thus far. 
Overall, qualitative data will allow specific insight into participants’ 
subjective experience of the GRT. Content analysis will enable evaluation of goal 
-reflection itself, and potentially, indicate any real-world value of the GRT 
intervention. In other words, evaluating this intervention will involve assessing 
whether it ‘works’, but also show whether it is an activity that participants 
enjoy, and/or will continue with of their own accord. 
Method 
Participants 
Seventy-eight participants were recruited for this study33 (66 female); 
age ranged from 18-34 years (M = 19.56; SD = 2.65). Forty-eight participants 
 
33 Originally eighty participants were recruited, however two were removed having failed to 




(61.5%) self-reported English as their first language, a further six (7.7%) 
reported Malay, and five (6.4%) reported Chinese, three each for French and 
Cantonese (3.8% respectively), and two each for Mandarin and Tamil (2.6% 
respectively) as their first language. The remainder reported Urdu, Spanish, 
Korean, Bengali, Polish, Turkish, Hungarian, Bulgarian, and Hindi as their 
primary languages (1.3% each). Participants were recruited from a panel of first 
year undergraduate psychology students at the University of Warwick, who 
each received course credit for their participation, or from University of 
Warwick volunteers, paid £6 for their participation. 
Measures and stimuli 
 Questionnaires and GRT. Following Study 4 (see Chapter 5), an identical 
questionnaire battery (i.e., SHS, THS, PANAS, free-response questionnaire), and 
GRT format was used. 
 Alternative Uses Task (AUT). Following Study 3, an identical AUT 
(Guilford et al, 1978) procedure was used.  More details of the rationale for use 
of this paradigm are included in the overview of the methodological issues for 
this thesis (see Chapter 3). 
Design 
A MM design was used for this study. For the experimental aspect (i.e., 
GRT effect on AUT performance), a 3 x 4 mixed factorial design was used. The 
between-participants factor was Instructional Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and 
Control), and within-participants factor was Section (One, Two, Three, Four). 
The dependant variables were Error Rate (%), Fluency, Flexibility, Originality, 
and Elaboration. For the observational element (i.e., exploration of GRT-related 
behaviour), engagement was measured by the number of words written by the 
participant. All questionnaires were recorded twice; before undertaking the GRT 




For the qualitative component of the study, the free-response 
questionnaire was administered to all participants. These data were collected to 
address two specific questions; 1) what connection, if any, do participants 
discern between the GRT and the AUT? and 2) how do participants experience 
the GRT overall, and are there any apparent effects of goal reflection on goal 
achievement? 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly allocated to one of the Instructional 
Conditions (Implicit, Explicit, or Control) and were given an information sheet, 
before fully informed consent was sought. Testing took place in individual 
sound- attenuated laboratory cubicles. To begin, all participants completed the 
SHS, THS, and PANAS (T1). Detailed instructions (see Stimuli & Measures section 
above) were then provided for either the GRT (i.e., Implicit, Explicit), or Typical 
Day (i.e., Control) task.  
GRT Procedure. An identical procedure to Study 4 was used (pg. 149). In 
the Implicit instructional condition, participants were given an instruction sheet 
for the GRT, where they were asked to reflect on a goal they had previously 
achieved. No parameters for the goal were indicated, simply that it should be 
meaningful to the participant and had been achieved. Completion of the GRT 
was self-paced, and undertaken alone, with instructions to inform the 
researcher when finished. The Explicit instructional condition was identical to 
the Implicit condition, with one additional step. Before starting the GRT, 
participants were informed (by the researcher using a script) why they were 
being asked to complete the GRT, and what the expected outcomes were (e.g., 
increased hope, better performance on the subsequent ACT task). Finally, in the 
Control condition, participants given instructions for the Typical Day task, where 
they were asked to describe what they would consider to be a typical day. 
Similarly, once instructed, task performance was self-paced in isolation, with 




AUT Procedure. An identical procedure to Study 3 was used (pg, 150). 
Following completion of the reflective task, participants were instructed for the 
Alternative Uses Task. They were informed verbally to read the instructions 
carefully, and to signal any questions before starting the task. Participants were 
informed that they would be presented with some common objects with a 
defined use (e.g.., newspaper; used for reading), and that their task was to think 
of up to six alternative uses for each item. Participants were provided with a 
completed example for newspaper, and instructed to note each of the example 
uses listed were different from each other and from the primary use. 
Participants were presented with three items per section, with four minutes for 
each section; they could complete all three items in each section 
simultaneously, but they could not return once the four minutes were 
complete. Participants were given a chance to ask questions before the first 
section started. 
Upon completion of the AUT task, participants were given the SHS, THS, 
and PANAS again (T2), plus the free-response questionnaire.  Here, they were 
asked to reflect on the study as a whole, and describe any thoughts or feelings 
that occurred to them at any point during the study. In particular, participants 
were asked to comment on their experience of the GRT, any connection 
between the GRT and AUT performance, and any other resulting thoughts 
and/or feelings that arose.  
Following data collection, frequentist analyses were conducted using 
SPSS (IMB Corporation, 2016). Bayesian statistical analyses were also 
conducted, using the free software JASP (version 0.9.0.1) and default priors 
(JASP Team, 2017; see Chapter 3: Bayesian Analysis) Free-response data were 
collated using nVivo (QSR International Pty Ltd, 2012), and analysed using a 






In order to simplify the structure of the following findings, this section 
has been divided into three subsections. Firstly, descriptive statistics are 
outlined, followed by the questionnaires and experimental data (i.e., descriptive 
statistics for the AUT, and subsequent inferential analyses). Next, Bayesian 
analysis is reported on AUT data, to ensure analysis of these data is as robust 
overall as the design allows34.  To avoid repetition of statistics, only noteworthy 
findings from the Bayesian analysis will be reported in detail. Finally, qualitative 
data are analysed using a Content Analysis approach, with textual presentation 
of the findings. 
 Reflective Tasks  
Descriptive Statistics. Table 51 below displays the mean number of 
words written by participants, grand mean and item by item analysis35. 
Participants in the Implicit condition wrote the most words (m = 78.18, SD = 
43.93), and fewest in the Explicit condition (m = 57.37, SD = 28.19). Dispersion 
was substantial (mean collapsed across all conditions, m = 65.52, SD = 34.72), 
but similar across all groups. 
Table 51. Mean number of words written by participants, by Condition 
 Implicit Explicit Control 
 Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Grand Mean 78.18 43.93 57.37 28.19 61.01 32.03 
Q1 20.65 29.78 20.38 37.07 127.58 67.80 
Q2 70.27 48.58 52.62 38.71 7.19 13.25 
Q3 138.15 91.83 99.88 45.64 - - 
Q4 83.65 52.75 45.64 27.33 48.27 34.08 
 
34 Both in terms of experimental power and avoidance of Type 1 error, due to the number of analyses 
required by a complex design. Analysis of Effects are reported as BFinc, and BF10 for correlational analyses. 
35 Descriptive data for all questions reported in Table 51, although only the ‘Grand Mean’ figure will be 




Frequentist Analysis. No differences with anecdotal evidence for the 
null hypothesis were seen in the average words written between Instructional 
Conditions as determined by a one-way ANOVA, F (2, 77) = 2.57, p = .08, BFinc = 
0.80. 
Questionnaire data  
Descriptive Statistics. All participants completed each questionnaire at 
two time points, once before (T1) and once after (T2) the GRT and AUT; the data 
are displayed in Table 52 below. Somewhat unexpectedly, all Instructional 
Conditions had a very small decrease in hope between T1 and T2 (collapsed 
across all factors, SHS difference m = -.090; THS difference m = -.056). 
Interestingly, the Implicit condition showed a similarly small increase in the 
Agency subscale between T1 and T2 (Implicit Agency difference, m = 0.31). 
However, a reduction in negativity was also found (collapsed across all factors, 






Table 52. Responses for SHS, THS (Agency and Pathway subscales) and PANAS (Positive 
and Negative subscales) at both T1, T2, by Condition 
Questionnaire Condition 
Implicit Control Explicit 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
T1 SHS 33.73 4.97 32.81 6.36 32.12 3.75 
PANAS Positive 32.85 6.96 33.73 7.12 29.58 7.22 
PANAS Negative 19.46 7.50 19.85 8.18 19.65 6.90 
THS 45.92 6.45 43.88 7.61 43.77 5.81 
THS Agency 21.62 4.91 21.62 4.62 21.35 3.52 
THS Pathway 24.31 3.70 22.27 4.13 22.42 3.34 
T2 SHS 32.69 5.92 31.65 5.85 31.62 4.51 
PANAS Positive 32.27 8.72 32.54 7.40 30.27 6.92 
PANAS Negative 17.65 7.02 17.92 7.36 18.92 8.12 
THS 45.85 6.94 43.19 8.06 43.58 5.08 
THS Agency 21.92 4.68 21.31 4.84 21.27 3.27 
THS Pathway 23.92 4.27 21.88 4.25 22.31 2.92 
Difference SHS -1.04 4.93 -1.15 5.48 -.50 4.26 
PANAS Positive -.58 5.71 -1.19 4.65 .69 4.79 
PANAS Negative -1.81 3.97 -1.92 4.46 -.73 4.34 
THS -.08 4.73 -.69 3.52 -.19 4.76 
THS Agency .31 2.24 -.31 1.67 -.08 2.80 
THS Pathway -.38 3.34 -.38 2.37 -.12 2.41 
*N = 26 per Condition. 
 Frequentist Analysis 
Difference Between Questionnaire Score at T1 And T2. A mixed 2 x 3 
ANOVA was conducted on the questionnaires (Figure 40), with within-
participant factors of Time (T1, T2), and the between participants facto- 
Condition (Implicit, Explicit, and Control); the results are displayed in Table 53. A 
main effect of Time, with moderate evidence, indicates reduction in PN 




effects or interactions were found, with anecdotal evidence for the null (all Fs < 
2.52, all ps > .09). 
Table 53. Mixed ANOVA results for Time (i.e., differences in questionnaire results from 
T1 to T2), by Condition 
Questionnaire Effect F df p 2 BFinc 
SHS Time 2.60 1, 75 .11 .03 0.56 
Condition 0.57 1, 75 .57 .02 0.25 
Time * Condition 0.13 2, 75 .88 .00 0.13 
THS Time 0.42 1, 75 .52 .01 0.21 
Condition 1.11 1, 75 .34 .03 0.51 
Time * Condition 0.15 2, 75 .87 .00 0.12 
Agency Time 0.01 1, 75 .92 .00 0.17 
Condition 0.08 1, 75 .92 .00 0.38 
Time * Condition 0.48 2, 75 .62 .01 0.14 
Pathway Time 0.90 1, 75 .35 .01 0.29 
Condition 2.52 1, 75 .09 .06 1.09 
Time * Condition 0.31 2, 75 .92 .00 0.10 
PP Time 0.39 1, 75 .53 .01 0.21 
Condition 1.57 1, 75 .22 .04 0.62 
Time * Condition 0.93 2, 75 .40 .02 0.21 
PN Time 9.48 1, 75 .003** .11 11.37 
Condition 0.07 1, 75 .94 .00 0.34 









GRT Relationship with Questionnaires. A Pearson’s Product moment 
correlation was conducted to establish any associations between questionnaire 
scores (at both T1 and T2) and GRT engagement (see Table 54 below). Where 
correlations were statistically significant, simple linear regression analyses were 
used to calculate predictiveness of GRT engagement on questionnaire 
responses. GRT engagement was found to predict T2 Agency score (t = 2.33, p = 
.023, R2 =0.07, BF10 = 2.35). Agency score was equal to 19.50 + (0.03 x mean 
words), see Figure 41 below. However, Bayesian evidence in support of this 
relationship was only anecdotal. 
Table 54. Correlational analyses between GRT engagement and questionnaires at T1 
and T2 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS PP PN THS Agency Pathway 
T1 r .16 .15 -.07 .20 .21 .10 
p .16 .19 .53 .09 .07 .36 
T2 r .12 .12 -.07 .15 .26* -.02 
p .29 .30 .57 .19 .02 .85 
 
Figure 41. Line graph depicting relationship between Agency scores at T2, and average 





Descriptive Statistics. No outliers were removed from the data. 
Descriptive statistics for AUT performance are displayed in Table 55, paired with 
a short summary for each variable. Generally, the Implicit condition showed the 
best AUT performance (i.e., highest score, fewest errors). 
Fluency.  Across all sections, both GRT Conditions had similar scores. The 
Implicit condition had highest Fluency scores (m = 2.48, SD = 0.95), followed by 
the Explicit condition (m = 2.37, SD = 0.88), and the Control condition, the 
lowest (m = 1.58, SD = 0.79). All conditions decreased in performance over time 
(collapsed across conditions Fluency m = 2.14, SD = 0.87). 
Flexibility. Across all Sections, the Implicit condition had the highest 
Flexibility score (m = 1.99, SD = 0.67), and the Control the lowest (m = 1.22, SD = 
0.55), although with a narrow range of only 0.77. Again, all conditions had a 
decrease in performance between Sections 1 - 4, although notably, the Implicit 
condition showed a small numerical score increase in Section 2 (m = 2.24, SD = 
0.71). 
Elaboration. The Implicit condition again had the best performance, with 
the highest Elaboration score (grand m = 1.05, SD = 0.44), followed by the 
Explicit (grand m = .82, SD = 0.65), then Control (grand m = .44 SD = 0.41). 
Interestingly, all conditions had a slight increase in Elaboration score between 
Sections 1 and 2, although Section 4 had the lowest score for all conditions 
(Section 4 collapsed across Conditions m = 0.70, SD = 0.56).  However, overall, 
this indicated an absence of a clear pattern. 
Originality.  Originality scores were generally low (collapsed across all 
factors, m = 0.35), with a range of only 0.21 between the highest (Explicit grand, 




Error Rate36.  Finally, the Implicit condition had the lowest error rate 
(grand m = 15.24%, SD = 15.51). Notably, the Control condition did much worse, 
with an error rate of over 50% for both sections 3 (m = 50.68, SD = 20.40) and 4 
(m = 55.62, SD = 22.34; grand m = 44.50%, SD = 22.42). Similarly to other 
performance measures above, Accuracy became progressively worse with time, 
for all conditions (Section 1 collapsed by Condition m = 18.72, SD = 19.21, 
Section 4 collapsed by Condition m = 35.81, SD = 21.36).  
 
36 If a participant failed to provide any alternative uses for an item, then the Error Rate was 




Table 55. AUT Fluency, Flexibility, Elaboration, Originality, and Error Rate (%), by Section and Instructional Condition 
Instructional 
Condition* 
Section Dependant Variable 
Fluency Flexibility Elaboration Originality Error Rate 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean (%) SD 
Implicit 1 2.64 .81 2.10 .64 1.17 .70 .43 .29 5.81 10.36 
2 2.56 .86 2.24 .71 1.18 .80 .29 .33 13.78 14.33 
3 2.36 .95 1.90 .68 .94 .77 .37 .35 19.06 17.05 
4 2.35 1.18 1.72 .65 .91 .58 .44 .29 22.31 20.31 
Grand mean 2.48 .95 1.99 .67 1.05 .71 .38 .32 15.24 15.51 
Explicit 1 2.56 1.00 2.10 .72 .78 .82 .39 .29 20.24 20.42 
2 2.29 .93 1.96 .80 .91 .61 .39 .30 24.29 16.78 
3 2.28 .78 1.87 .60 .88 .65 .47 .38 26.30 22.75 
4 2.33 .79 1.69 .52 .72 .51 .51 .39 29.49 21.44 
Grand mean 2.37 .88 1.91 .66 .82 .65 .44 .34 25.08 20.35 
Control 1 1.82 .96 1.42 .71 .44 .41 .21 .24 30.11 26.85 
2 1.62 .73 1.37 .52 .54 .53 .26 .34 41.58 20.09 
3 1.44 .62 1.13 .50 .38 .31 .12 .20 50.68 20.40 
4 1.44 .84 .96 .46 .38 .37 .31 .36 55.62 22.34 
Grand mean 1.58 .79 1.22 .55 .44 .41 .23 .29 44.50 22.42 




Frequentist Analysis  
Fluency Data. A mixed 3 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT Fluency data 
(Figure 42); the within-participants factor was Section (1, 2, 3, 4), and the 
between-participants factor was Instructional Condition (Implicit, Explicit, 
Control). There was a main effect with moderate evidence; Fluency was highest 
for Section 1 and Lowest for Section 3, F (3,225) = 4.12, p = .007, 2 = .05, BFinc = 
3.14. Pairwise comparisons revealed Section 1 (m = 2.34, SD = 0.99) was higher 
than Section 3 (m = 2.03, SD = 0.89, p = .016); however, no other differences 
were found (all ps > .07). An effect of Condition was found, with extreme 
evidence, F (1,75) = 13.33, p = <.001, 2 = .26, BFinc = 1889.31. LSD post-hoc 
analysis revealed both the Implicit (m = 2.48, SD = 0.79, p = <.001) and Explicit (m 
= 2.37, SD = 0.73, p = <.001) to have higher Fluency scores than the Control (m = 
1.58, SD = 0.51), although there was no difference between Implicit and Explicit 
Conditions (p = .569). Finally, no reliable interaction was found, F (6,225) = 0.27, 
p = .95, BFinc = 0.02; with strong evidence for the lack of an interaction.  
 
Figure 42. Graph showing Fluency, Section by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard 
error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 




prior to regression analyses.  No clear association was evident, r (78) = .12, p = 
.29, BFinc = 0.24, and evidence to support the null hypothesis was anecdotal. 
Therefore, no regression analyses were calculated.  
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations assessed possible relationships between Fluency and hope 
questionnaire scores at both T1 and T2 prior to any regression analyses (see 
Table 56 below). Fluency was found to be a predictor of T2 SHS (t = 2.75, p = 
.007, R2 =0.09, BF10 = 5.67). SHS score was equal to 27.56 + (2.06 x fluency score), 
see Figure 43. Bayesian analysis yielded moderate evidence to support the 
predictiveness of Fluency on post-intervention state hope. No relationship was 
found between Fluency and T1 questionnaires, or between Fluency and THS 
(including both subscales) at T2 (all rs < .19, all ps > .10, BFinc 0.16 – 0.53). There 
was anecdotal evidence only to support the null hypothesis.   
Table 56. Correlational analyses between questionnaires at T1 and T2, and Fluency 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS Agency Pathway THS 
T1 r .15 .05 .19 .14 
p .20 .22 .66 .10 
T2 r .30* .13 .19 .19 
p .007 .10 .25 .10 





Figure 43. Line graph depicting relationship between SHS scores at T2, and average 
Fluency. 
Flexibility Data. A mixed 3 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT Flexibility 
scores (Figure 44); the within-participants factor was Section (1, 2, 3, 4), and the 
between-participants factor was Condition (Implicit, Explicit, Control). A main 
effect of Section, with extreme evidence, indicates Flexibility was highest for 
Section 1 and Lowest for Section 4, F (3,225) = 13.54, p = <.001, 2 = .15, BFinc = 
394610.41. Pairwise comparisons revealed more Flexibility Section 1 than 
Sections 3 (p = .02) and 4 (p = <.001). Section 2 was also had Flexibility than 
Sections 3 (p = .03) and 4 (p = <.001), with to Section 3 scoring higher on 
Flexibility than Section 4 (p = .043).  
In addition, there was a main effect of Condition, supported by Bayesian-
based extreme evidence, F (1,75) = 20.20, p = <.001, 2 = .35, BFinc = 144394.28. 
LSD post-hoc analysis revealed both the Implicit (p = <.001) and Explicit (p = 
<.001) to have higher Flexibility scores than the Control, although there was no 
difference between Implicit and Explicit Conditions (p = .53). Finally, there was 
no interaction, F (6,225) = 0.54, p = .78, 2 = .01, BFinc = 0.03, with strong 






Figure 44. Graph showing Flexibility, Section by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 
conducted to assess any relationship between Flexibility and GRT engagement 
prior to regression analyses.  No relationship was found, with anecdotal evidence 
in support of the null hypothesis, r (78) = .14, p = .22, BFinc = 0.45; therefore no 
regression analyses were calculated.  
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess any relationships between Flexibility and 
hope questionnaire scores at both T1 and T2, prior to any regression analyses 
(see Table 57). Flexibility predicted T2 SHS (t = 2.22, p = .029, R2 =0.06). SHS score 
was equal to 28.09 + (2.28 x Flexibility score), see Figure 45. However, Bayesian 
analysis indicates only anecdotal evidence to tentatively support this predictive 
relationship was found (BF = 1.48). There were no relationships between 
Flexibility and any T1 questionnaire scores, and no relationship between 
Flexibility and THS (for either sub-scale) at T2 (all rs < .15, all ps > .18); all 
Bayesian evidence was anecdotally in support of the null hypothesis (BFinc = 0.14 





Table 57. Correlational analyses between questionnaires at T1 and T2, and Fluency 
Time Questionnaires 
SHS Agency Pathway THS 
T1 r .08 .02 .15 .10 
p .51 .85 .19 .38 
T2 r .25* .09 .15 .14 
p .03 .46 .18 .22 
* = significant <.05 
 
Figure 45. Line graph depicting relationship between SHS scores at T2, and average 
Flexibility. 
Elaboration Data. A mixed 3 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT 
Elaboration data (Figure 46); the within-participants factor was Section (1, 2, 3, 
4), and the between-participants factor was Condition (Implicit, Explicit, Control). 
There was a main effect of Section, the highest scores for Elaboration in Section 
2 and Lowest in Section 4, F (3,225) = 2.88, p = .04, 2 = .04, BFinc = 0.70. Pairwise 
comparisons revealed more elaboration in Section 2 than Section 4 (p = .024); 
but there were no other differences (all ps > .35). However, Bayesian evidence 




 The main effect of Condition achieved statistical significance, with 
extreme evidence in support, F (1,75) = 11.52, p = <.001, 2 = .24, BFinc = 582.85. 
LSD post-hoc analysis revealed both Implicit (p = <.001) and Explicit (p = .004) 
conditions had higher Elaboration scores than the Control, although there was 
no difference between Implicit and Explicit Conditions (p = .09). Finally, there 
was no interaction, F (6,225) = 0.72, p = .64, BFinc = 0.03, with strong evidence to 
indicate the factors do not interact.  
 
Figure 46. Graph showing Elaboration, Section by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation assessed 
any relationship between Elaboration and GRT engagement prior to regression 
analyses. A simple linear regression was conducted, with GRT engagement 
predicting Elaboration (t = 2.51, p = .01, R2 = 0.07, BFinc = 3.43); Elaboration score 
was equal to 0.51 + (.004 x Word Average); see Figure 47 below. Moderate 
evidence was found to support the predictiveness of participant engagement 





Figure 47. Line graph depicting relationship between Elaboration scores, and GRT word 
average. 
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess any relationships between Elaboration 
and hope questionnaire scores at both T1 and T2. prior to any regression 
analysis. No relationships were found (all rs < .19, all ps > .29, BFinc = 0.14 – 0.24), 
therefore no regression analyses were conducted. Anecdotal evidence in support 
of the null was found for all relationships.   
Originality Data. A mixed 3 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT Originality 
data (Figure 48); the within-participants factor was Section (1, 2, 3, 4), and 
between-participants factor was Condition (Implicit, Explicit, Control). There was 
a main effect of condition, with strong evidence, F (1,75) = 7.32, p = .001, 2 = 
.16, BFinc = 21.83. LSD post-hoc analysis revealed both the Implicit (m = 1.16, p = 
.008) and Explicit conditions (m = 1.21, p = <.001) had higher Originality scores 
than Control (m = 0.44), although there was no difference between Implicit and 
Explicit Conditions (p = .34). There was no effect of Section, F (3,225) = 2.31, p = 
.07, BFinc =0.28, and no interactions achieved statistical significance, F (6,225) = 





Figure 48. Graph showing Originality, Section by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 
conducted to assess any relationship between Originality and GRT engagement 
prior to regression analyses.  There was no relationship, supported by anecdotal 
evidence for the null hypothesis, r (78) = .004, p = .97, BFinc = 1.76. Therefore, no 
regression analyses were calculated.  
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess any relationships between Originality and 
hope questionnaire scores at both T1 and T2, prior to any regression analyse. 
There were no statistically significant associations (all rs < .17, all ps > .13, BFinc = 
0.14 – 0.42), therefore no regression analyses were undertaken. Anecdotal 
evidence in support of the null was found for all correlational analyses.   
Error Rate. A mixed 3 x 4 ANOVA was conducted on AUT Accuracy data 
(Figure 49); the within-participants factor was Section (1, 2, 3, 4), and the 
between-participants factor was Condition (Implicit, Explicit, Control). There was 
a main effect of Section, F (3,225) = 14.86, p = <.001, 2 = .17, BFinc = 1.73, with 
Error Rate lowest for Section 1 and highest for Section 4. Pairwise comparisons 




and Section 2 to be more accurate than Section 4 (p = .006); no other differences 
were found (all ps > .26).  
Similarly, there was a main effect of Condition, F (1,75) = 32.42, p = <.001, 
2 = .46, BFinc = 1.98. LSD post-hoc analysis revealed both the Implicit (p = <.001) 
and Explicit conditions (p = < .001) had higher accuracy scores than the Control, 
and Implicit to be more accurate than the Explicit Condition (p = .01). However, 
as both main effects for Condition and Section only achieved anecdotal evidence, 
these findings should be interpreted cautiously. Finally, there was no interaction, 
F (6,225) = 1.25, p = .28, 2 = .03, BFinc = 0.10. 
 
Figure 49. Graph showing Error Rate, Section by Condition. Error bars indicate ± 1 
standard error of the mean. 
Predictiveness of GRT. A Pearson’s Product Moment correlation was 
conducted to assess any relationship between Error Rate and GRT engagement 
prior to regression analyses. A simple linear regression was conducted, and GRT 
engagement was found to be a predictor of Error Rate (t = 8.73, p = .03, R2 =0.06, 
BFinc = 1.76); Error Rate was equal to 36.16-.12 x Word Average, see Figure 50.  






Figure 50. Line graph depicting relationship between Error Rate, and GRT word average. 
Predictiveness of Questionnaires. A series of Pearson’s Product Moment 
correlations were conducted to assess any relationships between Originality and 
hope questionnaire scores at both T1 and T2, prior to any regression analyse. 
There were no statistically significant associations (all rs < .09, all ps > .43, BFinc = 
0.14 to 0.19); therefore no regression analyses were conducted. A Bayesian 
analysis was consistent with these results, with anecdotal evidence in support of 
the null for all relationships.   
Qualitative Data 
Free-response questionnaire. Participants’ responses to the free 
response questionnaire were analysed using the same methodology as Study 437. 
A top-down content analysis was conducted to address two questions, 1) how do 
participants feel about the GRT task? And 2) what (if any) impact do they think it 
may have on subsequent performance? Importantly, qualitative analysis 
procedures (Braun & Clarke, 2006) recommend acknowledgement of implicit 
bias arising from prior analyses. Thus, while this content analysis was conducted 
 
37 Given the ‘top-down’ analysis, categories found in previous studies (i.e., 1-4) were considered 
and where similarities occurred, identical category names were used. Note: previous categories 




following standardised procedures, findings from Studies 4-5 use of the GRT will 
have influenced (or are highly likely to have influenced) the analysis. On a 
pragmatic level, categories identified in previous analyses do not constrain this 
analysis (i.e., new, previously undefined categories have been used), but where 
similarities have occurred, this has been noted (e.g., via identical category 
names). 
Reflecting on a Goal. Two categories were identified in the responses: 
Positive and Neutral. Overwhelmingly, the majority of codes were identified 
within the Positive category, with three subcategories: 1) Motivational, 2) 
Awareness of Accomplishments, and 3) Effective Reflection. Participants 
particularly emphasised the motivational nature of the GRT in boosting action 
toward current goals. In addition, participants taking time to reflect on a time 
where they have attained a goal, enabled them to ‘feel good’, and reinforce 
belief they are able to achieve their goals. Further, effectiveness of the GRT 
indicates, somewhat self-referentially, that it was considered positive in nature, 
even beyond its ‘natural remit’ (i.e., working toward future attainment).  
The Neutral category highlighted an arguably more balanced reaction 
from participants, with responses indicating both positive and negative aspects 
of goal reflection. Both Implicit and Explicit Instructional Conditions were equally 
represented in each category, suggesting similar experience across both 





Table 58. Examples of each of the Sub-Categories relating to the reflective tasks 
Category Sub-category Example 
Positive Motivational “My mind is opened as i usually move on in 
life after my dreams are achieved. I feel 
motivated after reflecting my own stories to 
myself. I can feel all the struggles I have 
been through, the moments I felt proud, 
afraid, enthusiastic and tired. But in the end 
everything goes in well [SIC]” 
Effective 
Reflection 
“It felt good, I don't think I think about the 
good things enough so it was really nice” 
Awareness of 
accomplishments 
“It was good, provided me with an 
opportunity to reflect on my progress thus 
far, as well as a way to focus on my 
successes as opposed to the failures I may 
have experienced on the way to success” 
Neutral Balanced Reaction “Made me feel nervous and worried 
recalling the problems before the goal but 
very proud thinking about reaching the goal 
itself” 
Impact of GRT. In considering what, if any, impact of the GRT participants 
perceive, two categories emerged: 1) General Behaviour (i.e., beyond the scope 
of the study), and 2) AUT Performance. Of note, very few responses could be 
coded within the General Behaviour category, as participants appeared to focus 
more on potential impact on AUT performance. 
 Regarding General Behaviour, two sub-categories were identified (see 
Table 59). The majority of the codes within the Impactful sub-category were 
from Implicit condition participants, highlighting a general sense of confidence-
building. A smaller number of codes made up the Indifferent sub-category, with 
participants suggesting the GRT lacked lasting impact. However, these codes 




‘theoretical’ benefits of the GRT; this suggested existence of some perceived 
benefit, whether experienced or not. 




Impactful “I do. It builds self belief and takes you through the logical problem 
solving you have previously used in order to repeat this again” 
Indifferent “I don't think it directly will help achieve said goal but it will certainly 
be a motivating factor. In the sense, you'd know that if a certain 
amount of hard work is put into achieving a goal, it will pay off for 
sure” 
For specific impact on AUT performance, one notable subcategory 
(Helpful) was identified, suggesting that the GRT supported AUT performance 
(Table 60). That is, participants discussed how the GRT enabled them to feel 
more creative, and enhance performance (in comparison to not undertaking the 
GRT). Notably, although a small sub-category, this mostly comprised Implicit 
condition responses. 




Helpful “Thinking of my goals was beneficial, I felt pushed to be 
creative and think outside the box” 
Discussion 
 Considering quantitative findings only, there was a decrease in negativity 
following GRT intervention. The GRT condition was also predictive of Trait Hope 
Agency, post-intervention. However, and unexpectedly, no differences in hope 
were seen for any Instructional condition. AUT data showed the behavioural 




(Implicit and Explicit) performing better than Control, although not from each 
other. Further, participants were seen to be more Fluent, Flexible, Elaborative, 
and make fewer errors after completing the GRT. Bayesian evidence supports 
these claims (c.f. Error Rate), with moderate through to extreme evidence to 
indicate the differences between conditions. Support was also evident for 
association between CF (here, measured by AUT performance), and hope, with 
AUT performance predictive of state hope (SHS). In addition, Elaboration was 
predictive of GRT engagement; intuitively, it follows that participants who reflect 
and therefore write more in the GRT may also tend to elaborate more in their 
general behaviour. 
Considered alone, the qualitative findings highlighted the beneficial 
nature of the intervention, generally and regarding AUT performance. 
Participants indicated feelings of more confidence or being encouraged to work 
towards current goals, in addition to general enjoyment of the task.  
 Converging the data strands, the findings provide potential evidence to 
support an ‘undoing effect’ (Fredrickson, 2001) elicited by the GRT, as indicated 
by literature on the BBH (Fredrickson, 2001; see Chapter 1). While no increase in 
hope was seen quantitatively, participants showed a reduction in negativity, and 
increased CF, as shown by improved AUT performance. Thus, we can suggest the 
GRT potentially activated a BBH-style undoing effect, allowing participants 
improve levels/quality of CF, but at a behavioural cost of hope levels; that is, 
putative task-related stress were ‘undone’. Beyond this, these data provide 
additional support for GRT efficacy in improving CF. With the exception of 
Originality measures, experimental participants showed better AUT 
performance, and reported perceived GRT enhancement of AUT performance.  
 However, the interesting relationship between increased CF, GRT 
performance, and hope levels should not be overlooked. Out of the four 
measures that increased, two were associated positively with SHS (i.e., Fluency 
and Flexibility predicted SHS at T2), and two were associated positively with GRT 




Rate). Meaning that these three factors appear to be reliably connected, at least 
within the context of this study.  
GRT: Reviewing the Evidence 
 Considering data from Studies 4-6 collectively, there is converging 
support for GRT efficacy. Evaluating subjective experience, intervention 
participants, particularly those in the Implicit instruction condition, viewed the 
GRT as a positive, beneficial activity overall. Outside quantitative measurement, 
perception of an intervention as positive (i.e., enjoyable) has its own merit, and 
fits within the parameters of PP interventions established in the literature (e.g., 
Niemiec, 2018; Meyers et al, 2012; see Chapter 4).   
 Quantitatively speaking, the GRT improves hope levels effectively, and 
decreases negative affect. For CF specifically, a similar trend was seen as with the 
CST: as complexity demands of the CF task increased, so did GRT impact. That is, 
little to no effect is seen when CF is measured by simple behavioural responses 
(i.e., RT, Accuracy), yet when behavioural responses require more behavioural 
choice and creativity (i.e., Optimality, Fluency), GRT participants outperform 
control participants. However, this relationship does not appear entirely 
straightforward. For example, the GRT increased hope when combined with the 
ACT (Study 5), and although no differences emerged between conditions, these 
increases in hope did predict ACT performance. The potential 
interconnectedness of these factors is discussed further below (see General 
Discussion).  
 The impact of the instructional conditions (i.e., Implicit, Explicit) can also 
be examined in more detail. Despite making no specific predictions, a review of 
the literature (e.g., Latham, Stajkovic, and Locke; 2010; Weis & Speridakos, 2011; 
see Chapter 5/Study 4) suggested that awareness of GRT aims should not hinder 
performance, and might have boosted it. For Studies 4-6, this is clearly not the 
case. No meaningful quantitative differences were seen between Implicit and 




participants in both conditions, although negative categories were more 
prevalent in responses from Explicit participants.  
While no conclusive findings can be drawn, they do emphasise the 
complexity of intervention implementation. A similar conclusion was drawn by 
Crossley (2001) in a review of health intervention literature. Crossley suggested 
that interventions may fail when they challenge typical behaviour, as this 
‘imposes’ a moral value (i.e., the health professional is right, therefore the 
participant is wrong). Put simply, by telling participants what they should do, 
they may become aware that both the opposite is possible, or that their typical 
behaviour falls into the ‘wrong’ category. While addressing this phenomenon is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, it does highlight an interesting future direction 
for PP interventions more generally.  
Chapter Summary 
 Additional evidence supported the effectiveness of GRT interventions, 1) 
in reducing negativity, 2) in GRT performance predicting (Agency), although this 
was not reflected in statistically robust differences. Additionally, experimental 
participants showed improved CF (here, measured by AUT performance), 
compared to controls. Finally, convergence of quantitative and qualitative data 
confirmed the key findings of this chapter.   
 
Chapter 8: Dear Diary: Evaluating A Goal-Oriented Intervention Linked 
with Increased Hope and Cognitive Flexibility 
 The following chapter was originally published in The Journal of 
Personality and Individual Differences (Hodson, MacCallum, Watson & 
Blagrove, 2021). It has been included in full below to preserve the integrity 
of the publication (cf. abstract and reference list; see Declaration of 
Published Work, pg. 16). However, naturally this entails a number of 
differences (i.e., in style, presentation format etc.) attributable to meeting 
the journal’s requirements38. 
The study expands on findings from Studies 4-6, exploring daily 
goal-setting, attainment, and reflection (in adapted GRT format). 
Moreover, this study is consistent with the overarching aims of the thesis 
(i.e., activating the BBH via character strengths interventions, extending 
the operation of BBH to CF, etc.; see Abstract/Aims and Objectives). Most 
importantly, it allows insight into these questions via examination in a 
more naturalistic environment (i.e., not a laboratory). 
An additional section (Supplementary Analysis) has been included at 
the end of this chapter.  The paper included suggestions for future research 
based on exploration of goals and motivations, and what may be gained by 
exploring these concepts. While this was beyond the scope of the original 
article (and constrained by publication requirements etc.), the additional 
analysis provides unique understanding of goal-setting and other goal-
oriented behaviour, not previously covered by Studies 4-6. The centrality of 
goal-setting to the second half of this thesis emphasises the relevance of 
the supplementary analysis here. 
  
 





The Role of Hope 
 Hope can be defined as the ability to successfully achieve one’s 
goals; in particular, by maintaining motivation and overcoming obstacles 
(Snyder et al., 2002; see Callina, Snow, & Murray, 2017 for an overview). 
Here, goals are short-to-long term targets set by an individual, ranging 
widely in their personal significance, importance, and specificity (Rand & 
Cheavens, 2009). Specifically, in Snyder and colleagues’ model, hope 
manifests in two ways; pathways and agency. Agency (or motivation), 
enables an individual to mentalize the ability to reach their desired goal, 
whereas pathways denote the ability to overcome obstacles that might 
prevent goal attainment. While both components contribute to hope, 
Snyder (1994) posits that it is the interaction between them that drives an 
individual’s hopefulness (but cf. Tong, Fredrickson, Chang & Lim, 2010; for 
an alternative perspective). In other words, to demonstrate hope, one 
must be able to plan a route to achieve a goal, and maintain the motivation 
to achieve it, even when the plan needs to be adapted. 
 However, the real-world implications of hope have been explored 
beyond simple goal attainment, to include corollary behavioural effects.  
For example, hope was associated with better workplace engagement 
(Reichard, Avey, Lopez, & Dollwet, 2013), in particular, effective, pro-social, 
behavioural goal-setting. In academic contexts, hope predicts student 
performance (e.g., improved grades, decreased drop-out rates; Snyder et 
al., 2002), with higher levels of hope associated with higher overall 
academic achievement (Ciarrochi, Heaven, & Davies, 2007). In addition, 
hope and religious faith are positively correlated (Sethi & Seligman, 1993); 
people who practiced/engaged with their faith daily demonstrated higher 
levels of hope (Berthold & Ruch, 2014). 
Behavioural benefits of hope extend to physical impact, including 




related activity; Nothwehr, Clark, & Perkins, 2013), and increased athletic 
performance (Curry, Snyder, Cook, Ruby, & Rehm, 1997). Further, higher 
hope levels have been associated with improved levels of mental health, 
including increased happiness and decreased negativity (see Alarcon, 
Bowling, & Khazon, 2013 for a review); increased subjective (Park, 
Peterson, & Seligman, 2004) and psychological (Gallagher & Lopez, 2009) 
well-being have also been reported.  
 A theoretical model through which hope can be explored is the 
Broaden and Build Hypothesis (BBH; Fredrickson, 2001) which accounts for 
the postulated ‘undoing effect’ of positivity (e.g., countering the effects of 
negativity such as narrowing of attention). This suggests the role of positive 
affect is to ‘broaden and build’ individuals’ thought-action repertoires (T-
AR); more simply, boosting the ‘resource bank’ needed to engage with 
one’s environment in novel and creative ways, while continuing to build up 
these available resources. This perspective aims to account for behaviour 
that classical evolutionary theory (e.g., threat-based orientation to 
negative stimuli, fight, flight or freeze responses; Fredrickson, 2001) fails to 
address. Potentially, BBH can be extrapolated to our understanding of 
hope and its applications. In other words, hopeful thinking behaviour is 
intrinsically positive and may lead to positive affect (also vice versa, 
positive affect may lead to increased hope), and arguably, the adaptive 
functions outlined above.  
This adaptive behaviour meshes with more traditional (e.g., 
philosophical, religious) views of hope as a virtue to be cherished (Callina et 
al., 2017; Gallagher, 2017), and earlier psychotherapists’ (e.g., Frank, 1968; 
Tiger, 1979) perspectives on hope as a powerful cognitive resource 
necessary for human development. However, the link between positivity 
and goal-achievement is not restricted to hope or the BBH per se. In fact, 
goal-orientation and responses to achieved/frustrated goal-directed 
actions have been suggested as elicitation mechanisms for human emotion 




etc., Bagozzi & Pieters, 1998).  This provides insight into a potentially 
reciprocal process where affect, intention and motivation influence our 
goal attainment, but the goal-oriented behaviour itself influences our 
subsequent affective behaviour (see Snyder, Feldman, Taylor, Schroeder, & 
Adams, 2000, for a hope-based example). These ideas suggest that there 
exists a complex interrelation between the individual behavioural and 
affective components that characterize hope as a construct.  
Although hope (and more generally, BBH) have been examined in 
relation to goal-directed behaviour and cognition, one domain that 
remains relatively unexplored is cognitive flexibility (CF). This phenomenon, 
broadly understood as thinking creatively and adapting quickly to new 
circumstances can be taken to subsume a number of higher cognitive 
functions; for example, planning, monitoring problem-solving, switching 
between cognitive sets in task performance, and inhibition of no-longer-
relevant strategies. However, the literature on CF- even broadly defined- 
offers mixed evidence for its correlates. For example, Yu and Lee (2017) 
reported a positive association between CF and hopelessness whereas 
Muyan-Yilik and Demir (2019) found a positive association between CF and 
dispositional hope. Additionally, their findings reinforced the idea of a 
connection between hope and subjective wellbeing (SWB), however, none 
was found between CF and SWB. One possible reason for this inconsistency 
may reflect use of a questionnaire to measure CF. While this approach is 
valid and robust (see Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010), by definition, CF entails 
deliberate, highly adaptive and creative thinking which may not be 
consistently captured via self-report questionnaires. In contrast, more 
naturalistic, ecologically-sound measures may increase both insight and 
consistency; fluency tasks (e.g., Alternative Uses Task; Guilford, 
Christensen, Merrifield, & Wilson, 1978) offer effective evaluation of the 
processes involved in CF.  Thus, a fluency task paradigm that uses 
ecological CF (i.e., creative and adaptive thinking) might avoid the potential 




Can Hope Be Increased?  
 If hope plays an important role in improving health, wellbeing and 
potentially, adaptive behaviour (i.e., via extended T-AR; Frederickson, 
2001), then boosting hope within the general population could be 
considered a priority. Indeed, hope theory has been successfully applied in 
therapeutic and clinical settings, delivered by individual- and group-
focused programs (Ciarrochi et al., 2007; Cheavens, Feldman, Gum, 
Michael, & Snyder, 2006). Among other outcomes (e.g., increased self-
esteem, meaning in life), an increase in agency thinking was found.  
Therapeutic techniques may focus on developing agency- and 
pathways-thinking separately, as both traits are highly correlated, but 
distinct (Cheavens & Guter, 2017). For example, pathways can be enhanced 
through goal-mapping activities, where individuals are encouraged to 
evaluate routes to a goal in order to identify the optimal one. In contrast, 
agency interventions focus on developing goal-focused motivation, 
adjusting thought patterns that may cause goal pursuit to falter. These 
interventions also focus on the goal-setting process itself (e.g., assessing 
‘Goldilocks’ just-right goals or ‘stretch’ goals); these challenge the 
individual to develop and increase the likelihood of self-concordant (i.e., 
personally relevant) goals being set (see also Pedrotti, Edwards, & Lopez, 
2008). Such goals are more likely to be achieved, creating a positive 
feedback-loop, with higher levels of agency-and pathways-thinking evident 
(Koestner, Lekes, Powers, & Chicoine, 2002). Thus, we can suggest that 
supporting all facets of goal-directed action (i.e., goal-setting, motivation, 
obstacle-avoidance, attainment-orientation) may positively influence 
overall levels of hope in the individual.  
Methods like those in therapeutic settings have also been applied 
more broadly, indicating their potentially wider remit. In an educational 
context, the Making Hope Happen program (see Pedrotti et al., 2008) 




intervention. Children were guided through various activities (e.g., The 
Hope Game; participants collect both ‘pathway’ and ‘willpower/agency’ 
cards, bolstering the need for both in order to progress) aimed to augment 
trait hope. Similarly, Marques, Lopez, and Pais-Ribeiro (2011) conducted a 
group-based, five-week long intervention designed to develop goal 
conceptualisation, setting, and attainment, which led to post-intervention 
increases in hope.  
One-off sessions have also proved effective; following a 90-minute 
goal-oriented intervention, college students increased in hope and 
progressed better towards goal attainment (Feldman and Dreher, 2012).  
Supporting this design, meta-analysis by Weis and Speridakos (2011) found 
that hope levels improved more with single session interventions in a 
laboratory setting (27 studies were included; seven studies were one-off 
interventions, 19 were multi-sessional).  However, they suggested this 
disparity could be explained by delivery of sustained interventions in 
clinical settings. Thus, typical participants (i.e., from clinical populations) 
may respond less to hope enhancement strategies, regardless of delivery 
method. This suggests a ‘middle ground’, to date, less frequently 
examined; sustained intervention could be delivered to a non-clinical 
population over a comparatively short period (e.g., 7 days), with 
participants engaging in goal-reflective behaviour. In this regard, diary 
studies have proved an effective method for investigating reflection-
related phenomena (Ouweneel, Le Blanc, Schaufeli, & van Wijhe, 2012); 
the diary forms the intervention, allowing a combination of objective, 
validated measures with individually-tailored methodology. This 
intervention type has also been used frequently within the positive 
psychology literature (e.g., Amabile, Barsade, Mueller, & Staw, 2005, 





Purpose of the Current Study 
 Primarily, we aimed to assess a novel goal-oriented intervention for 
increasing hope and subsequently, CF (see predictions below), via a brief, 
self-administered design located between single-session and sustained 
interventions. The intervention consisted of a daily diary task in which 
participants set and reflected on their goals. We used a convergent mixed 
methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018), with quantitative data 
(Phase 1) collected at two time points (i.e., before diary entries and after) 
to examine efficacy of the ‘self-conducted’ intervention (i.e., daily goal 
reflection). These data included hope, affect, and self-efficacy scores, 
alongside performance on a CF/fluency task (the Alternative Uses Task, see 
Measures).  In Phase 2, qualitative data comprised entries from a daily 
open-ended goal reflection diary collected over one week, as well as 
general experiences of using the diary. To establish environmental and 
individual differences in hope, groups identified as having dispositional 
high levels of hope (e.g., spiritual/religious), or in environments found to 
respond well to hope interventions (e.g., office workers, students) were 
recruited (e.g., Ciarrocchi et al., 2008; Ouweneel et al., 2012). Overall, this 
enabled us to: 1) evaluate behaviour beyond the ‘typically-studied’ student 
population, 2) ensure sufficient diversity in age, educational background 
and occupation, and 3) maximize input from groups that have established 
relevance to the literature (e.g., dispositional or interventional relevance). 
In terms of intervention impact on quantitative data, we expected 
an increase across all measures, including questionnaires, and the fluency 
task. In terms of qualitative data, we aimed to explore how participants 
engaged with their goals (i.e., how they reflect on them, whether goals 
elicit particular thoughts and/or affect etc). We also examined participants’ 
overall experience of the intervention, expecting participants to have a 
generally positive experience. Lastly, utilizing the benefits of mixed 
methods design, we investigated emergence of behavioural patterns, 




quantitative measures (e.g., increased hope, positive affect, CF, and/or 
reduced negative affect). In summary, we explored the data for evidence of 
a reciprocal, symbiotic-style association. 
General Method 
 A mixed method design convergent approach was used collecting 
both qualitative and quantitative data concurrently (from the same 
sample) allowing increased understanding (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2018). 
For clarity, the methodology and results are presented in two phases, 
representing the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the study. 
However, their combination is used where appropriate to provide holistic 
perspective.  
Participants 
Forty-four participants (29 Female, 19 Male, Mage = 36.9 years, SD = 
14.4) were recruited by opportunity sampling39. Participants comprised 
three groups; Ordained, Office, Student. The Office and Student groups 
each had 15 participants, the Ordained group had 14. Forty (90%) of the 
participants self-reported English as their first language, two (5%) reporting 
Chinese, and one (2.5%) each for Turkish and Malay respectively. All 
members of the Ordained group were Christian. Further, six of the Office 
workers also identified as Christian. Three of the Student group were 
Christian and Muslim respectively, with one as Buddhist and Hindu. The 
Office and Students groups were recruited through University of Warwick 
Networks, Ordained participants via the Church of England Birmingham 
diocesan clergy bulletin. All participants completed both qualitative and 
quantitative phases of the study. The study was approved by the University 
of Warwick Psychology Department Ethics Committee. Participants 
received £30 upon finishing both phases of the study. 
 





Phase 1: Quantitative Data 
Method 
Measures 
Questionnaires. A battery of six questionnaires was administered, 
divided into two sub-batteries: 1) Hope, 2) Affect and Efficacy40.  In the 
hope sub-battery, state hope was measured using the State Hope Scale 
(SHS; Snyder et al., 1996), which consists of six items, with ratings made on 
an eight-point Likert scale (1 = Definitely false; 8 = Definitely true). Trait 
hope was measured using the Trait Hope scale41 (THS; Snyder et al., 1991), 
with 12 items, and ratings made using an eight-point Likert Scale (1 = 
Definitely false; 8 = Definitely true).  
In the Affect and Efficacy sub-battery, mood was measured using 
the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & 
Tellegen, 1988) which produces both a positive (PP) and negative (PN) 
score. This scale consists of 20 items, with responses made using five-point 
Likert scales (1 = Very slightly, 5 = Extremely). Self-efficacy was measured 
using the General Self-Efficacy Scale (GSE; Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1995), 
which comprised ten items, each measured on a four-point Likert scale (1 = 
Not true at all, 4 = Exactly true).  
Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guilford et al., 1978)42. Participants 
are asked to generate up to six novel uses for each of a set of household 
items (e.g., a sewing needle), within a given time (4 minutes per section). 
The task is separated into four sections, each containing three different 
items. Five measures were taken from participants’ responses: 1) Fluency 
 
40 General Religiosity Scale (Ritter & Preston, 2011) was administered to ensure that the religious emphasis 
placed on group differences was meaningful. As expected, Religiosity was higher for Ordained than both Student 
(p < .001) and Office (p < .001) groups (no differences between Office and Student groups; p = .14). 
41 This is often referred to as the Adult Hope Scale, however, here, it has been labelled as the Trait Hope Scale to 
distinguish it from the State Hope measure. 
42 Reproduction by special permission of the Publisher, Mind Garden, Inc., www.mindgarden.com from the 
Alternate Uses (Guilford's Alternate Uses) by J.P. Guilford, Paul R. Christensen, Philip R. Merrifield, & Robert C. 





(the total number of acceptable responses), 2) Flexibility (the number of 
categories acceptable uses related to), 3) Elaboration (how much 
participants elaborated on their answers), 4) Originality (how original the 
suggested use was compared to the rest of the sample), and 5) Accuracy 
(how many suggested uses were considered acceptable).  
AUT Analysis. Initially, responses were coded by one researcher 
(see Guilford et al., 1978 handbook), however to ensure objectivity and 
consistency, the analysis was reviewed by a second coder (i.e., verify 
accepted/rejected responses). Responses were rejected if they met one of 
the following two conditions; first, if they were a repetition of a previous 
answer in the same part (e.g., A or B) by the same participant (e.g., ‘sewing 
needle’ and ‘fork’ might both be used as jewellery, but if the participant 
had just stated ‘jewellery’ or phrased the use in the same way for both, it 
would be rejected the second time). Second, responses were also rejected 
if the proposed use was infeasible, or did not make sense without further 
explanation. For example, an unacceptable response would be ‘lightbulb- 
start a fire’, however, ‘lightbulb- glass used to focus light and start a fire’ 
would be accepted.  
Fluency was calculated as total acceptable responses for each 
section, with accuracy as total rejected responses. The elaboration score 
was determined based on the detail included in an acceptable response. 
Thus, ‘bedsheet-protect furniture’ would receive no elaboration points, 
whereas ‘bedsheet- protect furniture when painting’ would receive one 
point. Flexibility scores were obtained by summing the different use 
categories for each item. In this case, ‘shoe- used as a plant pot’, ‘shoe- 
used to squash bugs’, and ‘shoe- used as a weapon’ would receive two 
flexibility points; one for decoration, and one for weapon. Finally, 
originality was scored by comparing the frequency of accepted responses 
across the whole participant sample. For example, a use provided by fewer 
than 1% of the sample (in this instance, once) would accrue two points, 





Time One (T1): Before Diary Initiation. The researcher met with 
participants individually in a quiet, private space, or at the participant’s 
home (see Phase 2: Method, for goal-diary procedure). Participants were 
provided with an information sheet detailing the expectations of the study, 
and informed consent and demographic details were collected. Part A of 
the AUT (Guilford et al., 1978) was administered. Participants were 
instructed that they would be presented with some common objects with a 
specified use (e.g., newspaper; used for reading), and that their task was to 
think of up to six alternative uses for each item.  
Each participant was provided with the completed example for 
newspaper above and asked to note that each of the example uses differed 
from each other, and the primary use. Part A comprised two sections (six 
items and eight minutes total).  All items in each section could be 
completed simultaneously, however, participants could not return to their 
responses once the four minutes were complete. Finally, the battery of six 
questionnaires was administered (see Measures: Questionnaires), without 
time limit. Each questionnaire included its own instructions, and the order 
of the questionnaires was randomly allocated prior to participation. 
Time Two (T2): After Diary Completion. The researcher met with 
the participant again, in the same environment as time one, between one 
and two days after the final diary entry (approximately seven days after 
T1). Participants were administered part B of the AUT (Guilford et al., 
1978), and an identical questionnaire battery as at time one. Finally, 
participants responded to two questions about their general experience of 
completing the diary (see Phase 2: Methods below). Participants were 







 Table 61 shows questionnaire scores at T1 and T2. To test for the 
differences in questionnaire responses between T1 and T2, across the 
entire sample and between participant groups, a series of 2x3 
(Questionnaire Time x Group) Mixed ANOVA’s were conducted 43. The 
differences in scores between T1 and T2 for all questionnaire batteries are 
shown in Figure 51. 
Battery 1: Hope. For SHS, responses at T2 were higher than at T1 
for all groups, F (1, 41) = 23.42, p = <.001, 2 = .364, with differences 
between Groups, F (1, 41) = 3.82, p = .030, 2 = .157; no interaction was 
found (p = .240). Post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed the Ordained 
group was higher in state hope than the Student group (p = .009), although 
no other differences were found (all ps = > .159). In comparison, while 
there was difference between Groups for THS, F (1, 41) = 3.75, p = .032, 2 
= .155, no main effect of Time (p = .175) and no interaction (p = .733) was 
found. Similarly, post-hoc pairwise comparisons showed the Ordained 
group to be higher in trait hope than the Student group (p = .012); no 
difference was found between the Office and Ordained groups (p = .518), 
and between Office and Student groups (p = .052). Interestingly, THS sub-
scales suggested more nuanced effects. While no main effect of Time (p = 
.632), Group (p = .179) nor interaction (p = .871) was seen for the Pathways 
sub-scale, a striking contrast was seen with the other subscale. The Agency 
sub-scale demonstrated a main effect of Time, F (1, 41) = 5.93, p = .019, 2 
= .126, with scores higher at T2.  No effect of Group (p = .157), nor an 
interaction (p = .743) achieved significance. 
 
43 Methodologically, a larger sample size would be ideal, however tension between the qualitative and 
quantitative phases limits participant numbers. Effect sizes are reported to substantiate results, and data from 




Battery 2: Affect and Efficacy. Self-efficacy scores at T2 were higher 
than T1, F (1, 41) = 7.37, p = .010, 2 = .152, although no interaction (p = 
.736) or Group differences were found (p = .409). For positivity (PP), 
differences were seen between Groups, F (1, 41) = 4.71, p = .014, 2 = .187; 
post-hoc pairwise comparisons revealed both the Ordained and Office 
groups to be more positive than the Student group (p’s = .008 and .016 
respectively), although the difference between Ordained and Office groups 
was not (p = .770); no main effect of Time (p = .377), or interaction was 
found (p = .164). For negativity (PN), participants were found to be less 
negative at T2 compared to T1, F (1, 41) = 16.54, p = <.001, 2 = .287; no 
interaction (p = .359), or Group main effect was found (p = .229). As a main 
effect of Time was only found for negativity, a paired sample t-test was 
calculated post-hoc to explore the difference in affect change (PN change 
mean = -3.75, PP change mean = 0.73), t (44) = 3.19, p = .003, with a 
medium effect size, d = 0.7544, revealing the reduction in negativity 
between T1 and T2 to be independent from the absence of changes to 
positivity. 
AUT 
To test for the differences in AUT performance between T1 and T2, 
both overall and between participant groups, a series of 2x3 Mixed 
ANOVA’s (AUT Time x Group) were conducted, see Table 62 for AUT scores. 
The differences between T1 and T2 for all AUT outcome measures are 
shown in Figure 52. 
 At T2, Fluency scores were found to be higher than T1 across all 
groups, F (1, 41) = 82.24, P = <.001, 2 = .667. No interaction (p = .834), or 
Group differences was found (p = .090). Across all groups, Flexibility at T2 
was found to be higher than T1, F (1, 41) = 110.23, P = <.001, 2 = .729, 
although no interaction (p = .656), or Group differences were found (p = 
 




.059). A main effect for Time was found for Elaboration, F (1, 41) = 9.99, P = 
.003, 2 = .196; no interaction (p = .493), or Group differences were found 
(p = .152). Similarly, all groups were found to make fewer mistakes at T2 
compared to T1, F (1, 41) = 45.85, P = <.001, 2 = .528, although no 
interaction (p = .109), or group differences were found (p = .478). Finally, 
for Originality no main effect was found for Time (p = .319), Group (p = 
.443), or interaction (p = .418). 
 
 




































Figure 52. Differences in AUT outcome scores between T1 and T2. Error bars indicate ± 1 standard error of the mean. *Typically in the text, Accuracy 
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Note: N= 44; n= 15 Office and Student groups, n=14 Ordained group. State Hope Scale (SHS), Trait Hope Scale (THS; Agency and 




Table 62. Mean AUT scores (Standard Deviation in parenthesis) across T1 and T2, by dependent variable and group 
Group Fluency Flexibility Elaboration Originality Accuracy 

























































































Phase 1 Discussion 
Overall, participants’ scores increased between T1 and T2, indicating an 
effective intervention. Improvement in THS agency scores was notable, 
particularly when compared to trait hope overall, and pathways scores (which 
did not increase). For affect specifically (i.e., PANAS scores), an elevation was 
indicated overall, but this occurred via a decrease in negative affect scores; 
positive scores per se did not increase. Echoing questionnaire data, scores on 
AUT measures (cf. Originality scores) increased between T1 and T2. However, no 
Group x Time interactions were seen for questionnaire or AUT scores. 
Although a general improvement in scores was predicted across all 
measures, in terms of hope, the distinction between state and trait measure 
effects (and thereafter, between pathways and agency effects) suggests separate 
mechanisms may underlie these processes. In particular, the improved agency 
score aligned more with measures such as self-efficacy and state hope 
(consistent with previous literature; see Aspinwall & Leaf, 2002), indicating an 
overall shift in goal-orientation. Furthermore, the divergence between trait sub-
scales reinforces a debate on the conceptualisation of hope (i.e., 
interconnectedness of agency and pathway; see Tong et al, 2010), suggesting a 
potential for more concrete, focused goals to enable pathway thinking. On a 
simplistic level, this is consistent with the nature of undertaking the diary task; 
participants reflected on goals, their attainment and implications. Indeed, it is 
possible that GSE (i.e., improved perception of personal competence; Scholz, 
Gutiérrez Doña, Sud, & Schwarzer, 2002) increases along with agency, indicating 
that the intervention encourages participants towards more self-concordant 
thinking and internal motivation. In turn, this highlights differences between the 
facets of trait hope (see Phase 2 for further discussion in light of qualitative 
findings). 
Examining these results in the light of BBH, tentative evidence of the 
‘undoing effect’ emerges (e.g., countering negative effects; Fredrickson, 2001). 




because negativity decreased), nor 2) behaviourally linked as constructs (i.e., 
validation data has confirmed independence of negative and positive affect in 
the scales; see Watson et al., 1988), completing the diary task may have 
contributed to ‘undoing’ negative affect experienced by participants (e.g., due to 
prior affective state or concurrent life experiences etc.). However, the lack of 
increase in positivity is perplexing, particularly as positivity (and optimism more 
broadly), have been connected with hope previously (see e.g., Gasper, Spencer, 
& Middlewood, 2019; Kelberer, Kraines, & Wells, 2018).  
That said, the posited undoing effect indicates the impact of the 
intervention may be more restorative than preventative. Rather than boosting 
positivity to secure protection against future negativity, the intervention may 
restore affective equilibrium. This appears consistent with the wide-range of 
improved ‘coping’ effects associated with increased hope (e.g., athletic 
performance, stress, physical health; Berg et al., 2008; Curry et al., 1997; 
Nothwehr et al., 2013). Individual differences in the subjective experiences of 
participants may give further insight into these unexpected results (see Phase 2 
below).  
Data from the AUT suggest improved CF in a number of domains; 
specifically, precision of response, elaboration and overall number of responses 
over time, while acknowledging possible training effects, given the short time 
span. This is particularly important to both the CF and BBH literatures, as it 
demonstrates CF in a naturalistic, applied setting (cf. previously used 
questionnaire measures; e.g., Dennis & Vander Wal, 2010), and consolidates 
previous findings (e.g., Muyan-Yilik & Demir, 2019). Additionally, it is possible to 
argue that CF, as a collection of higher cognitive functions (or an overarching 
ability that ‘marshals’ lower cognition), is affected by positivity in a similar way to 





Phase 2: Qualitative data 
Method 
Materials 
Goal Diary. The diary was divided into four sections, and consisted of 
seven prompts, each with a free-response answer (see Table 63 below). The 
diary was in digital format as a secure online form, or a word-processing 
document (if internet access was limited). The diary was completed each 
evening, between 6pm and midnight, and was estimated to take 15 minutes to 
complete. In section 1, participants were asked to think about the goals set for 
that day. Section 2 required participants to set goals for the next day. Finally, 
section 3 was an open section to be utilised by participants to write about 
whatever they wanted.  
Table 63. Prompts and questions to be answered in each daily diary entry 
Q1 Please briefly recap the goals that you had set for yourself today, and if 
you achieved them? 
Q2 Thinking about these goals, describe any plan that you might have used, 
or any obstacles or problems occur that you had to overcome 
Q3 Please reflect on and describe how it feels now to think on what you 
achieved today 
Q4 If you did not reach all of your goals, think about and detail what you 
could have done to change the outcome. If you did achieve everything, 
would you do anything differently? 
Q5 Please detail the goal, or goals you want to achieve tomorrow 
Q6 Why do you want to achieve these goals, and what will it mean to 
achieve them? 
Q7 This is an open section for you to share any thoughts or feelings from 
today. They can relate to the goals you have listed, or anything else that 




End of Diary Questions. At the end of the study (i.e., T2), each participant 
was given two prompts, designed to elicit a response of their overall experience 
after completing the diary. First, participants were asked to write about their 
‘General ideas, thoughts and experience’, and secondly, to consider the following 
questions, ‘Do you think completing the goal diary has had any lasting effects? 
Have any aspects of your behaviour changed?’. Each question was free-response, 
with no limits on word length or time taken. 
Procedure 
Participants received instruction on completing the diary at the end of T1 
(see Phase 1: Procedure above). An example version of the diary was provided, 
and the researcher described each section to the participant, explaining each 
question in detail and responding to queries.  Participants were instructed that 
these goals should be personally relevant. That is, goals did not need to be ‘life-
changing’ and could vary in both significance and number “so long as they mean 
something to you”. The requirement to reflect on goals set on the following day 
was also outlined at this point. Finally, participants were reminded that all seven 
entries should be completed, but that the style of diary interaction within this 
framework was entirely their choice (e.g., number of goals, personal relevance of 
goals, description style). Participants were sent a digital copy of the diary 
immediately after completion of T1, and the same template was used each day.  
Participants were assigned an ID code to input with each entry. They were 
instructed that the diary would take around 15 minutes each day to complete, 
between 6 pm midnight (if possible, at the same time each evening). A reminder 
email was sent each day at 6pm. Participants were provided with contact details 
for the researcher to ask any questions throughout the week of the diary. 
Participants completed all sections on all days, with the exception of part one on 
day one (as no goals had previously been set). Day one of the diary started within 






 All diary data were prepared for analysis by combining entries, and 
anonymising any identifying information; data were then entered into an NVivo 
(QSR International Pty Ltd, 2015) database. Thematic Analysis (TA) was used to 
explore the diaries (Braun & Clarke, 2006); specifically, this is an inductive, 
essentialist TA, extracting sematic themes that describe meaning as reported by 
participants, rather than situating responses within wider context or pre-
established theories. For themes to be classified, codes must occur across the 
whole data set and represent prevalent ideas or experiences. The PI was working 
from a positive psychology perspective and the research and subsequent analysis 
was conducted as part of their PhD. In order to combat any bias, analysis was 
reviewed by the final author to ensure themes were a credible representation of 
codes (i.e., checking initial coding and emergent themes for validity); where 
discrepancies arose, the initial codes were reviewed until an agreement was 
reached. 
Results 
  The most frequent goals were social (e.g., spending time with friends or 
family), followed by work- or academic-related goals. Distribution of goal type 
within each group appeared approximately equivalent, beyond those intuitively 
connected with specific groups (e.g., worship would be expected to be higher for 
the Ordained group than other groups). The research questions of goal reflection 
and subjective experience of the intervention were analysed separately using TA 
and are presented below, followed by a discussion of the Phase 2 findings. 
How Do Participants Reflect on Their Goals? 
 Two overarching themes were identified from the data: Positivity and 
Negativity, each with corresponding sub-themes.  
Positivity. Broadly, the Positivity theme recognised participants’ 




invoked a positive feeling or emotion was strongly evident, albeit often reported 
in a succinct way: 
“It feels good to have achieved these goals” (Ordained, Male, age 35). 
This positivity theme was present across all diaries, with approximately 
consistent representation each day of the diary, and across groups. Four sub-
themes were also identified: Relief, Completeness, Unexpected Bonus, and 
Positive Self. 
In the first sub-theme of Relief, people described the achievement of 
goals as being coupled with release of pressure, often using words that invoked a 
physical release:  
“It had helped my head feel clearer too without all the clutter that often 
feels 'on top' of me” (Ordained, Female, age 51). 
Another distinct sub-theme, was Completeness, where participants 
described achievement of their goals as finalised, or having finished everything 
they planned: 
“It’s always pleasing to get all the jobs done” (Student, Male, age 35). 
Interestingly, items here also described extensive, time-demanding goals 
which might have taken a long time to complete, or that the individual had 
avoided, thereby achieving a sense of completion after delay or procrastination: 
“LinkedIn has been on my to do list for a long time so I got up early to do 
it today and feel happy to have achieved this” (Office, Female, age 44). 
A third sub-theme Unexpected Bonus, identified semi-meta analytical 
reflections on how positive the actual diary was, and how in turn, the diary task 
impacted on the way they thought about their goals, and resulting satisfaction: 
“I recognise that setting myself these goals make me actively pursue 




work because I manage my workload…Clearly, I need to adopt the same 
process when it comes to achieving my overall goal for myself to feel 
healthier and focus on myself some more” (Office, Female, aged 32).   
In addition, via daily reflection, participants were able to recognise that 
they had achieved more than they planned: 
“It feels great to have not only accomplished your tasks but to also have 
‘put out fires’ for other people” (Ordained, Male, age 32). 
These reflections often enabled people to take account of everything 
they completed that day, and how such ‘bonus goals’ added to a sense of 
achievement; note, Unexpected Bonus was mostly (but not exclusively) 
comprised from the Ordained participants: 
“It feels like an especially productive day. It is really satisfying to end the 
day knowing not only that planned goals were met, but lots of additional 
things accomplished too” (Office, Female, age 41). 
Finally, the last sub-theme was Positive Self; specifically, the idea that the 
reflection process allowed participants to recognise their own strengths and 
capabilities: 
“Many of my achievements are focused on my values - empowering 
others, reducing stress in others, enabling self-awareness. So when I 
achieve these things I feel happy” (Office, Male, age 49). 
In addition, the idea of pride was often cited here, with participants 
recognising their goal achievement(s): 
“I feel proud that I finally achieved my goals” (Student, Female, age 22). 
Negativity. While far less common than the Positivity themes above, an 
overarching Negativity theme was also identified, along with three sub-themes: 
Dissatisfaction, Negative Self Reflection, and Guilt. The first, and most substantial 




(or was not) achieved that day. Participants described or reflected 
disappointingly on the balance of what they did achieve: 
“I'm disappointed because I don't think I achieved enough” (Student, 
Female, age 18). 
 Although this theme was represented in all groups, dissatisfaction was 
most commonly identified in the Student group. Further, this sub-theme was 
most common on the first day of the diary and tended to decrease over time. 
 A less frequent, but noteworthy sub-theme was that of Negative Self 
Reflection. People who reflected in this way considered reasons behind personal 
blame for not achieving their goals, expressing ideas such as disappointment: 
“:( [SIC] I am irritated about this because it is something I really want to 
achieve and have done for a while, but when it comes to it, I prioritise 
everything else” (Office, Female, age 27). 
This also extended to ideas of an individual not being good enough as the 
reason for not meeting their goal: 
“what I have done is never good enough” (Office, Female, age 23). 
Finally, Guilt (almost exclusively represented in the Student group) was 
also a common construct identified by participants, with guilty feelings being 
expressed in respect of failure to achieve what they planned: 
“Feeling guilty for not completing my tasks, hoping to try to complete 
them tomorrow” (Student, Female, age 29). 
Notably these ideas of guilt were sometimes accompanied with an 
attempt to nullify the feeling, or motivate a change in behaviour: 
“I'm actually sitting here contemplating whether to go out for a walk now 
in an effort to feel  less guilty” (Office, Female, age 52). 




From the responses to the free-response question at T2 (‘Do you think 
completing the goal diary has had any lasting effects? Have any aspects of your 
behaviour changed?’) two overarching themes were identified: Diary issues, and 
Benefits of reflection, with corresponding sub-themes 
Diary Issues. Comprised of two sub-themes (Mundane Goals and 
Inexperience) a small sample in each group (most frequent in the Office group), 
reflected on finding the diary itself difficult to manage. Specifically, participants 
suggested that the diary became a ‘chore’ as the week progressed, but also 
acknowledged that their engagement with the diary may have been lacking: 
“I started to feel that doing the goals and diary became a chore in itself. In 
hindsight the  goals were probably more tasks” (Office, Female, age 55). 
This emphasizes the highly subjective experience of the diary task, as well 
as the importance of both motivation and volition. This is further evidenced by 
the sub-theme of Mundane Goals; here, participants self-described their goals 
set as ordinary or simple. Not engaging in the reflective elements of the diary 
(due to a perceived problem with the goals) appears to constrain participant 
experience: 
“I have found that the goals I set myself were not always the most 
significant things on paper about my day, but they were the things that 
would likely get overlooked, for example having a rest” (Ordained, 
Female, age 34). 
Further, a related sub-theme of Inexperience highlighted this issue with 
engagement, with participants struggling with goal-setting due to unfamiliarity 
with the concept: 
“It was a new experience for me having to set goals for the next day as I 
am more of a spontaneous person, and my plans change all the time” 




Benefits of Reflection. Formed of three sub-themes (Continued 
Behaviour, Goal Understanding, and Dedicated Time), participants postulated 
positive aspects of the intervention.  An especially prevalent sub-theme 
identified was Continued Behaviour, with participants from all groups discussing 
the merits of continuing with their established practices: 
“Overall this has been a positive experience and one which I can see 
would be useful and beneficial for me to continue” (Ordained, Female, age 
51). 
A second sub-theme (Goal Understanding) identified the benefits of the 
diary structure, and how the procedure allowed participants to be more aware of 
their goal directed behaviour: 
“I looked forward to the time to reflect on the day. The goal setting 
worked for me. The process of writing down the goals - almost felt like a 
contract with myself which I would commit to. This fed my drive to keep 
at it. The goals were not huge but together overtime will have an impact 
on my sense of well being” (Office, Female, age 52). 
The final sub-theme identified was Dedicated Time; people found they 
were able to recognise the benefits of having some time set aside each day: 
“Having that time to reflect has made me think about not just the day but 
the whole situation I am currently in… it has been a really useful half an 
hour each day to sit and quietly reflect and something that I will hope to 
do moving forward” (Student, Male, age 35). 
By allowing some time to think and process their day, it could be 
suggested that participants were able to process their goals in a more 
meaningful way. In particular, an idea emerged that by considering the day 
holistically (i.e., not separating work, personal, social goal and chores), people 
were able to recognise how each thing they achieved contributed to their day, 




“I think that completing the diary has helped me to begin to think more 
carefully about how I am using my time each day, and to what extent 
certain tasks ought to take up my time. I have noticed that I tended to set 
very few 'personal' goals… This has made me start to ask myself when and 
how I might re-balance this aspect of my life” (Ordained, Male, age 49). 
Finally, as part of Dedicated Time, it was also identified that this enabled 
participants to reflect more broadly on their goals and specifically, the way they 
engage with them: 
“I have found the diary helpful as a tool for reflection and for revisiting 
this aspect of my daily life. It has been positive and supportive. I feel it has 
given me the opportunity to  reconsider some ways I work and live” 
(Ordained, Male, age 59). 
Commonality between the Benefits of Reflection sub-themes suggests 
that people found reflective time to be beneficial to their lives, instilling a sense 
of motivation and productivity that allows them to reach their goal(s). 
Discussion: Phase 2 
 Echoing Phase 1, a shift towards more self-concordant, internally-
motivated thinking was demonstrated by participants, providing converging 
support for the effectiveness of the intervention. Overall, participants found 
undertaking the diary task a positive experience, with many expressing an 
intention to continue goal-setting/reflection practice. However, this positive 
experience was not universal, with a small number of participants citing 
restrictions or repetitious design to be an issue. 
The richness of the qualitative data allows for a more nuanced 
understanding of the behaviour on display, and extends the findings of Phase 1. 
For example, we can argue that the subjective importance of participants’ goals 
(e.g., daily chores and obligations) as a means to evaluate ‘success’ emerged, 




to view goal attainment more holistically, recognising positive impact on 
wellbeing (e.g., spending more time focused on things important to them). 
Similarly, a level of critical reflection was also evident, promoting meaningful, 
self-concordant goal- setting in participants and reducing mechanistic checking 
items off a ‘to-do’ list.  However, those for whom the diary task was not positive 
still represented an important voice. Notably, a consistent interpretation of this 
group focused on obligation, as well as the lack of freedom and spontaneity in 
respect of the task, despite the lack of concrete constraints. That said, more 
negative responses (e.g., guilt) still motivated a change in behaviour (or at least, 
thought), suggesting increased goal awareness, and goal-oriented behaviour, 
regardless of subjective experience. 
General Discussion 
 We can affirm quantitative and qualitive support for a successful 
intervention. Our findings are consistent with previous work on positivity 
interventions (e.g., Cheavens et al, 2006). Participants demonstrated increased 
levels of state hope and trait hope agency, decreased negativity, and enhanced 
CF. Subjectively, most participants found the study to be a positive experience, 
and subsequently, demonstrated a substantial shift in goal-oriented thinking. 
Evidence from both study phases converged strongly (see Converging 
Quantitative and Qualitative Data below), giving further insight into efficacy of 
the intervention. However, interesting divergence was also noted. For example, 
no increase in positive affect was seen in Phase 1, despite robust subjective 
experience of task ‘positivity’ in Phase 2. The contrast between objective 
measures and subjective experience underlines how the same phenomenon (i.e., 
positivity) can be expressed. Overall, this highlights the nuanced findings 
characteristic of (and arguably, only attainable via) a mixed methods approach. 
Converging Quantitative and Qualitative Data 
 The use of a convergent mixed methods design (Creswell & Plano Clark, 




for differences between agency and pathway changes whereas the quantitative 
data alone would suggest the intervention did not access the depth of reflection 
typically required for pathway-related hope. Conversely, Phase 2 data 
highlighted increased engagement (e.g., more comprehensive responses) to 
agency-centred questions, indicating a focus on agency (i.e. rather than absence 
of pathway orientation). Intuitively, pathways thinking is more aligned to 
practical aspects of goal attainment (e.g., problem-solving, obstacle avoidance), 
thus, the reflective goal-oriented task may elicit more abstract, agency-based 
constructs (e.g., willpower, self-concordance). Moreover, gaining insight into 
changes of affect also evidences convergence. The ‘undoing effect’ (i.e., 
reduction in negativity; Fredrickson, 2001) suggested by Phase 1 is ostensibly 
different in nature to positive task experience observed in Phase 2. Overall, 
subjective experience of this affect change is interpreted by participants as 
positive, but is manifested behaviourally by a reduction in negativity. 
 In addition, these convergent data are useful as confirmatory measures 
where objective evidence is unavailable; for example, regarding absence of Time 
x Group interactions (see Phase 1: Results). That is, insight into participants’ 
experience of the intervention (i.e., seen via qualitative data) allows fuller 
interpretation of the quantitative data.  Clearly, goals were individual to 
participants, but shifts in goal-oriented thinking were identifiable across all 
groups. Instead, it could be suggested that the act of reflection (i.e., evaluating 
goals and their significance) has similar impact on all participants, regardless of 
pre-intervention individual differences. Overall, these conclusions represent a 
holistic view of participant behaviour and experience, mainly due to the 
methodological approach adopted. 
Study Implications and Future Directions 
 Evidence showed the current intervention to be both robust and 
effective, with increases in CF, state hope, agency, and reduced negativity, as 
well as positive subjective experience of the task.  Although this converges with 




improvements could not be made.  A pertinent future avenue of research could 
consider the implication of age. Age and hope have been examined previously, 
with some debate about their relationship (i.e., limited evidence for negative 
correlation; see Gum, 2017, for a discussion). However, age was not controlled 
here, as participants were recruited based on their occupation (e.g., HE students, 
office workers, ordained clergy), with differences in mean age seen as a 
consequence of group membership. Moreover, we did not anticipate particular 
age-related differences, as participants have responded positively to hope-based 
interventions across the lifespan (e.g., Marques et al., 2011). 
  However, age differences in related phenomena have been found in 
other studies (e.g., optimism; You, Fung, & Isaacowitz, 2009) and we observed 
small qualitative differences in behaviour that were potentially reflective of age. 
Older participants tended to have family- or children-centred goals, whereas a 
focus on friendship typified student responses, and we might still question if the 
content of the goal is important, or simply having a goal is sufficient to influence 
behaviour. Future research might consider controlling for age across participant 
groups or exploring its relationship (or interaction) with this intervention.  
 Future work could also develop the intervention, focusing more closely 
on trait hope. While shorter interventions have been found to be more effective 
(Weis & Speridakos, 2011), hence our methodological choices, an extended 
duration might yield more insight. This is indicated particularly by current 
participants’ desire to continue reflective practices involved in the diary task.  
Agency and pathways aspects of hope are considered iterative and additive (i.e., 
increase in agency leads to increase in pathways, and vice versa; Snyder et al., 
1991), and while this claim is contentious (e.g., Tong et al., 2011) more time may 
have been needed for an increase in pathways to emerge. However, the 
observations (i.e., absence of pathway and positivity changes) may be reflective 
of a wider population’s response to the intervention; thus, controlling for these 
via methodological changes may constrain the richness of the data that has 
proved valuable in this instance. Finally, analysis focused on connecting the two 




the interplay between subjective experience and outcome measures. Moreover, 
qualitative analysis focused specifically on goal type or motivation may allow for 
an understanding of the impact goal content has on behavioural outcomes, or 
indeed, hope. 
Conclusions 
This study showed reliable increases in state hope and trait agency across 
three groups of participants (HE students, office workers, ordained clergy) with 
use of a novel goal-oriented intervention. Further, using a more naturalistic test 
of CF (i.e., the AUT; cf questionnaires/deficit measures) appeared to facilitate 
nuanced understanding of behaviour, especially in the case of CF enhancement. 
Finally, application of a mixed methods approach elicited both objective and 
subjective support for the intervention, in addition to a convergence of findings 
that would not be possible with a single methodological approach.  
Supplementary Analysis 
 As stated above, given the useful exploration of goal-setting practice (i.e., 
specific goals and motivation), an inductive conventional content analysis (CA; 
Hsieh & Shannon, 2005) was conducted. Although this could not be included in 
the original publication (both due to the focused narrative presented, and the 
length of the article), this CA allowed a ‘first step’ into examining goals more 
closely. The intention of its inclusion here is not to provide comprehensive 
review of goal-typology and/or motivation, but instead to capitalise on the rich 
data collected as part of the study. The results are presented below, and their 
interpretation (both within the context of this study specifically, and the wider 
thesis) are discussed in Supplementary Discussion. 
Goals 
 The results of the CA are presented in Table 64 below; examples for any 
sub-categories are presented textually. Several relatively predictable categories 




by students). Work emerged across all three groups, and related mainly to daily 
work-based activities, with a smaller sub-category of Avoiding Work (i.e., goals 
specifically focused on not engaging in work-related activities, e.g., “I want to try 
to forget work and everything going on there once I finish for the day”).  The 
most common category was Social, which centred on friends and family. A small 
sub-category of Social Support was also identified, which was most typically 
associated with Ordained participants (e.g., “be available afterwards for the 
family and friends who will be attending for emotional/spiritual support and give 
every assurance of the life to come and our place with the deceased in the 
Heavenly Kingdom”). 




Social “Spend some quality time with family” 
Work “Provision new laptops and give to staff members” 
Logistics and 
Preparation 
“draw up a schedule for other fitness classes I want to 
enrol on and then book them” 
Academic “Attend all my lectures and seminars, finish up one of my 
end-of-term assignments” 
Worship “To preach and lead to the best of my ability on the day, 
allowing God to speak through me” 
Chores “I want to do the weekly shop and keep in budget” 
Health and 
Exercise 
“I want to do 10,000 steps” 
Rest and 
Relaxation 
“A coffee shop visit as it's my day off” 
Self-
Reflection 
“Be more grateful for what I have” 
 Overall, small, but important differences within categories emerged in 




activities; however, these tended to be focused more on family for the Ordained 
and Office groups (e.g., “I am looking after both of my sons as my wife is busy all 
day. Therefore my goal is to survive the day and keep my boys happy”), and 
friends for the Student group (e.g., “hang with friends”). 
Motivation 
The diary format of this study has resulted in participant responses 
ranging from specific motivations for each goal set, through to a general answer 
which discussed their motivations more broadly. Pre-existing theories and 
research (e.g., Seo, Patall, Henderson, & Steingut, 2018; Werner, Milyavskaya, 
Foxen-Craft, & Koestner, 2016) have discussed motivation at length (i.e., the 
differences between internal/external motivation, self-concordant goals, goals 
motivated via necessity or obligation), therefore using a deductive approach to 
‘fit’ motivations into these pre-existing categories was considered too 
parsimonious in this instance. 
A number of the categories identified were foreseeable, insofar as they 
were specific to a particular group; for example, the category of God and 
Vocation was mostly populated by Ordained participants. This focused on 
motivation for the goal being connected to a relationship with God. The Other 
People category centred on wanting to achieve a goal because of relationship 
with someone else. While this category was identified in all groups, it was most 
frequent in the Ordained group.  
Further, the category Just Because was particularly transparent; some 
goals just ‘needed to be achieved’.  The Deadline category was also 
straightforward according to this evaluative, and comprised motivations around 
goal completion due to external time pressure. However, an interesting sub-
category of Deadline was Previously Avoided (mostly populated from the Student 
group). Here, the deadline only emerged  because a goal had been avoided 
previously (e.g., “The other is something I don't like doing so will hopefully this 




The Present-Self category refers to times where participants were broadly 
motivated by themselves, with a focus on self-care, ranging from broadly positive 
ideation through to more direct self-preservation (e.g., “I just need some time for 
me”). The Proactive category consisted of motivations aimed at solving future 
problems or avoiding obstacles. Although similar to Present-Self category, here, 
the focus of participants was to attend to a goal which did not necessarily need 
to be completed, but did provide a future advantage. Two distinct sub-categories 
emerged from this category. Firstly, we saw Creating Time, which covered 
participants being motivated by freeing up time at a future date (and dedicated 
to more desirable pursuits; e.g., “One will mean I don't need to worry about it on 
Saturday, which will really help me then”) . Secondly,  the sub-category Creating 
Opportunity emerged, which encompassed motivations which would only benefit 
the individual in the future (e.g., “it is very important that I start looking for grad 
schemes to prepare for the end of year, especially as I do not know what I want 
to do afterwards”). Notably, the majority of the Create Opportunity sub-category 
items were from the Student group. 
The Responsibility category was populated by motivations of goal- 
achievement related solely to expectations. Within this, a sub-category of Role 
Fulfilment was identified, which described an idea of achieving a goal because of 
importance to a participant’s job or vocation (e.g., “Meeting families seeking 
baptism is a privilege, a mandatory requirement and an opportunity to serve as 
well as to listen to their faith stories”). Role Fulfilment was identified in all 






Table 65. Categories of Motivation identified, with overall frequency and 
examples 
Goal category Example 
Present self “It will mean I can rest properly, attend to my own 
needs” 
Proactive “To get 'ahead of the game' freeing up some time and 
space on Saturday which often feels overly full of work 
and pressured. This will leave more time to spend with 
the family on Saturday” 
Other people “My sister has been really helpful looking after our little 
one this weekend, so I'd really like to treat her” 
Responsibility “It's an important part of the role - the hospitality and 
welcome and standard offered” 
Deadline “For some of the goals they are strictly tasks that need 
to be done and I've been putting off” 
Just because “Quite a few of them simply have to be done” 
God and 
Vocation 
“Daily devotions is part of my rule of life which grounds 
and balances me. First reading of the scriptures for next 
sermon is exciting and energises me” 
During the analysis, a general pattern was noted across all groups.  
Participants tended to start the diary motivated by other people, deadlines, and 
being proactive (the most populated three categories respectively). However, 
this contrasted to entries at the end of the week where the motivation was 
driven more from the self, being proactive, and other people respectively. Being 
proactive remains consistent throughout the week, but the divergence from 
external, pressured motivations to ones driven by self-care and a sense of agency 
is important in terms of self-concordant thinking. 
Supplementary Discussion  
Considering the categories identified across both CAs above, two initial 




motivations are in line with what we might intuitively expect. Both goals and 
motivations reflect individual circumstances and environments (e.g., the 
differences in Social goals between typically older and younger groups) yet show 
commonality across groups (i.e., the goals are social regardless of context). 
Second, self-concordance appears to increase with goal reflection as the week 
progresses and both goals and motivations for attainment become less focused 
on fulfilling external pressures or perceived compulsions. This is in line with 
previous literature (i.e., Koestner et al, 2002), where increased self-concordance 
of goals is connected with improved goal implementation and attainment. Simply 
put, people set goals that are more important to them, and thus, gain more from 
their achievement. In turn, this process self-perpetuates, as individuals then set 
additional important goals etc. 
 The conclusions from these CA should be treated tentatively as clearly, 
further work is needed (see Chapter 9: General Discussion). That said, an 
interesting pattern can be inferred if we converge all data from this study to gain 
a more holistic perspective. As state hope, trait agency, and CF increase (and 
negativity decreases), goal (and motivations) become more self-concordant. 
Participants become more focused on the impact of their goals and the wider 
meaning for attaining them. Importantly, previous research indicates an increase 
in well-being associated with self-concordant goals (Sheldon & Elliot, 1999). 
Therefore, future research might usefully focus on substantiating any connection 
between objective measures (e.g., THS) and the changes in goals identified here.  
Fitting into the Thesis and Chapter Summary 
  The diary study, considered within the wider context of this thesis, 
provides our final evidence in support of 1) the operation of BBH in relation to 
character strengths, and 2) its extension to CF. Participants completing the GRT 
in both single-session contexts (i.e., Study 6) and the repeated context (i.e., here, 
Study 7), showed improved CF (i.e., via AUT performance; Guildford et al., 1978). 
Moreover, the findings from Chapter 7 serve as further support for the GRT’s 




decrease in negativity. Finally, in this broad spectrum of participants appear to 
enjoy GRT-based activity, consistently finding value in the process of reflection, 
regardless of objective outcome. The broader implications of this research, and 
that presented in the collected empirical chapters  of this thesis are discussed 




Chapter 9: General Discussion 
This thesis sought to address three key questions. First, can the operation 
of BBH (Fredrickson, 2001) extend to character strengths (i.e., beyond general 
positive affect)? In other words, do character strengths enable people to 
broaden and build?  Second, can the operation of BBH extend to include 
Cognitive Flexibility (CF; i.e., rather than lower level cognition)? Third, building on 
these questions, do simple strengths-based interventions (applied generally, and 
hope-specific) impact on performance in CF tasks? Finally, an overarching theme 
has been the use of a Mixed Methods (MM) design, and its pivotal role in gaining 
insight into the findings presented here. Particularly of note, use of this approach 
has highlighted the differences between qualitative and quantitative data 
strands, and the improved holistic perspective enabled by their convergence. 
The extent to which these questions can be answered will be addressed 
below. A brief summary of each study will be presented, followed by a review of 
the methodologies used in this thesis (i.e., MM, interventions, CF paradigms). 
Finally, theoretical implications, and suggestions for future directions based on 
the finding of this research will be presented.  
Summary of Results 
Card Sorting Task (CST): Studies 1-3 
 In this first cluster of studies, the CST was used as a ‘pseudo-intervention’ 
(see Chapter 4) to explore effects on performance in CF paradigms. In Study 1, 
using Navon Task (NT, Navon, 1977) experimental and control conditions were 
quantitatively comparable (i.e., similar RT/Accuracy). Qualitative data highlighted 
a mixed reaction to the CST; while broadly positive, some participants suggested 
the CST was detrimental to NT performance. Considered together, these data 
suggested some CST efficacy in enabling strengths-reflection; however, they also 
highlighted a potential ceiling effect in performance (i.e., NT demand did not 




literature (i.e., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Garland et al., 2010) and presented 
a potential baseline for how we consider CF task demands. 
 Study 2 built on this approach, by engaging participants in a higher CF 
demand paradigm; namely the Adaptive Choice Task (ACT; Irons & Leber, 2015). 
Interestingly, despite higher cognitive demands, the quantitative data were 
similar to Study 1; experimental and control group performance was comparable 
(i.e., similar RT, Accuracy, Optimality). In contrast, the qualitative findings were 
more cohesive, identifying the CST as broadly positive, and potentially motivating 
better ACT performance (cf. quantitative data). These findings (combined with 
Study 1) indicated the potential relevance of CF beyond the cognition required 
perceptuo-attentional tasks. In turn, this facilitated investigation focusing on an 
important aspect of the original BBH studies, i.e., thought-action repertoires 
(TAR; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005).  
 In Study 3, a traditional measure of divergent thinking (e.g., Gilhooly et 
al., 2007) was used; the Alternative Uses Task (AUT; Guildford et al, 1978). In 
contrast to the first two studies, here, quantitative evidence suggested that 
participants assigned to the experimental condition performed better than 
control counterparts. Specifically, experimental participants generated 1) more 
alternative uses with 2) fewer errors, 3) increased elaboration and a 4) wider 
range of categories. Moreover, the qualitative data indicated the CST to be 
beneficial, with an apparent increase in wellbeing and motivation. However, 
participants also reflected on the negative CST category (i.e., Weaknesses), with 
some indication that participants created a self-imposed dichotomy. In other 
words, they considered whatever is not a strength must be a weakness.  
 Considering Studies 1-3 together, two main conclusions were drawn. 
First, the CST lacked specificity, and due to its passive design, this potentially 
impacted on its efficacy. Second, CST-related interventions were able to 
‘activate’ BBH (Fredrickson, 2001), although only when CF demand was high (i.e., 
more than a simple behavioural response was required). At this point, a novel, 
active intervention was designed, 1) to focus on a specific character strength 




Goal Reflection Task (GRT): Studies 4-6 
The Goal-Reflection Task (GRT; see Chapter 5) was used in conjunction 
with the same CF paradigms presented in Studies 1-3 (i.e., NT, ACT, AUT). In 
addition, a second experimental group was added to examine the potential 
impact of participant awareness of the intervention’s purpose (i.e., Implicit or 
Explicit instructions). Moreover, to determine any individual differences-based 
changes (e.g., in state/trait hope) questionnaires were also included pre- and 
post- GRT (e.g., THS; Snyder et al., 1991). 
In Study 4 (i.e., NT; Navon, 1977, see Chapter 5), as with Study 1, no NT 
performance differences were seen between conditions (i.e., similar 
RT/Accuracy). That said, Implicit Instruction participants were more hopeful (i.e., 
increased SHS, THS) after completing the GRT, and both Implicit and Explicit 
Instruction participants had a decrease in negativity (i.e., PN). Further, indirect 
association between GRT and NT performance was recognized (i.e., GRT 
predicted trait hope, and hope, state and trait, predicted NT performance). The 
qualitative data provided further support for GRT efficacy; here most positive 
experience was seen for Implicit Instruction participants.  Much like Study 1, the 
NT allowed an effective baseline for CF performance after completing the GRT to 
be established. Moreover, it also allowed an initial answer to one of the 
overarching questions: BBH cannot be extended to CF when measured by NT 
performance.  
The ACT (Irons & Leber, 2015) was used to assess CF in Study 5, 
highlighting more complex task demands and performance measures (see 
Chapter 6). Behaviourally, no differences were seen between conditions (i.e., 
similar RT, Accuracy, and Optimality). However, GRT efficacy evaluation showed 
consistent improvement in levels of hope (i.e., SHS and THS increases at Time 2), 
as well as reduction in negativity (cf. Explicit Instruction condition).  Increased 
engagement in the GRT (i.e., writing more extensively) also predicted subsequent 
increases in hope (Agency subscale). Overall, in the qualitative data, the GRT was 




Taken together, Studies 4 and 5 (and Studies 1-2) indicate that strengths-
based interventions (or at least, not the ones presented here) have no consistent 
performance effect on CF (i.e., as evident within the NT and ACT paradigms). 
That said, tentative evidence from qualitative and quantitative data strands 
highlighted a predictive relationship between hope and optimality (i.e., in Study 
5, T1 hope predicted optimality, and optimality predicted hope at T2). Plainly, 
more hopeful participants were more optimal, a relationship that was further 
explored in Study 6 (i.e., through creative, divergent thinking).  
The final study of the second series of studies investigates the effect of 
the GRT on AUT (Guildford et al, 1978) performance. Here, participants who 
completed the GRT demonstrated higher levels of CF (i.e., more alternative uses, 
fewer errors, with more elaboration, and more categories of use). In contrast, 
the questionnaire data (cf. Studies 4-5), there were no differences in hope (state 
or trait) between Times 1 and 2.  However, experimental participants had 
reduced negativity (i.e., PN) at Time 2. The qualitative data indicated the GRT 
was a positive experience, with participants identifying the helpful and beneficial 
nature of the GRT generally, and specifically on AUT performance. 
Based on Studies 4-6, the GRT appeared a positive experience for 
experimental participants. Indeed, some participants suggested the activity was 
a practice they might repeat or continue beyond participation. Quantitatively, 
the data demonstrated little impact was seen on less complex CF-demand tasks 
(i.e., NT, ACT), however, GRT participants outperformed their control 
counterparts on higher CF demand, creative/fluency tasks (i.e., AUT). Finally, 
given the improved intervention efficacy of the GRT (i.e., increases on 
hope/affective measures, improvement on CF tasks), the last empirical study 
explored this intervention in a more naturalistic (and applied) setting. 
Goal-Diary: Study 7 
The GRT was adapted into a diary format, to focus on daily goal-oriented 
reflection, as opposed to previously-attained goals. Participants undertook the 




performance were compared pre- and post-intervention. The findings from Study 
7 demonstrated clear improvement in CF (as indicated by AUT performance) 
post-intervention, as well as increases in state hope, trait agency, and reduction 
in negativity. In addition, qualitative data from the study provided more nuanced 
insight into the mechanisms and advantages underlying goal-oriented reflection 
(e.g., enhancing clarity/focus in participants). Considering Studies 4-7 as a group, 
we can reiterate the effectiveness of the GRT as a positivity intervention; 
specifically, it reduced negativity, increased hope, and improved aspects of CF 
performance.  
Answering the Research Questions… (possibly)  
Considering the empirical data above, it is difficult to be entirely 
conclusive in answering the questions posed at the outset. However, that does 
not mean we cannot draw any conclusions.  With our first question- ‘does the 
operation of BBH extend to character strengths?’; for the most part, yes. 
Quantitative data pointed towards enhanced T-AR in studies where this was 
measured (i.e., Studies 3, 6, and 7). Importantly, these data remain consistent 
with the original BBH research (e.g., Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005). However, in 
context, the character strength (quasi-) interventions adopted were either 1) not 
sufficient to impact on subsequent less complex CF tasks, or 2) the increase in 
positivity elicited by these (via character strength ‘induction’) was unable to 
produce the behavioural advantages observed by Fredrickson and Branigan. That 
is, at least as far as lower-level cognition and/or less complex CF (e.g., 
global/local perceptual processing/NT, respectively) is concerned.  
For our second question ‘Can the operation of BBH extend to CF?’, once 
again, the answer is not straightforward. Certainly, evidence suggests BBH and 
more complex CF (i.e., optimality, creativity) share some components (i.e., 
Studies 3, 6, and 7). That said, measures of less behaviourally complex CF (e.g., 
NT RT/accuracy) do not appear to benefit from the inclusion of (potentially) BBH-
activating intervention. The implications of these differences are considered 




 Our final question was ‘do simple strengths-based interventions (whether 
general or specific) impact on CF performance?’ Yes, but again only when CF 
demand is complex. For example, in both CST and GRT interventions, little effect 
was seen on both NT (Navon, 1977; Studies 1 &4) and ACT (Irons & Leber, 2015; 
Studies 2 & 5) performance, but differences between experimental and control 
groups were seen in AUT performance (Guildford et al, 1978; Studies 3, 6, and 7). 
Interestingly, on subjective experiential report alone, intervention participants 
considered this activity a beneficial experience; specifically, GRT participants 
expressed a belief that CF task performance was supported.  
Evaluation of Methodologies  
Mixed Methods and Convergent Data 
As noted above, one of the most important aspects of the thesis to 
emerge a posteriori is the use of Mixed Methods (MM) designs throughout. 
Briefly, MM designs use a mix of qualitative- and quantitative-related techniques 
(e.g., viewpoints, perspectives, data collection and analysis techniques; Johnson 
et al., 2007) in order to obtain optimal understanding of behaviour by data 
strand integration (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017). MM are particularly important 
here, as they allow for the same focus of investigation to be explored from 
different methodological standpoints. The theoretical framework for and 
applications of MM are more comprehensively detailed in Chapter 3; however, 
the key issue here is that the importance of data strand convergence should be 
emphasized.  
 For example, converging the data in all three CST studies (Studies 1-3) 
allowed for inconclusive quantitative data to be interpreted, despite lack of clear 
statistically-significant effects. On a more general level, converging the data from 
Studies 1-3 has also allowed more effective evaluation of the CST.  Whereas a 
‘broad-brush’ evaluation would simply designate this an ineffective ‘intervention’ 
(or quasi-intervention), a MM approach has allowed assessment of participants’ 
subjective experience of the CST. This includes their non-quantitative behaviour 




performance quantification (e.g., RTs and accuracy). This depth of evaluation 
enabled development of subsequent strengths-based interventions and 
subsidiary tasks (e.g., GRT).  
 Beyond impact on the findings, the MM approach has enabled the 
individual to remain ‘central’ to each study. At its core, this thesis has explored 
aspects of classical individual differences, and these can easily be overlooked, 
over-generalized, or worse, deliberately ignored in contrast to numerical 
performance data. Given the focus here is on gaining holistic understanding of 
the effects of character strengths (e.g., here, via the impact of quasi- and full 
interventions), combining the subjective and objective aspects of performance is 
critical.  
Using the GRT as an example, similarly to the CST, it is possible to argue 
the intervention was not effective (or only partially effective). In Study 4, no 
objective differences were observed (i.e., no RT /accuracy differences between 
conditions), however, participants considered the GRT to be a performance aid 
(e.g., “I (think) I performed better. Afterwards, I felt strangely accomplished 
about the whole thing”). Again, participants’ subjective experience of the GRT 
enables closer review of its ‘efficacy’. Here, as participants enjoyed the task and 
expressed positivity in its evaluation, it may have impacted on their overall 
mental state and affect.  Thus, while qualitative findings will not replace 
quantitative ones (or vice versa), there is a level of understanding that is 
arguably reached only by combining both approaches.  
Intervention Issues  
Aside from the technical debate regarding what does/does not comprise 
an ‘intervention’ (see e.g., Meyer et al., 2012; Niemiec, 2018), there are a 
number of issues from the literature that can be examined via the 
methodological choices in this thesis. A neat example of this is encapsulated by 
the two formulations of the GRT (i.e., in Studies 4-6 and Study 7). Studies 4-6 
presented the intervention in a brief format, requiring reflection on a previously-




7 developed this protocol into a week-long format, requiring daily reflection on 
goals set prior to the session in question, and goals set for subsequent ones.  
The debate regarding efficacy of single versus multi-sessional PP 
interventions (Weis and Speridakos; 2011) could be evaluated here in a 
particularly elegant way. Essentially, the two tasks were equivalent; differences 
were mainly attributable to repetition of the GRT. In fact, the results were also 
comparable; both found increases in hope, decreases in negativity, and increases 
in CF.  
The PP intervention debate also extends to sample and ecology (i.e., 
clinical samples versus student samples, laboratory versus ‘natural’ 
environments), reflected in the review by Weis and Speridakos (2011). Thus, is 
our understanding of PP interventions efficacy skewed by methodological 
limitations? While there were no clinical samples in this thesis, the sample 
recruited for Study 7 (i.e., Ordained clergy, Office workers, Students) could be 
seen as particularly diverse.  At a surface level, performance was equivalent 
across all groups, with no evidence of GRT x Group interactions. In addition, the 
GRT was presented in laboratory and naturalistic (e.g., home) environments, and 
was effective in both. Clearly, this comparison does not eradicate Weis and 
Speridakos’ (2011) general concerns around PP interventions. However, it does 
point towards a robust GRT intervention which can have impact independently 
of those factors that can disrupt efficacy (i.e., environment). Moreover, exploring 
application of the GRT to clinical populations (e.g., anxiety) would be an 
interesting extension of the work presented here (see Future Directions below). 
With some serendipity, these data can also speak to a new debate 
regarding intervention personalisation (Ruch et al., 2020). The debate centres on 
how subjective an intervention should be, either focusing on strengths generally, 
or only on a participant’s (identified) signature strength. Importantly, Ruch et al., 
also caution researchers against using ‘wellbeing’ as a default outcome measure, 
suggesting instead a broader focus on impact of strengths-based interventions. 
By only validating strengths-based interventions in terms of improved wellbeing 




current thesis to include acknowledged higher-level cognitive function (i.e., CF), 
the application of PP interventions has also been widened. 
In terms of how the work in this thesis aligns with this debate, again the 
GRT provides useful examples. The GRT is clearly grounded in the classic hope 
literature (e.g., Snyder et al., 1991), but allows for a high degree of subjectivity/ 
personalisation by focusing on goal-attainment as defined by the participant. 
Thus, no emphasis is placed on the personal significance or importance of the 
goal. In contrast, participants are instructed to reflect only on a goal meaningful 
to them, regardless of perceived value (e.g., societally, ethically, etc.,).  
However, this is not to say that intervention personalization does not 
have its limits.  Specifically, while participants’ subjective experience of the 
interventions has been positive, this is not a universal experience. Some have 
found reflection on goals a reminder of a how little they have achieved, or 
comment on the restrictiveness of goal-setting as a task. While this does not 
change the implication of Ruch et al.’s conclusion that further research is needed 
to ‘settle the debate’, divergence in our findings can speak directly to this point. 
It is clear that not every intervention will work for everyone. In fact, arguably one 
of the most important advantages of using such interventions (i.e., that allow for 
experiential divergence) is that they ‘tap into’ individual differences more 
directly. Thus, interventions are that are not enjoyed, or indeed, completed, may 
emerge as a behavioural diversion, and need not be considered further.  
In summary, the work presented in this thesis has made a novel 
contribution to understanding of PP interventions. By using a range of CF 
performance measures, we have demonstrated application of PP interventions 
to more traditional cognitive constructs. Moreover, potential insight has been 
gained into several current debates in the literature (i.e., personalization versus 






Another point of debate is the choice not to use traditional measures of 
CF in this thesis (e.g., WCST; Grant & Berg, 1948. See Chapter 2). The primary 
motivation for this choice was to ‘capture’ CF behaviour as it manifests in 
‘realistic’ cognitive/behavioural environments. In view of the work above, this 
choice was  apt, and the validity of our definition of CF has been supported in 
both pragmatic (i.e., the AUT measured more complex CF) and literature-based 
(i.e., consistent with previous research, e.g., Diamond, 2014; Canas et al., 2003 
etc.,) terms.  
In fact, we could assert these aspects point towards a more pragmatic 
understanding of CF overall, and more specifically, how it can be enhanced via 
intervention.  This enables clearer perspective on the scope of CF behaviour, 
especially, where little performance impact is seen for lower level cognition (i.e., 
RTs/ Accuracy on attentional tasks; e.g., NT, ACT ), and substantial performance 
changes are seen for higher order aspects  (i.e., optimality, creativity, e.g., AUT). 
In the context of this thesis, the ‘realistic’ aspects of CF that were successfully 
enhanced relate only to these higher-level facets.  
However, as yet we have no data to demonstrate how these findings 
would map onto more traditional measures of CF (e.g., CFI; Dennis & Vander 
Wal, 2010). Therefore, a ‘back-filling’ process would make a useful next step for 
this research, either alongside the newly-validated GRT intervention, or other 
more ‘tried and tested’ PP interventions (e.g., The Hope Game; Pedrotti et al., 
2008). It is important to note that limitations of these traditional measures still 
stand (i.e., target sample for the WCST; Grand & Berg, 1948). Indeed, it is not 
controversial to signpost their frequent use with cognitively-impaired 
participants (e.g., Kortte et al., 2002). Therefore, application where CF has been 
enhanced (i.e., rather than viewed in relation to behavioural deficit) would 
provide a clear extension to these traditional measures.  
Finally, use of non-traditional measures of CF (i.e., NT, ACT) has been 




arguments will not be repeated here. That said, their use has allowed for 
potential update of CF conceptualization to be suggested (see Redefining CF 
below); use of CF as an umbrella term may be too broad and as a result, 
complicate matters unnecessarily. Interestingly, the majority of strengths and 
weaknesses attributed to CF paradigms used here were dependent on 
convergence of qualitative and quantitative data. Naturally, this reinforced the 
importance of a MM approach to the findings presented in this thesis. 
Theoretical Implications 
For many theses, there will be more questions that emerge from the 
research than originally envisaged (i.e., in research questions and overarching 
aims). Similarly, for each question that is answered, another will spring up in its 
place. Thus, this section of the general discussion allows an opportunity to 
explore the implications of our findings, relating these to the wider literature, 
and speculating on their potential to contribute further.  
BBH and Character Strengths 
One of the key questions addressed in this chapter is the operation of 
BBH as it applies to Character Strengths, and evidence to support this connection 
has been detailed above (see Summary of Results). In answering this question, 
this empirical work has also provided an important extension to the theoretical 
framework of the BBH. This extension is not entirely novel; in fact, the literature 
holds the assumption that character strengths elicit positive emotions (see 
Güsewell & Ruch, 2012). More specifically, the assumed relationship between 
hope and positive affect is ubiquitous in both textbooks (e.g., The Oxford 
Handbook of Hope; Lopez & Snyder, 2018), and research literature (e.g., Snyder 
et al, 1991; 2002; Bruininks & Howington, 2018; Marques et al, 2011, etc.). The 
evidence presented in this thesis provides robust support for this notion, 





A Triadic Relationship?  
By now, a number of clear findings have been established, speaking 
directly to the original research questions. Take for example, the finding that GRT 
participation effectively increases hope levels and improves complex CF 
performance. On closer inspection, this relationship is not straightforward; while 
the GRT improves CF performance, this is indicated by creativity- and fluency-
style measures only (i.e., AUT Fluency, Flexibility, Elaboration); or T-AR as 
mentioned above (see BBH and Character Strengths). Moreover, the GRT also 
appears to augment positive individual differences (PIDs; e.g., increased 
state/trait hope, decreased negativity; see Studies 4-7 for evidence of both 
points). However, even when CF complexity demand is not substantially 
increased by the CF task (e.g., Study 5; increased PIDs, no impact on RT/accuracy-
based CF performance), hope levels still predict Optimality performance (i.e., a 
CF measure).  Note, Optimality is considered here as a ‘half-way’ measure 
between simple and complex CF. Thus, a consistent, static ‘picture’ is not easy to 
fix; at an intuitive level, however, there appears some interrelation between goal 
reflection, PIDs and complex CF: see Figure 53.  
In the specific context of this thesis then, there is highly tentative 
evidence for form of dynamic and complex triadic relationship between the act 
(and psychological outcomes) of Goal Reflection, task/resources demands that 
draw on more complex forms of CF, and enhanced (or enhancement of) PIDs. 
This allows a speculative and pragmatic extension to the BBH framework 
(Fredrickson, 2001) on which this empirical work is based. By analogy, the act of 
goal reflection per se could also be considered a ‘catalyst’, effectively boosting 





Figure 53. Hypothesised triadic relationship between PID, Complex CF, and the goal 
reflection. 
That said, and less tentatively, there is also evidence to support direct 
relationships between hope and CF. For example, Study 5 demonstrated that 
GRT participation did not affect ACT performance but did increase levels of hope. 
Indeed here, levels of trait hope predicted Optimality scores (i.e., a ‘moderately 
complex’ facet of CF; see above). Certainly, considerable investigation is required 
1) to consolidate the existence of such triadic interrelation, 2) to examine its 
components and mechanisms in more detail, and 3) to explore aspects of 
directionality, causality and equilibrium.  Overall, rather than vague speculation 
of some form of interconnectedness, we need to establish to what extent (if any) 
these three concepts actually interact, and how far we can crystallize their 
psychological definition? However, for subsequent theoretical ideas presented 
below, it is possible to argue that this potential interconnectedness is at least 
conceptually meaningful.  
Distinctions in CF: Adaptive Optimality 
 Reflecting back to the key aims, this thesis focused on exploring the 
impact of BBH (specifically T-AR; Fredrickson, 2001) on higher order cognition- 




adaptively in different environments; see Chapter 2). However, as this thesis 
progressed, it became more apparent, that even within our working definition of 
CF, more than one facet of this construct is evident. More concretely, two 
aspects of CF have potentially been identified, based on the data observed.  
The first is a relatively straightforward variant of CF , where an individual 
is required to respond rapidly to their environment (e.g., a perceptuo-attentional 
task; NT, ACT); here, performance measures are typically restricted to simple 
behaviour  (i.e., RT, Accuracy). Moreover, there is little room for CF performance 
that demonstrates any complexity or creativity. The second form does not 
require the same level of rapid reaction, but instead focuses on the most 
appropriate response to the environment (i.e., optimality). In addition, 
participants need to react to their environment in novel ways (i.e., creativity), 
with a residual element of task efficiency (i.e., fluency). While both constructs fit 
broadly within our definition of CF, their respective behaviours (and potentially 
applications) are quite different. 
Thus, it appears additional terminology may be needed to illustrate any 
inherent processing distinctions (i.e., faster, accurate response to simple 
environmental demands versus slower, more deliberate/divergent thinking). The 
term Adaptive Optimality (AO), capitalizes on the notion of optimality in ACT 
performance measures (i.e., where we start to conceptualize CF as an adaptively 
fitting response to task demands, rather than simply quick, accurate response).  
Naturally, this proposition is entirely speculative, based solely on the data in this 
thesis.  In no way is this intended to replace well-established work that 
comprises the CF literature (e.g., Diamond, 2014; Canas et al., 2003; Yu & Lee, 
2017; Moore & Malinowski, 2009 etc.). Instead, this is an attempt to highlight a 
behavioural distinction within CF phenomena, that may be worthy of further 
exploration. 
For clarity, the construct of AO (based on the behaviour outlined above) 
indicates slower, more deliberate CF, in which an individual is called to problem-
solve, be creative, or behave in a novel, original way. Simultaneously, that 




appropriateness throughout the required processing. This is a narrower range of 
function than that more generally associated with CF (e.g., from task-switching 
to problem-solving and creativity etc.; see Chapter 2). 
In the context of this thesis, the clearest evidence for differential 
conceptualization is in CF performance from the three ‘CF’ paradigms used (e.g., 
NT, ACT and AUT). Taking each in turn, we can also consider differential levels of 
CF resource demand. For example, RT and Accuracy responses in the NT (Navon, 
1977) and ACT (Irons & Leber, 2015) require relatively lower-level, 
straightforward processing, represented with a simple behavioural response (i.e., 
button press).  
However, it is possible to argue that this mask the additional layers of CF 
processing required.  For instance, the NT required participants to track response 
type, while identifying the target letter; the ACT required participants to 
monitor/respond to multiple aspects of environmental stimuli (e.g., colour and 
number). In comparison, the more complex processing needed by the AUT 
(Guildford et al, 1987) and aspects of the ACT (i.e., Optimality; Irons & Leber, 
2015) required participants to not only identity a target, but consider their 
strategy in how the target item is identified (e.g., ‘if there are more blue squares I 
should switch to the red target’) or manipulated (e.g., ‘in what other ways might I 
use this item, or parts of this item?).   
When we look at the effect of the GRT intervention on subsequent CF 
performance, we see little to no impact in more traditional measures of 
performance (i.e., NT RT/Accuracy, ACT RT/Accuracy), despite observing an 
increase in levels of hope and a decrease in negativity. However, when task 
demands more beyond CF in its simplest form (i.e., ACT optimality measures; 
AUT creativity/fluency), performance differences are seen between intervention 
and control groups.  Conversely, where we can infer 1) differential CF resource 
demands, and 2) see resulting group differences in performance, impact of the 
GRT on observational measures (i.e., levels of hope and/or affect) appears to be 
reduced. Thus, we could also suggest this indicates a threshold at which an AO–




task demands increase, this necessitates the individual ‘working smarter, not 
harder’ for successful performance. As shown below (Figures 54 and 55), AO 
would apply to circumstances where this threshold has been reached (i.e., the 
more demanding a task in terms of CF complexity, the larger range of resources 
that are required).  
 
Figure 54. Theoretical depiction of Adaptive Optimality.
  




  Again, this is not an entirely novel idea, but instead ‘brings together’ an 
existing number of theories and ideas. For example, Fredrickson’s (2001) original 
proposition of the BBH was predicated on the idea that it fits a behavioural gap 
that fight or flight response creates (i.e., scenarios without immediate risk, or 
where risk has been processed/evaluated). However here, conceptualization of 
the T-AR is broadened further to refer to a more focused optimality mechanism 
(Figure 55). That is, an individual can use their CF resources in novel, more 
creative, and ultimately, more adaptive ways. For example, new ways of 
interacting with environmental stimuli (i.e., people, objects) may be more 
efficient or yield ‘better’ results. Intuitively, this suggestion makes sense; rapid, 
simple behavioural flexibility is required in situations where the individual is 
under threat (or here, where task/resource demand is low), but slower, more 
purposeful response would represent a clear disadvantage (similar to the ‘fast 
and slow’ systems of thinking described by Kahneman; 2011). However, under 
less immediate pressure, a more elaborative and meaningful response can be 
made with minimal risk. This could also be reflected in the need to inhibit an 
appropriate (but inefficient, or overly-simplistic) behaviour in order to adopt 
more complex CF (e.g., switching target colour in the ACT).   
The concept of AO arguably also incorporates, the BBH-related ‘undoing 
effect’ which has been mentioned previously (e.g., Study 7; see Chapter 2 for a 
review). In brief, the undoing effect (Fredrickson, Mancuso, Branigan & Tugade, 
2011) indicates that positive affect undoes (i.e., counteracts) impact of negative 
affect. Thus, any increase in positivity might not be shown as positive affect per 
se, but as a reduction in negative affect (or negativity, more generally). Here, we 
might argue that any negative affect arises from undertaking the CF task or 
intervention; that is, the tasks are perceived as difficult, stressful, or challenging 
to the participant, due to task demands (and potentially, load on cognitive 
resource). Therefore, any positive affect experienced by participants who 
complete a ‘successful’ PP intervention (e.g., the GRT), may serve as a protective 




In contrast, we see lower CF in control participants, who by design, do not 
benefit from any ‘shielding’ effect of the intervention. Examining this negativity 
in light of the literature, Figure 54 could be adapted as a mirror image, to 
account for impact of negativity or anxiety (Fredrickson et al, 2011). For example, 
Attentional Control Theory (see Eysenck, Debrakshan, Santos & Calvo, 2007) 
suggests the role of anxiety in processing efficacy; specifically, slower processing 
of stimuli while greater effort is required, with this impact increasing as task-
demand increases). That said, while Attentional Control Theory is relevant as an 
analogy to the suggestion above, the thesis has focused on positive affect, so in 
principle, it has minimal theoretical impact here.  
 The idea of AO described above is not intended to be a definitive model, 
but instead theoretical speculation based on these findings. Clearly, extensive 
work would be needed to support these propositions. While AO is grounded in 
previous literature (see Chapter 2) and based on the evidence from this thesis 
(see Studies 5-7), there are some clear directions for future scholarship.  
Redefining CF  
 A final theoretical point is to revisit the definition of CF offered in Chapter 
2: “the capability of an individual to think and behave adaptively in different 
environments” (pg. 57). In light of the AO concept outlined above, coupled with 
the data presented in this thesis, this definition may be too broad. A search of 
the term ‘Cognitive Flexibility’ in the literature database Psychinfo returned 711 
results (2nd August 2020); cursory scanning of these abstracts suggested the 
definition above is commonplace.  Thus, the prevalence of this definition, 
combined with the research presented here suggests a lack of specify lends itself 
to CF acting as an ‘academic crucible’ for any higher-level cognition which cannot 
be readily defined. The point is not to criticize researchers for adopting this term, 
but instead propose a sub-definition for differential CF performance seen in this 
work (see Figure 56).  
 Returning to CF as an umbrella term, we could argue that AO sits as an 




which describes thinking/behaving adaptively to changing environments, instead 
focuses on functioning where resource and task demand is sufficiently high and 
CF sufficiently complex. Of most importance, this individuation/differentiation of 
CF can facilitate more effective evaluation of PP interventions (in turn, enabling 
more focused application), as performance changes  that might be traditionally 
be overlooked can potentially be attributed to  successful impact of the BBH.  
 
Figure 56. Visualization of how AO fits under the CF umbrella, with CF as a continuum. 
Future Directions 
Of course, it is natural to see more questions emerging from a body of 
empirical work, even as we are able to answer those few we set out to explore. 
There are three key areas that spring from our findings, and these fall in line with 
the arguments outlined above. These include 1) resource/demand/ behavioural 
thresholds, 2) goal-related behaviour, and 3) the further extension of BBH and 
the undoing effect.  
Continuing with a MM approach, an innovative data collection method 
might be to ask participants to ‘narrate’ their subjective experience of 
undertaking a CF task. Obviously, by exploring subjective experience during an 
ongoing task (as opposed to after), this would likely impact on the cognitive 




that cannot be gained unless the ‘narration’ of task experience is concurrent (i.e., 
adopting a very focused form of experience sampling; e.g., Scollon et al, 2003). 
Specifically, by using an exploratory design (see Creswell & Plano Clark, 2017), 
we can gain a more rounded understanding of processing, especially where 
mechanisms may not operate above the level of conscious awareness (i.e., Are 
participants aware of their shift towards AO? Do they recognise reaching a 
threshold? Are they aware of an undoing effect?). Moreover, this is in line with 
the suggestions for future research above (i.e., mapping current findings onto 
more traditional examination of the role of CF), and would provide further 
insight into where any thresholds may lie.  
While not a key focus of this thesis, a robust and rich bank of data 
concerning goals and motivations for goal-achievement have been collected, 
which also provide a clear avenue for future research. The brief content analysis 
(see Chapter 8: Supplementary Analysis) conducted on the data from Study 7 is 
an example of how we could extend understanding of this behaviour. For 
example, similar representation of Goal categories across groups suggests a level 
of similarity in daily pursuits, regardless of individual circumstances. However, 
while goal types are similar, individual circumstances impact on how goals are 
described; social goals for Ordained/Office groups tend to relate to family, but 
friends/peers for Students). Here, it appears that goal content has little influence 
on outcomes we might apply to the behavioural/cognitive differences discussed 
above (i.e., increased CF). Simply put, the goal does not matter, but having one 
does.  
Finally, this area of inquiry has potential for clearer understanding of 
specific character strengths (i.e., here, hope). Researchers (e.g., Aspinwall & Leaf, 
2002) have already indicated a need for Snyder et al.’s (1991; 2002) 
conceptualization to be updated, specifically focusing on differences between 
agency and pathway in lay-persons’ understanding (Tong et al., 2010). More 
focused, person-centred analysis (e.g., thematic analysis, phenomenological 
analysis) would allow for goal-oriented behaviour and motivation to be explored 




motivation, and attainment, we might better be able to support others in these 
processes. 
Looking more closely, investigating type of goals set, in addition to 
differences between individuals and circumstances (e.g., occupation, age etc.,), 
would give more transparency to how hope is evidenced within this behaviour 
set. Moreover, criticism (Tong et al., 2010) that pathway phenomena are 
represented less in the wider understanding of hope is consistent with our 
current findings (e.g., Study 7 found changes to trait agency but not to trait 
pathways). By exploring goal reflections, and looking for examples of pathways-
thinking, or indeed examples of active compensation for encountered obstacles, 
we may yield deeper insight into this aspect of hope. Clearly, this is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, nevertheless gaining clearer understanding of goal-related 
behaviour (including firm definition of the phenomena it entails) would add 
important knowledge in this field. 
Final remarks 
 PP interventions are still in their infancy (Ruch et al., 2020), therefore, we 
are in a privileged position that every advancement in the literature furthers 
understanding. The GRT and its application in this work highlights the potential 
impact of a PP intervention; alongside its real-world appeal to a broad audience. 
While by no means conclusive, this thesis provides a useful starting point by 
which the behavioural advantages of character strengths (and specifically, hope) 
can be explored. Finally, the link between character strengths and other 
(previously distinct) aspects of behaviour, such as adaptivity and complex 
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Appendix 2- The State Hope Scale (Snyder et al, 1994). 
 
Read each item carefully. Using the scale shown below, please select the 
number that best describes how you think about yourself right now and put 
that number in the blank before each sentence. Please take a few moments 
to focus on yourself and what is going on in your life at this moment. Once 
you have this “here and now” set, go ahead and answer each item according 
to the following scale: 
     
 
________ 1. If I should find myself in a jam, I could think of many ways 
           to get out of it. 
________ 2. At the present time, I am energetically pursuing my goals. 
________ 3. There are lots of ways around any problem that I am facing 
            now. 
________ 4. Right now, I see myself as being pretty successful. 
________ 5. I can think of many ways to reach my current goals. 
________ 6. At this time, I am meeting the goals that I have set for     





Appendix 3- The Trait Hope Scale (Snyder et al, 1991). 
 
 
Directions: Read each item carefully. Using the scale shown 
below, please select the number that best describes YOU and put 
that number in the blank provided. 
1. = Definitely False 
2. = Mostly False 
3. = Somewhat False 
4. = Slightly False 
5. = Slightly True 
6. = Somewhat True 
7. = Mostly True 
8. = Definitely True 
 
 
___ 1. I can think of many ways to get out of a jam. 
___ 2. I energetically pursue my goals. 
___ 3. I feel tired most of the time. 
___ 4. There are lots of ways around any problem.  
___ 5. I am easily downed in an argument. 
___ 6. I can think of many ways to get the things in life that are 
 important to me. 
___ 7. I worry about my health. 
___ 8. Even when others get discouraged, I know I can find a way 
 to solve the problem. 
___ 9. My past experiences have prepared me well for my future. 
___10. I’ve been pretty successful in life. 
___11. I usually find myself worrying about something. 




Appendix 4- The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (Watson et al, 1998). 
 
 
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then list the number from the scale below next to 
each word. Indicate to what extent you feel this way right now, that is, at the 
present moment OR indicate the extent you have felt this way over the past 
week (circle the instructions you followed when taking this measure) 
 1      2    3    4     5 
Very Slightly or A little    Moderately   Quite a bit    Extremely 
Not at all 
 
__________ 1. Interested 
__________ 2. Distressed 
__________ 3. Excited 
__________ 4. Upset 
__________ 5. Strong 
__________ 6. Guilty 
__________ 7. Scared 
__________ 8. Hostile  
__________ 9. Enthusiastic 
__________ 10. Proud 
__________ 11. Irritable 
 __________ 12. Alert  
__________ 13. Ashamed  
__________ 14. Inspired  
__________ 15. Nervous  
__________ 16. Determined  
__________ 17. Attentive 
 __________ 18. Jittery  
__________ 19. Active  
__________ 20. Afraid
 
